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Abstract 
The Feedback-Related Negativity (FRN) is thought to reflect the dopaminergic 
prediction error signal from the subcortical areas to the ACC (i.e., a bottom-up signal). 
Two studies were conducted in order to test a new model of FRN generation, which 
includes direct modulating influences of medial PFC (i.e., top-down signals) on the ACC 
at the time of the FRN. Study 1 examined the effects of one’s sense of control (top-
down) and of informative cues (bottom-up) on the FRN measures. In Study 2, sense of 
control and instruction-based (top-down) and probability-based expectations (bottom-up) 
were manipulated to test the proposed model. The results suggest that any influences of 
medial PFC on the activity of the ACC that occur in the context of incentive tasks are not 
direct. The FRN was shown to be sensitive to salient stimulus characteristics. The results 
of this dissertation partially support the reinforcement learning theory, in that the FRN is 
a marker for prediction error signal from subcortical areas. However, the pattern of 
results outlined here suggests that prediction errors are based on salient stimulus 
characteristics and are not reward specific.  
A second goal of this dissertation was to examine whether ACC activity, 
measured through the FRN, is altered in individuals at-risk for problem-gambling 
behaviour (PG). Individuals in this group were more sensitive to the valence of the 
outcome in a gambling task compared to not at-risk individuals, suggesting that gambling 
contexts increase the sensitivity of the reward system to valence of the outcome in 
individuals at risk for PG. Furthermore, at-risk participants showed an increased 
sensitivity to reward characteristics and a decreased response to loss outcomes. This 
contrasts with those not at risk whose FRNs were sensitive to losses. As the results did 
ii 
not replicate previous research showing attenuated FRNs in pathological gamblers, it is 
likely that the size and time of the FRN does not change gradually with increasing risk of 
maladaptive behaviour. Instead, changes in ACC activity reflected by the FRN in general 
can be observed only after behaviour becomes clinically maladaptive or through 
comparison between different types of gain/loss outcomes. 
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1 
Top-down and Bottom-up influences on ACC activation: Evaluation of a proposed 
model of the feedback-related negativity 
One of the hallmarks of adaptive behaviour is ability to monitor the environment 
and adjust one’s actions in response to any changes that occur. In humans, such 
behaviour can be described in terms of setting goals and self-regulating to achieve these 
goals. Successful adaptation to change relies on a number of neural networks which 
support basic processes (e.g., sensation and perception of the environment), keep track of 
the individual’s goal (e.g., complete a draft of a dissertation), allow the inhibition of 
interfering desires (e.g., watching TV instead of writing) and re-adjustment of 
expectations and goals when the environment changes (e.g., getting sick for two days and 
not being able to write). Although, humans often have more complex goals compared to 
other organisms (e.g., completing a paper versus obtaining a food pellet), the underlying 
neurocircuits involved in goal-directed behaviour are very similar. One such circuit is the 
mesocorticolimbic dopaminergic pathway, which is often referred to as the reward 
pathway of the brain.  
Reward-related neurocircuitry 
This pathway originates in the dopaminergic cells in the ventral tegmental area, 
projects to the nucleus accumbens (nAcb) and then to the limbic system (see Tobler & 
Kobayashi, 2009 for review), allowing for coding of objective reward value and 
motivational value of the stimulus, respectively. Neurons in the ventral tegmental area 
also project to the prefrontal cortex (Bjorklund & Dunnett, 2007). The prefrontal cortex 
can be further subdivided into medial frontal (including the orbitofrontal cortex) and 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. The medial frontal cortex has been shown to be sensitive 
2 
to the subjective value of the stimulus (Potts, Martin, Burton & Montague, 2006; Kable 
& Glimcher, 2007). The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is not directly involved in the 
processing of reward value but is responsible for executive functions such as integration 
of sensory information and working memory (Goldman-Rakic, 1995), which are used to 
hold current goal information. 
 Additionally, dopaminergic neurons from the ventral tegmental area project to 
the cingulate cortex (Bjorklund & Dunnett, 2007), which receives a number of inputs 
from the limbic system and the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC; Vogt & Pandya, 1987; 
Devinsky et al., 1995) and acts as an interface between the subcortical and cortical 
structures. More specifically, the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) receives projections 
from the ventral tegmental area (Tobler, & Kobayashi, 2009). Additionally, the 
orbitofrontal cortex (Brodamnn’s areas 11, 12) as well as the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex (Brodmann’s areas 9 and 46) have projections to the ACC (Vogt & Pandya, 1987) 
suggesting that the ACC integrates information regarding subjective reward value and 
current goals of the organism. The ACC has also been shown to have efferent 
connections to the prefrontal cortex, which then projects back to the nAcb (from 
Brodmann areas 24 and 25; Devinsky et al., 1995), thus, forming a feedback loop. In 
summary, coding of reward value of a stimulus is divided between subcortical areas for 
the objective value and medial frontal corticies for the subjective value. This information 
is then compared and integrated with the current goals (received from the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex) and projected back with updated information regarding achievement or 
failure of the current goal. Both dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the ACC have been 
shown to contribute to execution of willed actions such that the ACC plays a role in 
3 
response selection and is central to initiation of responses (for a review see Devinsky et 
al., 1995). Consistent with these findings, the ACC has been shown to be sensitive to 
performance monitoring such that its activity changes in response to errors committed or 
negative outcomes in the environment (Miltner, Braun, & Coles, 1997; Carter, Braver, 
Barch, Botvinick, Noll, & Cohen, 1998; Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004). An in-depth 
investigation of pathways between the ACC and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
demonstrated that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex contains mostly excitatory 
projections into the ACC, whereas the ACC utilizes more inhibitory projections (Medalla 
& Barbas, 2009). The authors suggest that these projections are used to supress task-
irrelevant stimuli, increasing the salience of goal-relevant information. Thus, the ACC 
monitors incoming information and suppresses activity after unwanted outcomes. 
Favourable outcomes lead to increased overall activity due to the lack of inhibition 
coming from the ACC. In this fashion, the information regarding the outcomes of goal-
directed behaviour is coded in the system and is updated after each action. Consistent 
with this proposal, the ACC has also been shown to be the generator for a number of 
event-related potential components associated with performance monitoring and error 
detection (for a review see Gehring, Lui, Orr & Carp, 2012), which can be 
conceptualized as markers for unfavourable outcomes of one’s actions. Based on the 
extensive evaluation of research utilizing these components, Holroyd and Coles (2002) 
proposed that the ACC is responsible for “generic” error-processing and the observed 
activity at the scalp occurs in response to changes in dopamine levels in the ACC. 
More specifically, the ACC has been shown to produce a negative deflection at 
the scalp that can be observed when participants are aware of making an error on a 
4 
speeded task, referred to as the error-related negativity (ERN; Dehaene, Posner, & 
Tucker, 1994). The ERN is usually observed in Flanker or Go/NoGo tasks, where 
participants do not need to rely on external feedback to know they have made an error, 
and appears around the time of the response (i.e., peaking shortly following the initiation 
of a button press) indicating that it is a response to recognition that they are about to 
make an error and it’s too late to prevent it. Holroyd and Coles (2002) proposed that this 
component is a marker for reinforcement learning processes utilized by the nervous 
system for evaluation of one’s actions.  
Prior to any event, a prediction is made by the system regarding the outcome of 
the event. The obtained outcome (e.g., an error following a button press) is then 
evaluated relative to the prediction. If the outcome is worse or better than expected a 
“prediction error signal” can be observed in the system. In terms of neurobiological 
mechanisms, the predictions regarding the outcomes are coded in the basal ganglia by the 
activity of dopaminergic neurons. Basal ganglia is a relative large structure in the brain 
containing the ventral tegmental area, ventral striatum and nAcb (Tobler, & Kobayashi, 
2009). In case of a prediction error (e.g., omitted reward) dopaminergic activity in these 
areas will drop at the time of the expected reward (Shultz, 1997). Similarly, 
dopaminergic activity increases in the case of positive prediction error (i.e., attainment of 
a reward). These signals are then conveyed to the ACC and higher cortical areas, leading 
to learning and adaptation of behaviour, and can be observed at the scalp as components 
generated by the ACC (Holroyd & Coles, 2002). Prediction error signals can be initiated 
by the external feedback from the environment (e.g., low grade on a paper) or internal 
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monitoring (e.g., accidentally swearing in a meeting). In both situations, the individual is 
aware that a negative, and unexpected, event has occurred.  
Apart from the ERN, the ACC has also been shown to produce a negative-going 
ERP component in response to external feedback (see Hauser et al., 2014). This negative 
deflection occurs about 200ms after the onset of the feedback stimulus, and is often 
referred to as the feedback-related negativity (FRN) or, due to a similarity in the 
topography with the ERN, feedback ERN (fERN). This component is often observed on 
tasks that require external feedback in order to evaluate performance, such as in 
gambling or learning tasks. In such tasks, the evaluation and generation of the prediction 
error can be observed at a known specific time point as individuals are unable to evaluate 
their performance until feedback is presented. The goal of this dissertation is to propose 
and test a more comprehensive model of generation and modulation of the prediction 
errors, as marked by the FRN. In order to understand the need for an updated model, we 
need to consider the development of theories and progression of research examining the 
sensitivity of the FRN to various stimulus and task characteristics.   
Feedback-Related Negativity 
The FRN was first reported as an independent component in 1997 by Miltner, 
Braun and Coles. Individuals participating in the study were asked to look at a blank 
screen, following a cue, and press a response key when they thought one second has 
elapsed (i.e., a time estimation task). In this task, participants do not know if they’ve 
made an error (i.e., under- or over-estimated the correct time) until feedback is presented. 
Researchers presented feedback in three different modalities and showed that, regardless 
of modality of presentation, the FRN was larger in amplitude following negative 
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feedback (incorrect) compared to positive (correct). Additionally, the dipole analysis 
modeled the ACC as a generator for the FRN. Thus, it seemed that the FRN was a 
marker for negative outcomes or incorrect performance. 
In 2002, Gehring and Willoughby observed a similar component after 
presentation of feedback in a gambling task. Participants were asked to choose between 
two cards, either one of which could be a win or a loss. Again, individuals had no way of 
evaluating their choice until the outcome (i.e., + or – ) was revealed. As in the time 
estimation task, negative feedback (i.e., loss) elicited larger FRN amplitude, when 
compared to positive feedback (i.e., win). At the time of the outcome, the valence of the 
non-chosen card was also revealed. The outcomes were divided into four types: win-
correct (i.e., choosing a winning card when the alternative was a loss), win-error (i.e., 
choosing a winning card when alternative was a win of a larger magnitude), loss-error 
and loss-correct. Interestingly, the FRN was not sensitive to the distinction between 
correct and incorrect choice (i.e., loss-correct and loss-error), but varied only in response 
to the valence of the outcome. As in the previous study, the ACC was also modeled to be 
the generator for the FRN, suggesting that it is not sensitive to degree of failure of task 
goals rather activity of the ACC is modulated by the objective valence of the outcome. 
Using the terms of reinforcement learning theory, unfavourable outcomes generate a 
larger prediction error, which is then projected to the ACC and can be observed as larger 
FRN amplitude. The authors did not directly examine the effects of magnitude on the 
sensitivity of the FRN, so it was unclear if this ‘prediction error signal’ is also sensitive 
to other objective stimulus characteristics. 
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Since 2002, there have been a number of studies examining the characteristics of 
the feedback stimulus that affect the FRN, in an attempt to understand the intricacies of 
its functional significance, and in turn, characteristics that modulate the magnitude of 
prediction errors. Yeung and Sanfey (2004) have used a gambling paradigm similar to 
Gehring and Willoughby (2002) to evaluate the sensitivity of the FRN to the magnitude 
of the outcome (e.g., large win vs. small win). In this study, the FRN did not appear to 
differentiate between the magnitudes of the stimuli but differentiated positive and 
negative outcomes in the expected direction (i.e., losses elicited a larger FRN compared 
to wins). They concluded that the FRN, and in turn the ACC, was sensitive only to the 
positive versus negative distinction of the outcomes (i.e., attainment of/failure to obtain a 
reward). This finding has been replicated a number of times using similar tasks 
(Toyomaki & Murohashi, 2005; Goyer, Woldorff, & Huettel, 2008; Kamarajan, et al., 
2009) and suggests that the FRN is a marker for the occurrence of positive and negative 
prediction errors, regardless of the magnitude of the obtained or omitted reward. 
Hajcak et al. also investigated the sensitivity of the FRN to the magnitude of the 
outcome and reached similar conclusions (Hajcak, Moser, Holroyd & Simons, 2006). 
The FRN was not sensitive to various magnitudes of the outcomes but differentiated only 
between the valence of the stimulus (i.e., win and loss) suggesting that the dopaminergic 
signal codes for objective rewards (wins) and punishments (losses), rather than 
differentiating those based on magnitude of the outcome. To ensure that the FRN was 
sensitive to the outcomes in binary fashion (good vs. bad), the authors conducted a 
second experiment with the same task and included a “nothing gained or lost” feedback 
condition. These outcomes elicited FRNs of similar magnitude to the loss outcomes, 
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suggesting that the ACC was engaging in the binary evaluation of the outcomes coding 
only for achieving or failing to achieve task goals rather than objective magnitude of the 
outcome. 
These results were partially consistent with an earlier paper where similar 
outcomes were used (Holroyd, Larsen, & Cohen, 2004). In this study, participants were 
asked to choose between three ‘balloons’ during three types of conditions across two 
experiments. In the ‘even’ conditions, the balloons could lead to a win of 10 cents, a loss 
of 10 cents, or no change (i.e., zero outcomes; Experiment 1). The second experiment 
contained a ‘win’ condition, where the outcomes were either ‘zero’ (i.e., worst option) or 
a win of 2.5 cents (middle option) or a win of 5 cents (best option). The ‘loss’ condition 
had the same options but in the reverse order (i.e., ‘zero’ was the best and loss of 5 cents 
was the worst outcomes). In the first experiment, the FRN was larger for loss and zero 
compared to win outcomes, suggesting that the system is sensitive to the reward/no-
reward dichotomy. However, in the second experiment, FRN elicited by the ‘zero’ 
outcomes differed depending on the condition (i.e., win or lose), such that larger FRN 
was observed when ‘zero’ was the worst possible outcome (i.e., win condition) compared 
to the best possible outcome (i.e., lose condition). The authors interpreted these results as 
evidence for the context-dependent sensitivity of the FRN to the valence of the outcomes. 
Thus, even in the absence of objective reward, a prediction error signal is still generated 
based on the subjective value of the outcome. In other words, FRN reflects a prediction 
error signal that is based on both, the stimulus characteristics and the task goals (i.e., 
context of the stimulus), and the combination of these factors is reflected in the 
subjective value of the stimulus.  
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Sensitivity of the FRN to the subjective value of the outcome was further 
investigated using a slot-machine task (Donkers, Nieuwenhuis & van Boxtel, 2005). 
Participants were told that on the trials where the three stimuli on the screen are identical 
(e.g., xxx) they will either gain or lose money, depending on the condition. The stimuli 
were presented one at a time and on some trials all three stimuli were different (e.g., xyz) 
while on others the first two were the same (e.g., xxy). The FRN elicited by the 
presentation of the third stimulus was compared across four outcome conditions: gain, 
averted gain, averted loss and loss. The authors found that the FRN to the 3rd stimulus 
was not sensitive to the valence of the outcome per se but rather appeared to differentiate 
between three ‘same’ and three ‘different’ stimuli, i.e., averted versus not-averted 
conditions. More specifically, FRN was largest in amplitude when the preceding two 
stimuli were the same but the third one differed (e.g., xxy). Although this type of 
stimulus led to averted wins or losses, depending on the condition, the FRN was not 
sensitive to this distinction. In a follow up study, the authors examined the possibility 
that the FRN was influenced by the frequency-sensitive N2, often seen in oddball tasks 
(Donkers & van Boxtel, 2005). Participants were asked to engage in a similar task, with 
manipulated frequency of gains/losses and, thus, different probabilities of avoiding each 
one. In order to eliminate any possible effects of the frequency-sensitive N2 at the time 
of the outcome presentation, difference waves between wins and losses were computed 
for each level of probability. It is important to note that the presented stimuli for averted 
gains and losses were objectively the same (i.e., xxy). The meaning of the outcome was 
determined by the condition of the task, or in other words, task instructions. The authors 
found that averted gains elicited larger FRNs compared to averted losses. This finding is 
10 
consistent with previous research showing that the FRN is sensitive to the valence of the 
outcome in a binary fashion (i.e., positive vs. negative). The reinforcement learning 
theory suggests that omitted rewards (i.e., averted gains) produced a larger prediction 
error than omitted punishments (i.e., averted losses), and this difference is then reflected 
in the size of the FRN.  FRN following wins (i.e., gains) was also modulated by the 
probability of the outcome: most unexpected outcomes elicited the largest FRN.  Thus, 
stimulus subjective valence and expectedness (both of which are necessary to formulate a 
prediction) appear to modulate the response of the ACC to presented outcomes.  
One possible confound, as highlighted by Donkers and van Boxtel (2005), that 
arises when examining the relationship between stimulus expectancy and the FRN is the 
frequency of the stimuli presented. Often expectations are manipulated by varying 
probability of an outcome, which necessitates unequal frequency of outcomes with 
different valence. A frequency-sensitive N2 component, which is a negative deflection in 
the waveform, was shown to be larger for infrequent events compared to frequent ones 
(for a review of N2/ERN/FRN see Gehring et al., 2012) and occur at a time similar to the 
FRN (suggesting the FRN is an N2 in a specific context). Thus, it is possible that effects 
of expectations on the FRN can be confounded with the effects of stimulus frequency on 
the N2. For example, Cohen, Elger and Ranganath (2007) examined the effects of 
expectations on the FRN by presenting participants with a gambling paradigm (choose 
between two cards), where probability of the reward (25%, 50% or 75% reward) was 
varied between blocks. This probability manipulation was unbeknownst  to the 
participants, and only had an effect on the FRN elicited by wins, such that FRN 
amplitude was less negative (or more positive) as wins became more unexpected (i.e., 
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25%>50%>75%). These results are similar to those observed by Donkers et al. (2005) 
such that only FRN following wins was affected by probability manipulation. It should 
be noted that Cohen et al. (2007) did not control for the possible effects of frequency-
sensitivity of the N2 as probability was manipulated by changing the frequency of the 
outcomes. However the consistency of these results with those presented by Donkers et 
al. (2005), who did control for frequency N2 effects at the time of the FRN, suggests that 
any effects of the frequency-sensitivity of the N2 at the time of the FRN do not 
significantly impact on the FRN amplitude. Furthermore, FRNs observed to near-wins in 
another study using a slot machine task were larger than those elicited by the wins and 
smaller than those observed after complete losses (Luo, Wang, & Qu, 2011). In this slot-
machine study, all of the outcomes had equal frequencies (i.e., no frequency effects), 
thus, supporting the hypothesis that frequency-sensitivity of the N2 has minimal impact 
on the FRN. Finally, similar to Donkers et al. (2005), probability effects observed by the 
Cohen and colleagues (2007) were present only on the gain trials. Thus, it is possible that 
positive outcomes are treated differently by the system compared to negatively valenced 
stimuli.  
Effects of Expectation of Outcome on the FRN.  
The influence of expectations on the FRN sensitivity was further examined by 
Bellebaum and Daum (2008) in a learning paradigm. Participants’ progress could be 
measured while they were learning that the stimuli had different probabilities of winning. 
Thus, in the first half of the FRN elicited by the presentation of the outcome was largest 
in amplitude for unexpected negative outcomes compared to expected or positive 
outcomes. Unlike in the previously described studies (Donkers et al., 2005; Cohen et al., 
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2007), in this task, when participants are still learning the rules, no expectations were 
present. In the second half of the task, once the rules were learned, participants’ 
expectations could be predicted. The FRN following wins did not differentiate between 
outcomes of different probabilities. Kobza and colleagues (2011) also investigated the 
sensitivity of the FRN to the probability of the outcome in a learning paradigm. The FRN 
was found to differentiate between wins and losses only in low-probability conditions 
and only in those participants that learned the rules of the task. There were no 
interactions with probability in non-learners. Thus, although the FRN seems to be 
sensitive to the frequency/probability of the outcome, it is still unclear why these effects 
are observed only for one type of outcome valence (i.e., either reward or non-reward). 
Nevertheless, both studies illustrate that learning is necessary for these effects to occur, 
suggesting that probability of the outcome affects participant’s expectations, which then 
modulate the FRN. 
The necessity of expectation development for FRN modulation was further 
demonstrated by Bismark et al. (2013) by examining the effects of the time of the 
feedback presentation and the active/passive involvement of participants in the task. In 
one of the three versions of a gambling paradigm, participants chose a ‘balloon’ and were 
shown a white square around it, which allowed time for expectations to develop (self-
choice). In the other versions of the task, participants were shown the same screen but the 
choice was made by a computer. They were then shown either the same white square 
(observer-delay) or immediately given feedback (observer-immediate). Expected FRN-
valence effects (i.e., larger FRN after losses) were observed in the self-choice condition 
and observer-delay conditions. There were no significant FRN-valence effects in the 
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observer-immediate condition. The authors concluded that time to develop expectations 
is necessary for any FRN effects, suggesting that expectations are the driving force 
behind the sensitivy of the FRN to the valence of the outcome. This interpretation is 
consistent with the reinforcement learning theory, as expectations are necessary for 
formation of prediction errors, which in turn are necessary for modulation of the FRN.  
Thus, it appears that the ACC seems to evaluate outcomes with respect to one’s 
expectations rather than subjective or objective valence of the stimulus.  
Importance of Expectations over Stimulus Value.  
This distinction is supported by the results of Gu, Wu, Jiang and Luo (2011), who 
used a classical two-choice gambling paradigm to examine the sensitivity of the FRN to 
the alternative outcomes. As in other gambling tasks, participants were asked to guess 
which of the two presented cards was a winning card. Unlike in other studies, the valence 
of the alternative card (i.e., not chosen card) was presented first, followed by the valence 
of the chosen card. The FRN observed after the outcome on the chosen card showed the 
expected pattern, such that losses elicited larger FRN compared to wins. The FRN was 
also sensitive to the distinction between valence of the alternative card, but not in the 
expected direction (i.e., larger FRN after losses than wins). Alternative outcomes of 
positive valence (i.e., wins) elicited larger FRN when compared to negatively valenced 
(i.e., loss) alternative outcomes. This finding further illustrates the lack of sensitivity of 
the FRN to the objective valence of the stimulus. The authors also note that although the 
valence of the alternative and chosen cards were independent, participants might have 
assumed that positive alternative card decreases their chances of winning on the chosen 
card. Consistent with this assumption, the largest FRN was observed when losses on the 
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chosen card were presented after a negatively valenced alternative card (i.e., unexpected 
losses). Thus, participants formed expectations based on the alternative outcome and the 
size of FRN reflected the degree of violation of these expectations (i.e., a prediction 
error). 
Expectations of Value and the FRN.  
The effects of expected value of the outcome on the FRN were also investigated 
by San Martin and colleagues (2010). The authors presented participants with four 
possible choices, which were coded based on their magnitude and probability of winning, 
resulting in four stimuli: small size/low probability, small size/high probability, large 
size/low probability and large size/high probability. These combinations of stimuli 
allowed the authors to have comparisons between stimuli of different expected value. 
Participants had to guess which response button would lead to the best choice and were 
aware of both the size and probability of the outcome. Losses produced a larger FRN in 
general and were not differentiated based on probability or magnitude, consistent with 
previous research (Donkers et al., 2005; Cohen et al., 2007). However, win outcomes 
elicited significantly larger FRN on the trials with low expected value (i.e., low 
probability/low magnitude outcomes). The authors concluded that both of these 
characteristics affect the expected value of the reward, which is reflected in the ACC 
activity. As in previous research (Donkers et al., 2005; Cohen et al., 2007; Kobza et al., 
2011), the pattern of FRN sensitivity for positive and negative outcomes was not the 
same. Taken together the results of these studies suggest that stimulus characteristics for 
rewards and non-rewards (e.g., magnitude, probability) are processed separately by the 
reward network.  
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In fact, support for this was shown by Holroyd, Pakzad-Vaezi and Krigolson 
(2008), who demonstrated that rewards elicit a positive deflection at the time of the FRN 
(i.e., reward positivity).1 Holroyd et al. (2008) have proposed that valence effects 
observed in the FRN are driven by a reward positivity occurring after correct/positive 
feedback, which modulates the negative deflection (i.e., N2) occurring in response to 
task-relevant events. Thus, negative feedback does not elicit larger N2 response 
compared to positive feedback, but rather positive feedback is followed by a positivity 
that decreases the N2 response. This positivity was shown to occur in response to events 
of positive valence (Holroyd et al., 2008), unexpected rewards (Holroyd, Krigolson, & 
Lee, 2011) and to be sensitive to the magnitude of the reward (Kreussel et al., 2012). 
Lole et al. (2013) investigated this distinction further by conducting a spatial principal 
component analysis (PCA) on the waveforms obtained during an electronic gaming 
machine task. Participants were asked to bet either a large or a small amount of money 
on each trial and won when all four presented pictures were exactly the same. The 
outcomes were separated into three bins: wins, near misses (i.e., three out of four pictures 
were the same) and losses. Spatial PCA analysis revealed two waveforms at the time of 
the FRN: a negative deflection after loss outcomes and a positive deflection after wins. 
This positive deflection was also sensitive to the magnitude of the outcome, such that 
larger reward magnitudes elicited a greater positivity compared to smaller ones. Thus, the 
FRN seems to be a combination of two separate events. A negativity that occurs 
following non-rewards and punishments, that is further modulated by unexpectedness of 
an event, and a positivity that occurs after reward and is also modulated by the 
                                                           
1
  Normally, of course, it is not possible to differentiate positive deflections due to reward from negative 
deflections due to losses/punishment when comparing the two types of outcomes. 
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expectedness (Holroyd et al., 2011) of the event as well as its magnitude (Lole et al., 
2013). 
These findings are consistent with the reinforcement learning theory proposed by 
Holroyd and Coles (2002) such that rewards and punishments lead to opposing activity 
of the ACC, which is reflected as positivity (after rewards) and negativity (after 
punishments) at the time of the FRN. After a review of the literature examining the ERN 
and the FRN, they suggest that these components reflect the dopaminergic activity in the 
subcortical structures (e.g., nAcb) which is projected to the ACC. Combined with the 
works of Shultz (2007), who examined the responses of the nAcb to rewards and 
punishments in rats, this theory would suggest that FRN reflects a prediction error that is 
coded in the nAcb. These neurons respond to rewards and omitted rewards by generating 
a prediction error signal for each type of the outcome, such that reward leads to an 
increase in dopamine levels, which further increase if the reward was unexpected. Losses 
or omitted reward, on the other hand, lead to a drop in dopamine levels, which is even 
greater when these events are unexpected (see Figure 1.0). 
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Figure 1.0. Schematic representation of the reinforcement learning theory of FRN 
generation. 
The Role of Top-Down Factors 
The review of the literature suggests that the FRN is a marker of prediction errors 
which are coded in the subcortical areas (i.e., basal ganglia) and projected to the ACC. 
Under certain task conditions, these prediction errors can be dissociated and shown to 
have differential activation for rewards and omitted rewards, which can be further 
modulated by salient stimulus characteristics (e.g., magnitude). These conclusions are in 
line with the reinforcement learning theory, which specifies that a prediction error signal 
is coded in the subcortical areas and projected to the ACC. Previous research has also 
shown that objectively identical stimuli can elicit differential ACC activation depending 
on the instructions given (Holroyd et al., 2004). There was no competition between the 
identical stimuli as the valence of these stimuli was blocked within condition, ensuring 
that the valence marker for the stimulus can be easily coded in the subcortical areas (i.e., 
information was simple and did not require a choice between cognitive interpretations). 
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Calculation of prediction errors 
FRN 
ACC 
Loss negativity or Reward Positivity 
Dopaminergic response 
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However, previous research has also shown that more complex constructs such as one’s 
sense of responsibility over the outcome (Li et al., 2010), trustworthiness of the partner 
in the game (Long, Jiang, & Zhou, 2012), personality (Santesso & Segalowitz, 2009; 
Segalowitz & Dywan, 2009; Santesso, Dzyundzyak, & Segalowitz, 2011) and cognitive 
reappraisal (Yang, Gu, Tang, & Luo, 2013) modulate FRN amplitude. Such complex 
cognitive constructs rely on the activation of larger cortical networks in order to integrate 
the information successfully and adjust one’s interactions and response to the stimuli in 
the environment. Thus, it is likely that these networks heavily rely on the cortical areas, 
and more specifically the prefrontal cortex, given its sensitivity to rewards (for review 
O’Doherty & Dolan, 2006). Given the reciprocal connections of the ACC with the 
prefrontal cortex (Vogt & Pandya, 1987; Devinsky et al., 1995), it is then plausible to 
assume that goals, subjective value and expectations are integrated in higher cortical 
areas and then relayed to the ACC via top-down projections. This information is then 
used to modulate one’s response to the outcomes in the environment by affecting the 
interpretation or salience of the stimulus. This model was proposed in order to explain 
the results of my Master’s thesis, where unexpected FRN patterns were observed.  
Master’s thesis data 
One of the goals of my Master’s study was to examine if FRN is sensitive to 
valence and magnitude of the stimulus in various contexts. One way of changing the 
salience of the stimulus through instructions is by giving participants a higher level of 
control over the outcome. Most studies investigating FRN sensitivity to stimulus 
characteristics use variations of gambling paradigms, where participants are guessing 
which choice to make in order to win. In order to address the research question, the FRN 
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was examined in three task contexts: to the outcomes in a standard two-card gambling 
task; to cues that give the subject valence information (i.e., potential win or loss) 
concerning the current trial in a speeded-response task; and to the outcome feedback in 
the speeded response task. In the gambling task, participants had to choose between two 
cards of different magnitude. Once the choice was made, the outcome (+ or –) was 
revealed. In the Monetary Incentive Delay (MID) task providing the latter of the two 
contexts, participants were first presented with a cue labelling the trial as either a win or 
a loss of small or large magnitude. In order to win, participants had to press a response 
button while the target stimulus was one the screen. There were four types of outcomes 
in this task, depending on the preceding cue: win, missing a win, avoiding a loss, loss. 
We compared the FRNs elicited by the outcomes in both tasks as well as the FRN-like 
component observed after the cue (referred to as cue-FRN from now on).  
The Cue-FRN was sensitive to the valence of the cues, such that cues signifying 
potential losses elicited a larger cue-FRN amplitude when compared to potential win 
cues. This finding is consistent with the reinforcement learning theory, if we assume that 
prediction errors are generated any time a stimulus has valence (i.e., regardless of 
whether it is an outcome of an action). On the other hand, this activity can be in response 
to the salience of the stimulus – potential losses are more arousing and signify the 
potential need for more resources in the upcoming trial. In fact, Talmi and colleagues 
(2013) argue that FRN is a reflection of salience of prediction errors rather than the 
rewarding nature of the error. However, the results of their study cannot be used to 
differentiate between these two possibilities. 
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More interestingly, the outcomes in the two tasks elicited different patterns of the 
FRN.  In both tasks, losses elicited an FRN of equal size that was larger in amplitude 
than that observed after wins on the gambling task. Surprisingly, wins in the MID task 
were followed by an FRN of larger amplitude compared to losses on either task (see 
Figure 1.1). 
 
Figure 1.1. Average FRN amplitude elicited by the outcomes in the gambling and MID 
tasks in Dzyundzyak (2010). 
 As discussed earlier, frequency of the outcomes can affect the size of the FRN 
such that infrequent outcomes elicit larger FRN amplitude. However, in the MID task 
positive outcomes were more frequent than losses, and thus should not have produced a 
larger FRN. In fact, based on frequency of the outcomes, losses should have been less 
expected and produced a larger FRN compared to wins. Moreover, the wins on the task 
should have elicited a reward positivity, which would have further attenuated the FRN 
amplitude. Thus, the results of this study were inconsistent with previous literature and 
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could not be intuitively explained with the reinforcement learning theory of FRN 
production. 
The two major differences between the tasks were the presence of informative 
cues and the perceived sense of control on the MID task.2 Presence of informative cues 
might have provided participants with enough information regarding the valence of the 
trial, emphasizing the achievement of task goals at the time of the outcomes. However, in 
this case, the FRN would be attenuated rather than amplified, as some of the 
dopaminergic activation would have occurred at the time of the cue, resulting in a 
smaller change in dopamine levels at the time of the outcome. Finally, if participants did 
have a perceived sense of control over the outcomes they might have engaged in 
predictions regarding the outcome in the time after the response but prior to the 
presentation of the feedback. Although participants could have expected to lose on each 
trial, thus making wins less expected and more salient, there was no objective reason for 
such expectations. As mentioned earlier, wins were more frequent and, thus, more 
probable than losses. Furthermore, low levels characteristics such as frequency and 
probability of wins were about the same in both tasks, so it is unclear as to why 
individuals would expect to lose more often on the MID task but win more often on the 
gambling task. It seems that some more global task characteristic modulated the FRN 
valence effect causing an unexpected pattern. 
As previously discussed, a number of complex cognitive constructs and 
judgements were shown to modulate FRN amplitude (e.g., Li et al., 2010; Long et al., 
2012). These constructs arise from integration of many levels of information (i.e., from 
                                                           
2
 Note: Participants had no real control over the outcomes as the task was set up to result in losses one third 
of the time. 
22 
basic perceptions to utilization of previous experience and memory) in order to set a 
subjective value of the stimulus. Previous research on localization of function has shown 
that tertiary cortical zones are responsible for integration of information, especially in the 
frontal lobes. For example, the overall task goals would be ‘kept’ in working memory, 
integrity of which relies on the functioning of the dorsolateral PFC (e.g., Levy & 
Goldman-Rakic, 2000). This information is then projected to the medial PFC and 
integrated in the response of the reward network. It has been shown that medial-frontal 
cortex is sensitive to subjective value of the stimulus (Kable & Glimcher, 2007) and, as 
previously mentioned, frontal structures have direct connections with the ACC (Vogt & 
Pandya, 1987; Devinsky et al., 1995). Thus, there is no reason why this information 
could not be projected to the ACC in order to influence its responses to the stimuli (i.e., 
decisions regarding salience of a stimulus). If this is the case, subcortical areas may be 
more focused on objective (i.e., relatively low level) stimulus characteristics (such as 
frequency of occurrence), while more complex constructs (subjective stimulus 
characteristics) are processed in higher cortical areas. Information from both streams 
would then be conveyed to the ACC, which then inhibits activations to non-relevant 
stimuli, in turn increasing activation to relevant ones.  
Differentiation between the two streams (i.e., objective vs. subjective stimulus 
characteristics) can be done by manipulating expectations through either 
frequency/probability of the outcome (i.e., objective) or by manipulating the individual’s 
cognitive state at the time of the outcome presentation (i.e., subjective). Individuals learn 
the probability of a stimulus based on previous experience of its frequency (a low level 
characteristic), and thus, this information can be coded in subcortical areas (e.g., ventral 
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stratum). Manipulation of expectations through instructions requires more complex 
processing and integration of information (e.g., source of information, previous 
experiences), which is then projected from frontal cortex to ACC and other subcortical 
areas.  The goal of this dissertation research was to propose a more comprehensive model 
of FRN modulation, which could account for effects of complex cognitive constructs on 
the FRN.  
Proposed model 
According to the proposed model (Figure 1.2), an outcome stimulus (e.g., win or 
loss) that is presented to the individual contains information that will be processed by 
subcortical and cortical areas of the brain. More specifically, neurons in the subcortical 
areas (basal ganglia) will code information about low level stimulus characteristics (e.g., 
frequency, value, magnitude) and project it to the ACC. Complex cognitive constructs, 
such as task goals, will be coded in higher cortical areas (e.g., PFC) and input from these 
areas will also have an effect on the response of the ACC as the prefrontal cortex has 
direct connections with the ACC (Bjorklund & Dunnett, 2007). Thus, it would be 
plausible to assume that the activity of the ACC is modulated by both top-down 
projections from the prefrontal cortex as well as bottom-up projections from the basal 
ganglia.    
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Figure 1.2. Schematic representation of the proposed model of FRN generation. 
Based on the proposed model, a neutral stimulus (e.g., in the balloon task used by 
Holroyd et al., 2004) presented in a ‘loss’ trial (i.e., in which it is the best possible 
outcome) will be processed by the basal ganglia and the prefrontal cortex. This stimulus 
has no objective reward value associated with it, thus the dopaminergic changes in 
subcortical areas will be relatively minor. However, the subjective value of the stimulus 
is positive, as it is the best possible outcome in this type of trial. This information will be 
coded by the medial prefrontal cortex and then projected to the ACC. Similarly, a neutral 
stimulus presented during a ‘win’ trial will have a negative subjective value, which also 
will be coded in the medial prefrontal cortex.  In this scenario, the difference in 
activation of the ACC in each type of trial will be based on the top-down projections 
(i.e., from the frontal areas) rather than bottom-up (i.e., from the subcortical areas), as the 
latter does not differentiate between the trials due to equivalency in the objective value of 
the stimulus.  
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It must be noted that this is a very simplified model of the system, as there are a 
number of interconnections between these structures. For example, the ventral tegmental 
area projects to the prefrontal cortex (Vogt & Pandya, 1987) and prefrontal cortex is 
connected to the nAcb. Similarly, the projections between ACC and prefrontal cortex are 
bidirectional (Bjorklund & Dunnett, 2007). However, given the relatively late timing of 
the FRN, it is likely that this component reflects a result of contextual processing (i.e., 
stimulus + the cognitive state of the individual) rather than objective stimulus 
characteristics. Furthermore, if the information regarding the subjective value of the 
stimulus is processed in the prefrontal cortices and then projected to ACC indirectly (i.e., 
through subcortical areas), then this dopaminergic signal produced by the basal ganglia 
will reflect an interaction between these characteristics. In this case, objective and 
subjective stimulus characteristics will not be dissociable at the level of the ACC activity 
(i.e., FRNs).  As EEG technology does not directly measure activity of the subcortical 
areas, this model could not be tested directly. However, it was hypothesized that the 
proposed model of FRN generation (i.e., with direct connections between the PFC and 
ACC) would be supported only if the manipulations of subjective (defined by various 
cognitive factors) and objective stimulus characteristics can be clearly dissociated at the 
level of the FRN.  
Goals for the dissertation research. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to evaluate the proposed model by examining 
the effects of cognitive factors (sense of control, expectedness of the outcome based on 
instructions) and objective stimulus characteristics (valence, expectedness based on 
probability, presence of informative cue) on the FRN within individuals as well as 
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compare the responses to reward-based information in two populations (individuals who 
do not gamble and those who are at risk for problem gambling). The effects of 
informative cues and sense of control over the outcome was examined in Study 1. 
Participants were asked to complete a series of tasks which varied in level of control over 
the outcome: observing choices made by a computer, guessing which card leads to a 
reward and responding to a target within an allotted amount of time. Each task was 
presented with or without an informative cue.  The study was designed to allow for the 
dissociation of the effects of predictive cue (i.e., bottom-up) and sense of control (i.e., 
top-down) on the FRN amplitude. 
 In Study 2, the model was tested further by comparing individual’s responses to 
tasks varying in sense of control as well as by comparing the responses of two different 
populations. More specifically, participants were asked to complete a time estimation 
task, with a perceived sense of control over the outcome and perceived levels of 
difficulty, and a gambling paradigm where participants had no sense of control and were 
explicitly asked to predict the outcome. In the gambling paradigm, predictions were 
based on the probability of positive outcomes and, thus would reflect information 
contained in the bottom-up projections to the ACC. In the Time Estimation task, 
frequency and probability of the outcomes were kept equal, so any effects of expectations 
would be solely due to the  instructions given (i.e., top-down projections to the ACC). 
Comparison between the two tasks allowed us to examine the relative effects of these 
factors on the FRN amplitude, and thus the ACC activity. The proposed model was 
further tested in Study 2 by comparing the FRN observed in two populations: problem 
gamblers and non-gamblers. These results were used to clarify the role of individual 
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differences (e.g., previous experience, cognitive distortions) on the activity of the ACC.  
Together the results of the studies should provide insight into the task characteristics that 
can affect the FRN, and therefore ACC activity and provide support to the proposed 
model of FRN generation.   
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Study 1: Effects of sense of control and presence of an informative cue on the 
Feedback Related Negativity 
In the original Dzyundzyak (2010) study, participants were asked to perform two 
tasks where reliance on external feedback for performance evaluation was necessary. 
Feedback on each task elicited an FRN similar in latency and topography, and the FRN 
to loss feedback was of similar amplitude in the two tasks. However, in comparison to 
the loss-FRN, the FRN observed after wins was significantly smaller in the gambling 
task and significantly larger in the MID task (i.e., wins elicited a larger FRN then losses). 
This effect was unexpected and not consistent with previous literature (e.g., Gehring & 
Willoughby, 2002; Kreussel et al., 2012). As participants produced a classic FRN-
valence effect in one task but not in the other, it is likely that some difference in task 
characteristics modulated the FRN response. Thus, Study 1 was designed to examine the 
effects of these differences on the FRN amplitude. 
The tasks differed in two ways. In the gambling task, participants received no 
information regarding the potential outcome of the trial; all trials resulted in a win or a 
loss, and participants reported no sense of control over the outcomes or ability to develop 
a strategy. In the MID task, participants were first shown a cue that labeled the trial as a 
potential win/loss, eventually leading to four possible types of outcomes (win, no win, 
loss, no loss). The FRN on this task was not sensitive to the differentiation between the 
four types of outcomes; instead, consistent with previous literature, only successes (i.e., 
win & no loss) and failures (i.e., loss & no win) were discriminated (e.g., Hajcak, Moser, 
Holroyd & Simons, 2006). Additionally, participants reported having a sense of control 
over the outcome in the MID task as well as the ability to develop strategies. Thus, the 
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two main differences between the tasks were the presence/absence of an informative cue 
and perceived sense of control over the outcome.  
Cue effect 
Shultz’s body of work on the sensitivity of nAcb to reward-related information shows 
that this structure is sensitive to the cues predictive of a reward (see Shultz, 2007 for 
review). Using classical conditioning paradigms, Shultz demonstrated that dopaminergic 
neurons in the nAcb increase their response to the predictive cue and decreased the 
response to the outcome as the association between the cue and the outcome is learned. 
Once this pairing was established, these neurons responded exclusively to the 
presentation of the cue and not to the presentation of the reward. Although studies with 
human participants rarely utilize classical conditioning paradigms, learning paradigms 
are often used (e.g., Bellebaum & Daum 2008). The basic mechanisms responsible for 
reward processing in humans are likely to rely on the same neural structures as those in 
rodents (e.g., nAcb/Basal Ganglia).  
Knutson and colleagues (2001) examined brain activation of participants engaged in 
an MID task at the time of cue and outcome presentation. In this version of the task, 
seven cues were used: potential wins and losses with three levels of magnitude as well as 
a no-incentive cue. Reward cues led to higher activation of the nAcb when compared to 
no-reward cues (i.e., a valence effect). Similarly, nAcb activation was observed during 
the anticipation period of the MID task, which follows the cue and precedes target 
presentation (Bjork et al., 2004). Activation of both the nAcb and PFC were observed at 
the time of feedback presentation, illustrating that both structures are involved in the 
processing of outcomes. 
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The cues used in the MID paradigm did not predict the outcome completely (as 
would be observed in classical conditioning paradigms) but still elicited activation of the 
nAcb. If the mechanisms of reinforcement learning outlined by Shultz (2007) can be 
generalized to humans, activation of the nAcb at the time of the cue should diminish the 
response at the time of the outcome. As these cues were not completely predictive of the 
outcome, activations of dopaminergic neurons at the time of the cue would never abolish 
activation at the time of the outcome. Instead, one would expect the neural response to 
the reward to be distributed across the times of the cue and reward. If the FRN reflects 
dopaminergic signal to the ACC from the basal ganglia, then presence of informative 
cues should affect the magnitude of this signal.  
The effects of a predictive cue on the FRN were explicitly examined by presenting 
participants with three types of cues prior to presentation of the outcome (Xu et al., 
2011). The cues could signify a certain win, a certain loss or an uncertain outcome. The 
feedback was then presented to inform the participants of the valence and magnitude of 
the outcome (e.g., +5yuan). Feedback after cues signifying certain outcomes (i.e., win or 
loss) elicited a larger FRN following losses compared to wins. Feedback following the 
uncertain cue also elicited an FRN-valence effect in the expected direction, which was 
larger in magnitude than that observed on the certain-cue trials. The authors also reported 
observing an FRN-like component after the uncertain cues that was similar in size to the 
FRN observed after loss outcomes on the same trials. Thus, if the FRN is a marker for 
change in dopaminergic activity, the results can be interpreted as evidence for 
dopaminergic activation at the time of the cue as well as the outcome. When the pairing 
between a cue and an outcome was certain (e.g., certain win cue), dopaminergic 
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activation at the time of the feedback presentation was reduced, presumably due to 
reduced value of it as a source of new information. As the cues were predictive of both 
wins and losses, this resulted in a smaller overall differentiation between the two in the 
FRN (i.e., smaller valence effect). Although the authors did not examine electrocortical 
responses to the certain gain/loss cues, one would expect to see a cue-FRN component 
that was larger after certain loss cues than certain win cues. On the uncertain trials, when 
the cue is not completely predictive of the outcome, activation at the time of the cue does 
not replace the activation at the time of outcome delivery. Instead, presence of an 
uncertain cue led to a greater activation at the time of outcome presentation. Thus, 
presence of a cue prior to outcome modulated the amplitude of the FRN. 
Effects of presenting a cue on the outcome can be more clearly seen when cues 
predict the outcome in a probabilistic nature. These cues can be used to set up the 
participant’s expectations, which then modulate the FRN. Holroyd, Krigolson, and Lee 
(2011) have shown that wins following a ‘low probability win’ cue (i.e., unexpected 
wins) elicit a larger positivity at the time of the outcome, thus decreasing the size of the 
FRN. Conversely, unexpected losses elicited the most negative FRN. Additionally, the 
cue-FRNs differentiated between the cues of different probabilities, such that high 
probability loss cues elicited by a larger cue-FRN. The authors interpreted this result as a 
positivity that is elicited by reward cues, which then influences the response at the time 
of the FRN. This interpretation would be consistent with Shultz’s work (2007), as 
predictive cues elicited a dopaminergic response, and further supports the notion that 
cues influence responses at the time of the outcome. This interpretation is also consistent 
with reinforcement learning theory of FRN generation (Holroyd & Coles, 2002). If FRN 
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is generated by the dopaminergic signal to the ACC, it is expected that rewards and 
omission of rewards (i.e., punishments) will result in increase or depression of dopamine 
levels in the basal ganglia, respectively. The direction of change (activation vs. 
depression) reflects the valence of the outcome and is reflected as either a positivity or a 
negativity at the scalp. 
Thus, it is likely that presence of a cue in the MID task had an influence on the FRN 
observed at the feedback stage. Although, the cues are not completely predictive of the 
outcome, they carry valence information labeling the trial as potential win/loss. Given 
previous research on the topic (Holroyd, Pakzad-Vaezi, & Krigolson, 2008; Xu et al., 
2011), it is expected that presence of cues in each trial should either attenuate the FRN at 
the time of the outcome or increase the size of the valence effects due to presence of 
reward positivity. However, as neither of these effects were obtained it is unlikely that 
presence of the cue alone caused the reversal of the FRN-valence effect observed.  
Sense of control 
Another difference between the tasks was the perceived sense of control on the MID 
task reported by the participants. At the debriefing stage participants reported trying to 
develop strategies for the MID task, but said that their responses and outcomes on the 
gambling task were random. There are two possible effects of these perceptions on the 
participant’s cognitive state at the time of feedback presentation. Perception of control 
over the outcome could have increased participants’ motivation and made the feedback 
stimuli more salient. Previous research has shown that the FRN amplitude is attenuated if 
the outcomes are not driven by participant’s choices (e.g., when a computer chooses a 
card; Yeung, Holroyd, & Cohen, 2005; Bismark et al., 2011). A diminished sense of 
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responsibility was also shown to decrease the FRN-valence effect (Li et al., 2011). In this 
experiment, participants were asked to perform a gambling task with three dice; a trial 
was considered a win if the sums of three dice thrown was greater than 10. In a high 
responsibility condition, participants threw all three dice, whereas in the low 
responsibility condition participants threw only one of the three dice. The FRN following 
loss trials was larger compared to the FRN following win trials. Although valence effects 
were observed in both conditions, the size of this effect was larger in the high 
responsibility condition. Therefore, increased engagement on the task should lead to an 
increase either in the amplitude of the FRN or the size of the FRN-valence effect. As 
neither of these effects was observed in the original study (Dzyundzyak, 2007), it is 
unlikely that increased involvement in the outcome was the reason for the reversal of the 
FRN-valence effect. 
Perception of control of the outcome could also lead to increased confidence in one’s 
predictions of the outcome. In the MID task, participants were told that in order to obtain 
a positive outcome they have to press the response key while the target was still on the 
screen. The outcome was shown about a second after the response was made, giving 
participants enough time to form expectations. Unlike in the gambling task, the structure 
of the MID task allows the participant to predict performance (i.e., by comparing the 
duration of the target and the perceived speed of own response) and evaluate the 
feedback presentation based on the degree of conflict with expectations rather than its 
valence. In this case, unexpected outcomes might elicit a larger prediction error 
increasing the amplitude of the FRN. However, given the speeded nature of the task it 
may have been difficult to tell whether the response key was pressed while the target was 
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on the screen, so it is likely that participants’ predictions of the outcomes were inaccurate 
and varied with their ability to accurately monitor their reaction times. Although positive 
outcomes were more frequent, participants may have predicted success less often (i.e., 
wins being less expected).  If wins were less expected compared to losses, the FRN 
amplitude would reflect that by being larger following wins than losses. Although, this is 
consistent with results of Donkers et al. (2005), showing larger FRN amplitude following 
unexpected wins, this is inconsistent with the model of reward positivity. Based on the 
work of Holroyd et al. (2008), wins should have elicited a reward positivity (not a greater 
negativity), and this positivity should have increased as a function of the unexpectedness 
of the outcome and thus lead to more positive FRN. In this case, the expectations alone 
should not have led to a reversal of the FRN-valence effect. However, previous research 
has also shown that presence of a predictive cue could initiate reward positivity prior to 
presentation of feedback (Holroyd et al., 2008; Holroyd et al., 2011). Although it is 
unlikely that this positivity would last from the onset of the cue to the presentation of 
feedback (at least 2 seconds), it is possible that once valence information of the trial was 
processed, feedback was viewed to be devoid of any reward information and did not 
elicit a reward positivity. Thus, an interaction between the presence of a cue and sense of 
control over the outcome could have led to the reversal of the FRN-valence effect (e.g., 
Figure 2.1).  
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Figure 2.1. Graphical representation of the expected effects of cue and sense of 
control on the FRN amplitude. 
Current study 
This study was conducted to examine the effects of cues and sense of control on the 
amplitude of the FRN by using two levels of cues and three levels of sense of control. 
Three versions of the task contained cues that were informative, labelling the trial as a 
potential win or a potential loss. The other three had a non-informative cue that simply 
signified a start of a new trial. On each trial participants were presented with a cue (either 
non-informative or containing valence information) followed by the appearance of two 
cards that represented gambling results for that trial. In the ‘No-Control’ condition 
participants had to press a button to initiate the computer to choose a card for them. In 
the ‘Some-Control’ condition, participants chose a card themselves and in the ‘Full-
Control’ condition participants had to press a button while the cards were still on the 
Loss Win
Low Control High Control Low Control High Control 
No Cue Cue 
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screen in order to win. Following a response participants were presented with the trial 
outcome.  
Additionally, these condition characteristics will be used to test the proposed model 
of FRN generation. If the model is correct, presence of informative cues should be coded 
in the subcortical areas and projected to the ACC. For the purpose of this study, any 
effects of cues on the FRN will be interpreted as evidence for bottom-up input to the 
ACC. Similarly, effects of sense of control will be interpreted as influences of higher 
cortical areas on the ACC (i.e., top-down projections). 
Hypotheses 
1. Sense of Control (top-down). It is expected that the FRN amplitude or FRN-
valence effects will be attenuated with diminishing sense of control.  
(a) The FRN will be most sensitive to feedback valence in the ‘Full-Control’ 
condition.  
(b) The ‘No-Control’ condition should mirror the results observed by Li et al. 
(2011) in the diffusion of responsibility condition as participants are not 
completely in control of the outcome, and therefore are expected to have the 
smallest difference between the FRNs elicited by wins versus losses. This 
hypothesis is based on previous research suggesting that engagement in the task 
increases FRN sensitivity to valence (e.g., Yeung et al., 2005).  
(c) Reward positivity amplitude should not be affected by sense of control 
manipulation, as this signal was proposed to arise from subcortical areas (i.e., 
bottom-up projections). 
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2. Cues (bottom-up). Presence of cues is expected to either (a) attenuate FRN 
amplitude, as valence of the trial will be known ahead of time, or (b) have no 
effect at all, as the events are temporally relatively far apart.  
(c) Reward positivity is expected to be smaller following informative cues, as the 
cues were shown to elicit a positivity at the time of its presentation (Holroyd et 
al., 2011). 
3. Interaction effect. An interaction effect between cues and sense of control is 
expected, such that ‘full-control + informative cue’ condition will produce a 
reversal FRN-valence effect observed in Dzyundzyak, 2007.  
Experiment 1: Methods 
Participants 
Participants (N = 13)3 were recruited at Brock University through on campus posters 
and university research database (SONA). Participants were 19.8 years old on average 
(range: 18 to 25) and the majority were female (n = 10; 76.9%); none reported smoking, 
taking any types of medication, or experiencing recent stressors. Most participants were 
right handed (n = 9, 69.20%). Two participants scored in the low risk range for problem 
gambling behaviour and one participant scored in the moderate range (25%). One of 
these participants (low risk) took too long to complete the tasks, was very restless during 
the recording, and reported not engaging fully in the tasks. Additionally, this participant 
did not complete the No cue/No-Control condition and, thus, was excluded from further 
analysis. 
 
                                                           
3
 Data collection was halted due to lack of participants at the end of the term; collected data were analysed 
for a validity check prior to continuation of the study. 
42 
Materials 
Questionnaires.  
Demographic information about age, sex, neurological conditions and recent stressors 
was collected using a demographic questionnaire (see Appendix 1.1 for the questionnaire 
package). Handedness was measured using ten questions inquiring which hand would be 
used to carry out everyday activities (e.g., which hand is used to throw a ball?). The 
responses were measured on a 5-point scale, ranging from always left (zero) to always 
right (five) with a not sure (six) option (Oldfield, 1971).  
Participants were also asked to complete a Problem Gambling Severity Index (PGSI; 
Ferris & Wynne, 2001) to collect information about maladaptive gambling behaviour. 
This questionnaire consists of nine questions about frequency and consequences of 
gambling behaviour (e.g., Have you bet more than you could really afford to lose?). 
Participants were asked to respond using a 4-point scale, which ranged from never (zero) 
to almost always (three). According to the scoring criteria, anyone scoring between one 
and three was labeled as low risk problem gambler and those with scores above eight 
were considered high risk problem gamblers (Ferris & Wynne, 2001).  
Additionally, after each sense of control condition participants were given a Post-
Task Questionnaire, assessing their experience during the task on a 6-point scale (not at 
all = 0 to all the time/usually/most of the time = 5, depending on the question). 
Importance of the cue information (e.g., Were the cues helpful?), sense of control over 
the outcome (e.g., Did you have a feeling of control over the outcome?), perception of 
wins and losses (e.g., How often did you feel you would win?) as well as overall 
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engagement (e.g., Were you paying attention to feedback?) were measured. Participants 
were also asked to describe any strategy that they used during the task. 
Tasks. The tasks were designed to have a similar format and differed in two ways:  
presence/absence of an informative cue and level of control over the outcome. For 
detailed description of instructions, visual angles and average number of trials see 
Appendix 1.3. Participants were given four trials to practice each version of the task. 
No-Control condition. At the start of each trial a cue was presented for 500 ms to 
signify the start of a new trial (Figure 2.2). The cue was either a white square (non-
informative), a green square (potential win trial) or a red square (potential loss trial). The 
task was blocked such that one version of the task included an informative cue (Cue-No-
Control) and another a non-informative cue (No cue-No-Control). Otherwise, the two 
versions of the tasks were exactly the same. 
Following the cue, a gray screen was presented for 1, 1.20 or 1.5seconds. The inter-
stimulus interval (ISI) was varied to reduce participants’ ability to predict the onset of the 
next stimulus. After the ISI, a target stimulus in the form of two squares was presented 
on the screen for 700 ms. Participants were instructed to press a key in order to initiate 
the computer’s choice of card. The target stimulus was terminated at the time of 
response. If no response was made within 700 ms, the target disappeared and a grey 
screen for an ISI of 1000 ms was presented. After the target stimulus and ISI, both cards 
reappeared again for 300 ms. One of the cards was highlighted with a blue border, to 
show which card was chosen by the computer. If participants failed to respond to the 
target or took longer later than 700 ms to respond, both cards were highlighted with a red 
border. One second following this stimulus, the feedback was presented in yellow letters 
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for 1 second. There were five types of feedback, regardless of the cue condition: win, 
loss, no win, no loss, too slow. The latter stimulus was used to indicate trials where 
participants failed to respond to the target within 700 ms. All of the outcomes were 
predetermined to result in a rate of 60% wins overall. Participants’ earnings on this task 
differed only due to the number of Too Slow trials, each of which resulted in a loss. Each 
version of the task (i.e., cue and no cue) was divided into three blocks with 50 trials per 
block. Self-paced breaks were given to the participants between each block.  
 
Figure 2.2. Schematic representation of the No-Control conditions. 
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Some-Control condition. The order and duration of the events in this condition were 
the same as in the No-Control condition (Figure 2.3). Versions of the task with 
informative and non-informative cues were presented as separate tasks (Cue-Some-
Control and No cue-Some-Control, respectively). In this version of the task, participants 
were asked to choose a card from the two presented on the screen using two response 
keys. As in the No-Control condition, participants had only 700 ms to make their 
response. Once the response was made, the target stimulus disappeared. All of the 
outcomes were predetermined to produce 60% wins and did not depend on the card 
chosen. Similar to the No-Control condition, differences in earnings on this task resulted 
only from the variable number of Too Slow outcomes between participants. Participants 
received two self-paced breaks during each version of the task (3 blocks, 50 trials per 
block) and a longer break between the cue and no cue versions. 
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Figure 2.3. Schematic representation of the Some-Control conditions. 
Full-Control condition. This version of the task was also further divided into 
informative cue (Cue-Full-Control) and non-informative cue (No Cue-Full-Control) 
conditions (Figure 2.4). The beginning of the trial was exactly the same as the previously 
described versions of the task. A cue appeared at the start of each trial, followed by a 
variable ISI and a target stimulus. However, in this case, participants were told that they 
can win or avoid losing money by pressing the response key while the two cards were on 
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the screen. The initial duration of the target was 280 ms and was adjusted in response to 
participant’s performance (i.e., for every win the duration of the target was reduced by 10 
ms, and after every loss increased by 20 ms) to result in wins two thirds of the time. A 
second after the target stimulus, two cards reappeared on the screen for 300 ms. Although 
unnecessary in this version of the task, these stimuli were presented in order to be 
consistent with the No-Control and Some-Control conditions. Both cards were 
highlighted by a blue border if a response was made at some point, and by a red border if 
no response was made. Thus, participants knew when the Too Slow feedback would 
appear, but not any of the other types of outcomes. Each trial was worth 50 cents and 
there were 150 trials in each version of the task (over 3 blocks). As in the No-Control and 
Some-Control conditions participants were able to take two self-paced breaks after every 
50 trials.  
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Figure 2.4. Schematic representation of the Full-Control conditions. 
Procedure 
Participants were recruited using on-campus posters and a university research 
database. They were screened for neurological conditions (e.g., epilepsy), mental health 
problems (e.g., depression) and head injury during a phone interview. At the beginning 
of the testing session, participants were informed about the study and gave their consent 
to participate. Individuals were then fitted with an electrode cap and asked to sit down in 
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an electrically shielded testing room. During the fitting of the cap, participants were 
asked to complete the demographic questionnaire and the PGSI. Once the electrodes 
were placed into the cap, participants were shown the online recording of their 
brainwaves and explained the effects of muscle activity on the EEG recordings. 
Participants were then asked to complete the six versions of the task. Each testing session 
took about three hours. 
The order of task presentation was counterbalanced, such that at the end of the study 
all of the counterbalancing combinations were completed by at least one participant. 
Counterbalancing was done across the three levels of sense of control and then by the 
type of cue participant (see Appendix 1.3 for the list of the counterbalancing order). After 
each set of tasks for a specific level of sense of control (e.g., Cue-No-Control and No 
Cue-No-Control) participants were asked to fill out the Post-Task questionnaire.  
Upon completion of the task and the last questionnaire, the electrode cap was 
removed and participants were given time to clean up. Finally, the research question 
explored by the study was explained to the participants in the debriefing process. 
Participants were then paid based on their performance. Monetary reward was based on 
the earning in the tasks such that participants received the highest amount won across all 
the tasks. The average amounts won in each condition are presented in Table 1.1. This 
study was approved by the Brock University Research Ethics Board (see Appendix 1.1) 
Data analysis 
EEG pre-processing. 
The EEG was recorded with a 128-channel Active Two BioSemi system (BioSemi, 
Amsterdam). Two additional exogenous electrodes were placed beside each eye to 
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monitor horizontal movements and one exogenous electrode was placed below the right 
eye to monitor eye blink activity. The BioSemi system uses zero-reference and the 
digitized analog signal was stored at 512 samples per second, with a low pass filter with 
half-power cut-off at 102.4 Hz. The recordings were exported from the BioSemi format 
to EEGlab Version 11 format (Delorme & Makeig, 2004). Any non-task periods of time 
(e.g., breaks) and bad channels (labeled as such after visual inspection of the raw data) 
identified in the recording were manually eliminated. The data were pre-processed using 
the procedure outlined by Desjardins and Segalowitz (2013) and submitted to an 
automated, extended infomax independent components analysis (ICA; Bell & Sejnowski, 
1995; Makeig, Debener, Onton, & Delorme, 2004).  Once ICA decomposition was 
performed, any independent components (ICs) with activations and topographies 
consistent with eye movement and muscle activity were eliminated and the scalp data 
were recalculated (i.e., projected back to the scalp) based on the remaining components. 
The data were then segmented around the onset of the feedback stimulus, combining 
the outcomes into win/no loss (i.e., success) and loss/no win (failure) conditions. The 
outcomes were combined in order to ensure the necessary number of trials for each 
condition (see Appendix 1.3 for average number of trials per condition). There were 12 
conditions in total, Cue (2) x Control (3) x Win/Loss (2) (e.g., Cue-No-Control win, Cue-
No-Control loss). Each epoch contained a 200 ms pre-stimulus baseline and was 1200 ms 
in length. After segmentation, the data were further cleaned using the automatic artifact 
rejection tool available in the EEGLab. Each segment was analysed for changes in 
amplitude that exceeded the set parameters (±100 µV).  The segments were also 
manually rejected if they contained more than one stimulus-marker. During the initial 
51 
cleaning procedure, some segments of time were marked as ‘bad’ (i.e., having too much 
non-biological noise) and were removed from the recording prior to segmentation 
resulting in several event markers to appear closer in time on the recording. Thus, if 
during the segmentation the specified time window (i.e., 1200 ms) previously contained a 
‘bad’ time period that was removed, the data would contain more than one event marker 
and would not be relevant for the analysis of interest. This was observed rarely, and all 
such segments were removed prior to further analysis. The data were then averaged and 
exported to ERPScore (Segalowitz, 1999). Global Field Amplitude (GFA) was also 
extracted from the segmented (but not averaged) data to be used for the follow up robust 
ANOVA analysis. 
As the Biosemi montage used in this study  does not correspond to the 10-20 system 
perfectly, a number of channels with locations similar to Fz (C14, C13), FCz (C12, C11), 
Cz (C10, A1, A2) and Pz (A18, A17) were identified (see Appendix 1.3). The FRN, 
defined as the most negative peak between 200 and 320 ms, was scored across these 
midline sites. To reduce the number of statistical comparisons and to take into account 
individual differences in brain structures and variation in activation of the ACC across 
conditions (which was not a variable of interest in this study), a channel with the 
maximal FRN amplitude was identified for each condition. This reduced the number of 
channels to four, which henceforth will be referred to as Fz, FCz, Cz and Pz.  
Statistical analysis.  
Prior to conducting any inferential statistical analysis, the data were screened for 
outliers and violations of normality. None of the variables of interest contained outliers. 
If normality was violated, non-parametric tests were used to address the research 
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question. Repeated measures ANOVAs were used to examine the effects of cue and 
sense of control on the FRN amplitude. If assumptions of sphericity were violated, 
significance values based on Greenhouse-Geisser correction and original degrees of 
freedom were reported. 
Results 
Validity check 
The responses on the Post-Task questionnaire were compared across different levels 
of sense of control (Figure 2.5 and Table 1.2). As the data were not normally distributed 
and the sample size was small (N = 12), no statistical comparisons were conducted. 
Participants appeared to pay a similar amount of attention to the cues and found the cues 
to be equally helpful across all three conditions. A similar pattern of responses was 
observed for the feedback presentation, but participants reported paying slightly less 
attention to the feedback and found it less helpful in the No-Control condition. Although 
the tasks were counterbalanced, individuals reported being more tired/bored after the No-
Control condition compared to the other two levels of sense of control. The perceived 
frequency of wins and losses was similar across the three levels of sense of control. 
As expected, participants reported having lower levels of feeling of control over the 
outcome, being less able to predict the outcome, being less accurate in those predictions 
and being less confident in their predictions after the No-Control condition. Highest 
sense of control and ability to predict the outcome as well as highest accuracy of these 
predictions was reported after the Full-Control condition. Thus, based on self-reported 
data participants experienced the highest level of sense of control in the Full-Control 
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condition, followed by the Some-Control condition, and lowest levels in the No-Control 
condition, suggesting that the manipulation of sense of control was working as expected. 
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Figure 2.5. Graphical representation of means and standard errors of responses on the Post-Task questionnaire in Experiment 1.
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Finally, confidence in predictions was lowest in the No-Control condition and about 
the same in the Some-Control and Full-Control conditions suggesting that the effect 
perceived sense of control between these two levels was not as strong. This could be due 
to the perceived ability to predict random events often observed in gambling situations 
(i.e., Illusion of Control; Steenbergh, Meyers, May & Whelan, 2002). In order to clarify 
this result a χ2 test was conducted to examine the number of people reporting use of 
strategies across different levels of sense of control. Given the small sample size these 
results should be interpreted with caution. Overall, participants reported engaging in use 
of a strategy least frequently in the No-Control condition (n = 2; 16.7%) and half of the 
participants reported trying a strategy for the Some-Control tasks (n = 6; 50.0%; χ2 (2) = 
3, p = .022). Only four people reported having a strategy for the Full-Control condition 
(33.3%) and on average participants reported having more sense of control over the 
outcome in the Full-Control condition. Thus, the manipulation of sense of control was 
working as expected but the ability to predict outcomes based on this sense of control did 
not differ between Some and Full-Control conditions.  
Behavioural data 
Response times (RTs) in each version of the task were analysed across four different 
types of outcomes (loss, no loss, no win, win) in each version of the task. As the 
outcomes were predetermined there should be no consistent difference in RT observed in 
the No and Some-Control conditions. On the Full-Control tasks, the RTs on successful 
trials (i.e., win and no loss) was expected to be shorter than on failure trials (i.e., loss and 
no win). In order to test any potential effects of the cue on RTs, a 2 (cue type) x 4 
(outcome) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted for each level of sense of control 
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(Table 1.3). As expected there were no significant effects of cue or valence in the No-
Control and Some-Control conditions (see Table 1.4 for Ms and SDs). There was a main 
effect of valence in the Full-Control condition (F (3,33) = 58.01, p <.001, pη2 = .841), 
such that RT on successful trials (i.e., win/no loss) were significantly faster than RTs on 
failed trials (loss/no win). Thus, the presence or absence of the cue had no effect of RTs 
in any of the versions of the task. 
ERP data 
The FRN was scored as the most negative peak between 200 and 320 ms following 
the onset of the feedback stimulus (see Appendix 1.4 for overlays of waveforms with 
original Biosemi channels). In order to increase the power of the comparisons and to 
ensure at least 40 trials per condition, the outcomes on each trial were divided into 
successes (i.e., win/no loss) and failures (i.e., loss/no win). Examination of the overlay of 
waveforms elicited after feedback in the No-Control conditions (Figure 2.6) showed very 
little differentiation between wins and losses at the time of the FRN. Largest 
differentiation between conditions was observed in the waveforms elicited in the Some-
Control condition (Figure 2.7), such that losses elicited larger FRNs compared to win 
outcomes regardless of the cue type. The waveforms observed in the Full-Control 
condition (Figure 2.8) also showed little differentiation between outcomes of different 
valence at the time of the FRN. All of the conditions elicited a larger FRN at frontal 
channels. 
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Figure 2.6. Averaged ERP waveforms for the two types of cues and two types of 
outcomes received in the No-Control versions of the task.  
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Figure 2.7. Averaged ERP waveforms for the two types of cues and two types of 
outcomes received in the Some-Control versions of the task. 
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Figure 2.8. Averaged ERP waveforms for the two types of cues and two types of 
outcomes received in the Full-Control versions of the task. 
 
In order to examine effects of cue and sense of control a repeated 2 (cue type) x 3 
(sense of control) x 2 (valence) x 3 (site: Fz, FCz, Cz) ANOVA was conducted (Table 
1.5). There was a significant effect of Valence (F(1,11) = 5.62, p = .037, pη2 = .338), 
such that losses elicited a larger FRN (M = -1.95, SD = 0.41) than wins (M = -1.63, SD = 
0.35). No other significant effects were observed (see Table 1.6 or Ms and SDs). Thus, 
neither the cue nor sense of control manipulations had any significant effect on the FRN. 
To further examine if the results of this study replicated the FRN effects in Dzyundzyak 
(2010) a 2 (task) x 2 (valence) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted comparing No 
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Cue-Some-Control and Cue-Full-Control conditions (Table 1.7). No significant effects 
were observed in this comparison.  
Experiment 1 Discussion 
No significant effects of cue or sense of control were observed in the analysis of the 
FRN amplitude. Furthermore, the results of previous study using similar tasks 
(Dzyundzyak, 2007) were not replicated. There was an FRN-valence effect in the 
expected direction, but the magnitude of this effect was small, as it disappeared when 
only two versions of the task were compared. Although it is possible that neither the cue 
nor sense of control influence FRN amplitude, this conclusion would not be consistent 
with previous research showing that cues and investment in the task modulate the 
responses of the ACC (Holroyd, Krigloson, & Lee, 2011).  
During the data collection process participants’ comments at the end of the testing 
session suggested that they were not very engaged during the tasks. The results of the 
FRNs obtained in Experiment 1 are consistent with lack of motivation and engagement in 
the outcomes of the tasks, as the FRN-valence effects were quite small in Full-Control 
and No-Control conditions (see Figures 2.7 and 2.8). There could have been a number of 
factors contributing to this performance, one of which was the length of testing time. On 
average, each version of the task took about 20 min to complete (i.e., ~ 2 hours of testing 
time for all six conditions). Participants reported feeling tired and not engaged in the 
tasks.  
Additionally, participants reported feeling that the No-Control condition was very 
similar to the Full-Control condition as they had to respond within the allotted period of 
time. Although, the target was visible for a much shorter period of time in the Full-
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Control condition, the subjective experience on these two versions was very similar due 
to the termination of target stimulus immediately after the response in the No-Control 
condition. This property was included in the task to shorten testing time, as response 
times are usually much shorter than 700 ms. Unfortunately this led to the perception of 
the task as ‘speeded’ and participants reported being unsure if they made the response 
within the allotted time. Once the researcher became aware of this issue, a description of 
this task property was added to the instructions.  
Finally, the last factor that could have contributed to the lack of expected effects in 
Experiment 1 was the self-selection bias. The recruitment for the study was done at the 
end of the term, when many undergraduate students were trying to obtain research 
participation hours before the deadline for Introduction to Psychology course. Although, 
this course was two-terms in length, a number of individuals left this component of the 
course until the second term. The study ran for two weeks prior to the deadline and the 
majority of participants reported participating because it was “the only study available”. 
Thus, motivation and engagement were a problem in this sample and could have affected 
the results obtained. A second experiment was conducted in order to address these issues 
by recruiting at a different time of the year (i.e., spring/summer terms) and changing 
some of the task characteristics to reduce testing time. 
Experiment 2 
Methods 
Participants 
Participants (N = 12) were recruited in a similar fashion to Experiment 1 and were on 
average 21.08 years old (range: 19 to 23). The majority of participants were female (n = 
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8; 66.7%) and none reported smoking, taking any types of medication, or experiencing 
any recent stressors. All of the participants were right handed. Two of the participants 
scored within the low risk range for problem gambling behaviour (16.7%). 
Materials 
Questionnaires.  
The questionnaires given to the participants were exactly the same as in Experiment 1. 
Task.  
The tasks used in experiment two were adjusted following Experiment 1 in order to 
decrease the testing time and the perceived speediness of some of the conditions. To 
address the latter issue, in the Some-control and No-Control tasks, the target stimulus 
(i.e., the two cards) were not terminated at the time of response and stayed visible to the 
participant for the full 700 ms. In order to reduce testing time, the No Cue-No-Control 
condition was eliminated. Additionally, the reappearance of the two cards in the Some-
Control condition, which showed participants the chosen card, was considered redundant, 
as participants were aware of their choice, and was eliminated. Similarly, in the Full-
Control condition, presentation of the two cards following the target stimulus was 
eliminated completely as it did not hold any informative value. This change further 
increased the similarity between this version of the task and the MID task that was 
previously used, where feedback was shown one second after the target offset 
(Dzyundzyak, 2007). There was no change to the order or duration of any other events in 
the tasks. 
Procedure 
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The recording procedure was kept identical and the tasks were counterbalanced in a 
similar format to Experiment 1 (see Appendix 1.3). Participants received their winnings 
at the end of the session, based on the highest amount won across all the tasks (Table 
1.1).  
Data analysis 
The data pre-processing and analysis procedure were the same as in Experiment 1.  
In order to examine potential impact of cue and sense of control factors on the reward 
positivity rather than the N2 component elicited by the feedback in general (as proposed 
by Holroyd, et al., 2008), difference waves were created for each participant by 
subtracting waveforms elicited by negative outcomes (i.e., loss/no win) from those 
following positive outcomes (i.e., win/no loss). Average amplitudes of these waveforms 
at the time of the FRN (200 to 320 ms) were measured. Original frontal channels of the 
Biosemi montage were used in this analysis As the difference wave amplitude can be 
driven either by larger a negativity after losses or a larger positivity after wins, the 
absolute distance from the baseline as well as the direction (positive or negative) of the 
average difference wave amplitude is informative. Therefore, the data could not be 
reasonably reduced to only three midline channels by picking channels with maximal or 
minimal averaged amplitude.  
Finally, a series of robust 2 x 2 ANOVAs were conducted on the data using MATLab 
2010b custom functions. These measures are relatively new and thus are considered 
complementary to the SPSS analysis. This type of robust ANOVA uses original 
waveforms which were bootstrapped 1000 times and produces a statistic and a 
probability value for each time point of the waveform (based on Wilcox, 2005). 
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Currently, this analysis allows only comparison of 4 conditions at one location (i.e., one 
channel) or across all sites using Global Field Amplitude (GFA). A 2 (cue) x 2 (valence) 
robust ANOVA was conducted on the group data using GFA measures to identify the 
duration of significant main effects observed in the analysis of FRN peak amplitude and 
average amplitude of difference waves. Similar 2 x 2 robust ANOVAs were carried out 
on single subject data bootstrapping segments 1000 times to create a distribution for each 
participant.  
Results 
Validity Check 
The pattern of responses on the Post-Task questionnaire in Experiment 2 was similar 
to that observed in Experiment 1 (Figure 2.9 and Table 1.8). Participants reported paying 
similar amount of attention to different cues on all tasks and found the cues to be least 
helpful in the No-Control condition. Unlike in Experiment 1, feedback in the No-Control 
condition was reported to be the least helpful and individuals reported paying the least 
amount of attention to it. The perceived frequency of wins and losses was similar across 
the tasks. Self-reported levels of tiredness/boredom were similar across all three levels of 
sense of control, but were slightly graded such that highest levels of tiredness were 
reported after the No-Control condition and lowest after Full-Control tasks.  
The lowest levels of perceived control over the outcome and ability to predict the 
outcome were reported after the No-Control condition, as was expected.4  Although the 
self-reported ability to predict the outcome was rated highest in the Full-Control tasks, it 
was only slightly higher than in the Some-Control condition. The perceived accuracy of 
                                                           
4
 The self-report data were collected using questions with a five-point rating scale. As this sample is 
relatively small, the data were not normally distributed, thus violating the assumptions of parametric tests.   
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predictions was graded in a similar manner, but the differences between average ratings 
were miniscule. Self-reported confidence in the predicted outcome was lower in the No-
Control condition compared to the Some-Control and Full-Control. Furthermore, 
participants engaged in the use of strategy least frequently in the No-Control condition (n 
= 3; 25.0%; χ2 (2) = 4.3, p = .012), while most reported having a strategy for the Some-
Control condition (n = 8; 66.7%) and almost half had engaged in a strategy during the 
Full-Control condition (n = 5; 41.7%). These results are in line with the responses 
observed in Experiment 1 and suggest that the difference in perceived levels of sense of 
control over the outcome is highest between No- and Full-Control conditions and lowest 
between Some and Full-Control conditions.  
Behavioural data 
A 2 (cue) x 4 (outcome) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to compare 
RTs in each version of sense of control tasks (Table 1.9). There were no effects of cue or 
valence in the Some or Full-Control conditions (see Table 1.10 for Ms and SDs). The 
lack of outcome valence effects on the RT in the Full-Control condition does not 
replicate the findings in Experiment 1. Successful and failed trials were very similar in 
target duration, making it difficult to subjectively differentiate between win and loss 
trials during on-line performance on the task. This is supported by participants’ self-
report of ability to predict the outcome and accuracy of these predictions, which were 
very similar between the Full and Some-Control conditions. There was a main effect of 
valence in the No-Control condition such that participants were faster to respond on the 
potential win trials (win: M =276.44, SD = 54.30; no win: M = 272.30, SD = 57.59) 
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compared to potential loss trials (no loss: M = 285.63, SD = 60.23; loss: M = 294.43, SD 
= 62.69).5  
                                                           
5
 Post hoc tests using Bonferroni comparisons were used. Only the difference between win and loss 
outcomes (p=.040), no win and loss outcomes (p=.012) were significant. The difference between win/no 
win and no loss outcomes was marginally significant (p=.062). 
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Figure 2.9. Graphical representation of means and standard errors of responses on the Post-Task questionnaire in Experiment 2
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ERP Data 
Peak measures. 
As in Experiment 1, the FRN was defined as the most negative peak occurring 
between 200 and 320 ms after the presentation of feedback. The patterns observed in the 
waveform overlays partially supported the proposed hypotheses (see Figures 2.10 to 
2.12; see Appendix 1.4 for overlays of waveforms with original Biosemi channels). More 
specifically it was hypothesised that (a) FRN valence effects would increase with 
increasing sense of control (i.e., negligible, if any, in the No-Control condition, larger in 
Some-Control and largest in Full-Control conditions), (b) presence of an informative cue 
would either attenuate these effects or have no effect of the FRN-valence effect, and (c) 
FRN-valence effect would be reversed in Full-Control condition with an informative cue.  
Similar to Experiment 1, the waveform overlay in the No-Control condition showed very 
small differentiation between win and loss outcomes at the time of the FRN. There were 
clear valence effects in the overlay of waveforms elicited in the Some-Control condition. 
Unexpectedly, the differences between win and loss outcomes in the Full-Control 
condition were relatively small and clear only at the frontal channels. Presence of cues 
seemed to have an effect on the waveforms following win outcomes in the Some-Control 
condition; this effect was more pronounced at frontal channels. In the Full-Control 
condition, loss outcomes were followed by a smaller FRN when the warning cue was 
informative. There was no evidence of the predicted interaction and reversal of the FRN-
valence effect in the Full-Control condition. 
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Figure 2.10. Averaged ERP waveforms for the two types of cues and two types of 
outcomes received in the No-Control versions of the task observed in Experiment 2 
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Figure 2.11. Averaged ERP waveforms for the two types of cues and two types of 
outcomes received in the Some-Control versions of the task observed in Experiment 2 
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Figure 2.12. Averaged ERP waveforms for the two types of cues and two types of 
outcomes received in the Full-Control versions of the task observed in Experiment 2. 
 
The initial analysis was carried out only using data from Some-Control and Full-
Control conditions as there was no No Cue-No-Control condition, and the examination of 
cue effects would not have been possible. Effects of cue and sense of control on the FRN 
amplitude were examined using a 2 (cue) x 2 (sense of control) x 2 (valence) x 3 
(channel) repeated measures ANOVA6 (Table 1.11). There was a significant main effect 
of valence (F(1,11) = 8.29, p = .015, pη2 = .430), such that FRN amplitude was larger 
                                                           
6
 Note: Because there was no NCue-No-Control condition in this data set, the analysis was first conducted 
using Full-Control and Some-Control conditions only.  
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following losses (M = -2.03, SD = 0.33) than wins (M = -1.53, SD = 0.33). An interaction 
between type of cue and sense of control was also observed (F(1,11) = 6.54, p = .027, 
pη2 = .373). This interaction was superseded by a significant three-way interaction 
between sense of control, outcome valence and cue type (F(2,22) = 9.08, p = .001, pη2 = 
.452). Contrary to expectation there was no reversal of the FRN valence effects in either 
of the Full-Control conditions. A follow-up repeated measures ANOVA was conducted 
to examine the three-way interaction by comparing FRN peak amplitude elicited by 
different levels of sense of control and valence in the presence or absence of the cue. 
Informative cue condition. It was expected that presence of the cue would lead to the 
reversal of the FRN valence effect in the Full-Control condition. A 3 (FC, SC, NC) x 2 
(loss vs win) x 3 (Fz, FCz and Cz) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on the 
peak FRN amplitude observed after informative cues (Table 1.12). There were 
significant main effects of valence (F(1,11) = 6.34, p = .029, pη2 = .366) and sense of 
control (F(2,22) = 3.71, p = .041, pη2 = .254). Loss outcomes elicited a larger FRN 
amplitude (M = -2.07, SD = 0.35) than win outcomes (M = -1.59, SD = 0.37). If the sense 
of control manipulation worked as expected, FRN amplitude should be largest in Full-
Control condition, followed by Some-Control and No-Control conditions. Contrary to 
these expectations, post hoc comparisons of the three levels of sense of control revealed 
no significant differences between the groups when a Bonferroni comparison was used. 
A more liberal LSD comparison showed a marginally significant (p = .056) difference 
between Some-Control and Full-Control conditions such that larger FRN amplitude was 
observed in the Full-Control condition (M = -2.09, SD = 0.37; Some-Control: M = -1.25, 
SD = 0.41). FRNs observed in the No-Control condition (M = -2.15, SD = 0.44) were 
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also larger than in Some-Control condition but this difference did not reach significance 
(p = .076). Although the effects of sense of control on FRN were not in the expected 
direction, the results suggest that the Some-Control condition was approached by 
participants in a different manner from other conditions. It should be noted that the 
sphericity assumption for the repeated measures ANOVA was almost violated (p = .059) 
and if the Greenhouse-Geisser correction is used, the main effect for sense-of-control 
becomes only marginally significant (F(1,11) = 3.71, p = .061, pη2 = .252). Thus, the 
effect of sense of control in the informative cue conditions should be interpreted in 
caution.  
Non-informative cue condition. It was hypothesized that in the absence of valence 
information in the cue, the FRN valence effects would be similar in all conditions (i.e., 
larger FRN following losses). A 2 (sense of control) x 2 (valence) x 3 (channel) repeated 
measures ANOVA conducted comparing FRN peaks in the non-informative cue 
condition revealed a three-way interaction between the variables (F(2,22) = 8.40, p = 
.005, pη2 =.433; Figure 2.13; Table 1.13). As can be seen from the comparison of the 
means, overall the FRNs were smaller in the Full-Control condition compared to Some-
Control condition. As no specific predictions regarding the site were made, a follow up 
analysis was conducted at every channel, in order to examine if sense of control effects 
were driven by FRN elicited by certain valence of the outcome (i.e., win or loss only).  
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Figure 2.13. Graphical representation of the interaction between sense of control and 
channel observed in the No Cue conditions in Experiment 2. 
 
In order to examine if sense of control had an effect on the FRN-valence effect a 
series of 2 (sense of control) x 2 (valence) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted for 
FRN peak amplitude at each channel (Table 1.14). As expected from the patterns 
observed in the means (Figure 2.13), there was a significant interaction between sense of 
control and valence at Fz (F(1,11) = 5.74, p = .035, pη2 = .34). Two correlated t-tests 
were conducted to further understand this interaction. As expected from the patterns in 
the means, there was a significant valence effect in the Some-Control condition (t(11)= 
3.39, p = .006) but no valence effect in the Full-Control condition (t(11) = 0.40, p = 
.699). Thus, the FRN valence effects were observed only in the Some-Control condition, 
such that losses elicited larger FRN compared to wins. No such difference was observed 
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in the Full-Control condition. The three three-way interaction among sense of control, 
valence and channel observed in the overall ANOVA was due to the presence of FRN-
valence effects at Fz in Some-Control condition, but not in any other conditions. 
Valence effects. The lack of FRN-valence effects in the no cue condition suggests 
that this task might not have worked as previously expected. In order to rule out this 
possibility a 2 (valence) x 3 (channel) ANOVA was conducted to examine if the FRN-
valence effect was present or absent in the Full, Some and No-Control conditions (Table 
1.15). In the Full-Control conditions, there was no significant valence effect when the 
cue was non-informative and a marginally significant effect of valence when the cue 
contained valence information (F (1,11) = 4.66, p = .054, pη2 = .298). Losses elicited a 
slightly larger FRN peak amplitude (M = -2.37, SD = -0.31) compared to wins (M = -
1.81, SD = 0.45). A similar analysis of FRN in the No-Control condition showed no 
significant effects or interactions of interest. A significant valence effect was observed in 
the Some-Control condition only when the cue was not informative regarding the type of 
trial (F (1,11) = 7.50, p = .019, pη2 = .405; Cue condition: F (1,11) = 2.62, p = .134, pη2 
= .192). Thus, the analysis of peak FRN amplitude revealed that presence of valence 
information in the cue abolishes the valence effect observed in the Some-Control 
condition. Presence or absence of the cue had no significant effect in the Full-Control or 
No-Control conditions; however, this could be due to the relatively small FRN-valence 
effect observed in these conditions in the first place. 
Summary. The current study failed to replicate the reversal of the FRN valence effect 
observed in Dzyundzyak (2010). A summary of the hypotheses and the obtained results 
can be seen in Table 1.16.  
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Table 1.16. Summary of the hypothesised and obtained results of the FRN peak analysis 
in Experiment 2 
*Note: effects are presented as absolute amplitude of the FRN (i.e., > means larger FRN) 
 
FRN amplitude was expected to be attenuated with decreasing levels of perceived 
sense of control. This hypothesis was not supported, as FRNs were larger in the No-
Control and Full-Control conditions compared to Some-Control condition. Furthermore, 
there were no consistent FRN valence effects in Full-Control and No-Control conditions 
suggesting that the tasks did not work as expected. The presence of a valenced cue was 
expected to attenuate the FRN or affect only the FRN following wins by eliciting reward 
positivity prior to presentation of feedback, thus, increasing the FRN valence effects. 
Presence of informative cue attenuated the FRN valence effects observed in the Some-
Control condition, such that both FRNs elicited by wins and that elicited by losses were 
larger in the No Cue condition (loss: M = -2.19, SE = 0.37; win: M = -1.46, SE = 0.35) 
compared to Cue condition (loss: M = -1.48, SE = 0.45; win: M = -1.01, SE = 0.42). 
 Hypothesised Obtained 
Valence (all 
conditions) 
Loss > Win*  Loss > Win  
(only in Some-Control) 
Sense of Control No < Some < Full No = Full < Some 
Cue No Cue > Cue No Cue > Cue   
(only in Some-Control at Fz) 
Interaction Cue-Full-Control: Loss < Win Cue-Full-Control: Loss = Win 
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However, the difference between wins and loss FRNs was significant only when the cue 
was non-informative. Thus, the effect of valenced cues on the FRN peak amplitude was 
partially supported.  
Difference wave results. 
According to Holroyd et al. (2008; 2011) any effects acting on the positivity elicited 
by rewards at the time of FRN can be missed if only FRN peak amplitude is analysed. It 
was predicted that effects of top-down and bottom-up factors will be dissociated in the 
reward positivity such that presence of an informative cue could attenuate the reward 
positivity at the time of the feedback, but manipulation of sense of control would have no 
effect. In order to examine effects of the cue and sense of control on the difference wave 
amplitude at the time of the FRN, a repeated measures 2 (cue) x 2 (sense of control) x 8 
(channel) ANOVA was conducted (Table 1.17). A significant interaction between sense 
of control and channel was observed (F(7,77) = 4.09, p = .045, pη2 =.271). In order to 
further investigate the source of significance for this interaction two repeated measures 
ANOVAs were conducted for the Some-Control and Full-Control conditions (Table 
1.18). There were no significant main effects or interactions observed in the Full-Control 
condition. Only the main effect of channel was significant in the Some-Control condition 
(F(7,77) = 6.92, p = .011, pη2 =.386), such that the average difference wave amplitude 
became more positive at more posterior channels. This finding is not surprising as effects 
of the P3 following the FRN (a positivity) are usually stronger at posterior sites. 
The analysis conducted on the peak FRN amplitude revealed that that valence effects 
in the Some-Control condition were affected by the cue. Although no such interactions 
were observed in the overall ANOVA using a difference wave approach, in order to be 
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consistent with the literature and to further confirm this effect, a repeated measures 
ANOVA was conducted using the average amplitude of the difference waves obtained in 
the cue and no cue conditions (Figures 2.14 and 2.15; Table 1.19). 
 
Figure 2.14. Averaged difference waves for the two types of cues received in the 
Some-Control condition in Experiment 2. 
Cue – Some-Control 
No Cue – Some-Control 
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Figure 2.15. Averaged difference waves for the two types of cues received in the 
Full-Control condition in Experiment 2. 
 
When valence information was present in the cue, there were no significant main 
effects or interactions. Thus, sense of control had no significant effect on the FRN-
valence effect in the presence of the cues. A similar analysis was conducted on the No 
Cue conditions. There was a significant interaction between channel location and sense 
of control (F (7,77) = 5.16, p = .024, pη2 =.319), such that the difference wave in the 
Full-Control condition was more positive than in the Some-Control condition at the 
Cue – Full-Control 
No Cue – Full-Control 
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frontal channels, but more negative at the more central sites. As the effect can be divide 
into two parts – more anterior and more posterior than C10 – a follow up repeated 
measures ANOVA was conducted on either the four sites more frontal than C10 (i.e., 
C14, C13, C12 and C11) or three sites that were more central/posterior (A1, A2, A18). 
Two follow-up repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted to examine effects of sense 
of control (FC vs SC), cue (NC and C) and possible interactions on the average 
difference wave amplitude (Table 1.20).  
Consistent with the analysis of the peak FRN amplitude, there were no significant 
main effects or interactions at the central/posterior sites. At the frontal sites, the effect of 
sense of control was significant (F (1,11) = 7.34, p = .020, pη2 = .400), such that average 
difference wave amplitude at the time of FRN in the Full-Control condition was more 
positive (M = 0.12, SD = 0.28) compared to Some-Control condition (M = -0.64, SD = 
0.20). This supports the hypothesis that the valence effect would be greater in the Full-
Control condition. 
Holroyd et al. (2008) proposed that these difference waves represent the effects of 
reward positivity at the time of the FRN. It was hypothesised that presence of an 
informative cue will either have no effect or attenuate the reward positivity at the time of 
the FRN. This hypothesis was partially supported, as the results of the difference waves’ 
amplitude analysis conducted in the Cue and No Cue conditions suggest that presence of 
informative cues diminished the reward positivity at the time of the FRN in the Some-
Control condition. The FRN following both wins and losses in the Cue/Some-Control 
condition was attenuated compared to the No Cue/Some-Control condition. However, 
given the absence of valence effects in the Some-Control/Cue conditions it is more likely 
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that more positive difference wave amplitude reflects smaller negativity elicited by 
outcomes in general rather than only due to presence of reward positivity per se.  
Exploratory analysis using robust ANOVAs.  
This hypothesis was further examined through the use of robust repeated measures 
ANOVAs on the group and single-subject GFA data. Comparison of Some-Control 
conditions were chosen based on the results of the peak FRN amplitude and difference 
waves analysis. A similar analysis was run on the data from individual subjects in order 
to examine the number of subjects showing this effect. 
The robust ANOVA analysis conducted on the group GFA data showed no consistent 
effects of valence, cue or an interaction of the two factors (Figure 2.16), i.e., no 
significant effects of valence that lasted longer than 10 ms. Cue and interaction effects 
were not only as short, they were also later in the segment at 800 and 900 ms post-
stimulus onset. As this result was inconsistent with the peak and difference wave 
analysis, a further investigation was conducted on single subject data. 
82 
 
Figure 2.16. Overlay of the group global field amplitude (GFA) data and graphical 
representation of results of robust ANOVA analysis. 
Robust ANOVAs were carried out to compare Cue-Some-Control and N-SC 
conditions in each subject. Patterns of significant values for the main effect of cue and 
valence were examined in order to identify individuals showing these effects (see Figure 
2.17 for an example). A total of nine participants showed stable cue effects (75.0%; 
Figure 2.18) and eight subjects showed valence effects at the time of the FRN (66.7%; 
Table 1.21). There were no significant interaction effects between the type of cue and 
valence of the outcome, so no further investigation was conducted. It appears that the 
effects of the cue on the FRN, such that the FRN amplitude is attenuated in the presence 
of a valenced cue, are seen in majority of subjects. However, as no cue by valence 
interactions were observed, cue effects were not limited to either one of the valence 
conditions (i.e., loss or win).
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(a)          (b)  
 
Figure 2.17. An example of significance values plot for the main effect of (a) cue and (b) valence for participant 14.  
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Figure 2.18. Overlay of significance value for cue effects across all subjects in the Some-Control condition. 
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Discussion 
This study was conducted to examine the effects of cue and sense of control on the 
FRN and to replicate the reversal of the FRN-valence effect observed in Dzyundzyak 
(2010). Analysis of the activations at the time of the FRN showed that there was a 
significant interaction between levels of sense of control, type of cue and valence of the 
outcome. More specifically, the effects of valence of the outcome on the FRN were 
attenuated when an informative cue was present. However, these effects were observed 
only in the Some-Control condition. A follow up difference wave analysis showed that at 
a more frontal channels, the Some-Control condition elicited a larger negativity at the 
time of the FRN compared to the Full-Control condition. A follow up analysis of 
waveforms elicited in the Some-Control condition showed that the valence and cue 
effects on the FRN were observed in only 2/3 of the participants. The hypothesised 
reversal of the FRN-valence effect in the Full-Control condition was not observed in this 
study.  
Sense of Control 
The effects of a sense of control on the FRN amplitude were not consistent with the 
hypothesis that increased levels of control over the outcomes would lead to an increase in 
the FRN-valence effect due to greater investment at the time of outcome presentation. 
There were no significant valence effects in the No-Control condition, suggesting 
participants did not differentiate in the FRN between the outcomes or possibly were not 
engaged adequately at the time of outcome presentation. Furthermore, FRN-valence 
effects observed in the Full-Control condition were not consistently significant across 
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cue condition and were not in the direction hypothesised from the Dzyundzyak (2010) 
data. Only Some-Control tasks produced clear valence effects. 
Thus, the results of the study should be interpreted with caution as lack of stable 
FRN-valence effects suggests that this experiment lacks power. In fact, although the 
study tested 12 participants, only 8 individuals showed stable valence effects in the 
Some-Control condition. It is possible that the length of testing time and similarity 
between the tasks affected participants’ engagement in the tasks, as the Cue and No Cue 
conditions were presented sequentially for each level of sense of control. However, the 
presentations of sense of control conditions were counterbalanced and there was no 
consistent pattern of condition orders that explained lack of FRN-valence effects.  
The established occurrence of the FRN-valence effect in the literature using a number 
of different tasks (e.g., time estimation, Miltner et al., 1997; gambling, Yeung & Sanfey, 
2004; learning, Bellebaum, & Daum, 2008) suggests that the FRN sensitivity to valence 
reflects an automatic process. However, the results of this study led to the conclusion that 
this automatic effect is subject to modulation of arousal and engagement in the task. This 
is not surprising given the relatively late timing of this component as well as previous 
literature showing that lower investment in the outcome attenuates the sensitivity of the 
FRN to valence (Yeung et al., 2005).  
Although the effects of sense of control manipulation were not in the expected 
direction, participants did perceive the levels manipulation of control to be different: If 
the sense of control manipulation had no effect on the FRN and subjects were not 
engaged in the tasks due to the length of testing session, the FRN effects in the Some-
Control condition should have been attenuated when these tasks were at the end of the 
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session. In fact, participants who did not show FRN-valence effects performed these 
tasks at all stages of the experiment (i.e., first, second and last). Furthermore, of those 
who showed the FRN-valence effects, Some-Control tasks were presented at the end of 
the session an equal number of times as in the beginning or middle.  
The reason for lack of the FRN-valence effect in the Full-Control and No-Control 
conditions could lie in the similarities between these tasks. Similar to the Full-Control 
condition, in the No-Control condition participants had to respond to the target cards 
within a longer but still limited period of time (700 ms). It is possible that participants 
viewed the Full-Control tasks as harder versions of the No-Control tasks, treating 
outcomes as not dependent on their responses, which in turn attenuated the FRN 
amplitude to the outcomes. However, this interpretation would be inconsistent with the 
self-reported feelings of control over the outcome.  
Cue 
Although the effects of sense of control on the FRN could not be interpreted due to 
the manipulation not working as well as expected, the effects of cue could still be 
examined. In the Some-Control condition, presence of the informative cues attenuated 
the FRN amplitude to both positive and negative outcomes.  These findings are 
consistent with previous research that predictive cues elicit an FRN-like response that is 
similar to the FRN response to outcome valence (Deng et al., 2012). Furthermore, 
Holroyd et al (2011) showed that predictive cues elicited a positivity that affected the 
FRN amplitude at the time of outcome. The results of this study are consistent with these 
findings such that if presence of an informative cue elicited a response to positive 
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valence (i.e., potential wins), it would have affected the reward positivity at the time of 
the outcome, but not the response to losses.  
Integration with Dzyundzyak (2010) data 
It appears that the reversal of the FRN effect observed in Dzyundzyak (2010) was not 
due to the presence of informative cue or higher level of sense of control over the 
outcome. There were no other differences in the task structures and characteristics that 
could have influenced the FRN amplitude. Furthermore, two studies have used the MID 
task to examine the FRN sensitivity to valence and found that loss-FRN was larger than 
win-FRN (Santesso et al., 2012; Broyd et al., 2012). So it seems likely that the FRN 
effects observed were due to some difference in the structure of this version of the MID 
task compared to the versions used in the literature. In these studies the duration of the 
target was adjusted based on a practice period prior to the task or with a computerized 
algorithm during the task based on frequencies of rewards. More specifically, on the loss 
trials, the target was visible only for the 15th percentile RT of the participant and on win 
trials on the 85th (Santesso et al., 2012), a considerable difference in the paradigm from 
the dynamic adjustment method we used. A similar adjustment was made in the Broyd et 
al. (2012) study such that RTs were tracked throughout the task and target duration was 
adjusted after win responses to result in 66% win overall (Broyd et al., 2012). The 
version of the MID task used in Dzyundzyak (2010) adjusted target duration by a fixed 
period of time (+20/-10 ms) after every trial so the difficulty of the task varied 
throughout the task duration. If this is the case, the reversal of the FRN-valence effect 
could have been driven by the first blocks of the task where the difficulty was not 
uniform. The target was always presented for 280 ms at first, so the first few trials could 
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have been either a sequence of wins (if their average RTs were faster) or a series of 
losses (if their average RTs were slower), which could have set up expectations for the 
rest of the task. If this is the case, individuals would vary in their FRN responses 
depending on which outcome they were more set up to expect. This would explain why 
this effect was not replicated in other studies using the same paradigm. This hypothesis 
can further explain why there were no consistent valence effects observed in the Full-
Control condition of this study. If loss outcomes were more unexpected than win 
outcomes for some individuals, a larger FRN would be observed following losses; 
however, if win outcomes were more unexpected then the FRN amplitude would reflect 
that by being more negative after wins. This variability in opposite directions would have 
been impossible to detect when working with group data. A more in-depth analysis of 
individual subject data could shed light on how many participants showed the valence 
effects in the expected direction (however, there are technical reasons at the moment 
preventing this analysis). Thus, further research is needed to determine whether the 
characteristic in the task structure of the MID used in Dzyundzyak (2010) is necessary to 
understand the reversal of the FRN-valence effect. 
Summary 
In summary, presence of cues attenuated the FRN-valence effects in a gambling task 
by eliciting a greater positivity at the time of the feedback presentation, as both wins and 
losses elicited a smaller FRN in the cue condition compared to No Cue trials. Thus, the 
hypothesis concerning effects of a valenced cue on the FRN was partially supported. 
Contrary to expectations, the manipulation of sense of control was not reflected in the 
FRN amplitude. More specifically, FRN amplitude in the No-Control and Full-Control 
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conditions was similar in size and larger than that observed in the Some-Control 
condition. This pattern of results cannot be explained by varying levels of sense of 
control, and suggests that there were unpredicted similarities between No-Control and 
Full-Control condition which in turn affected the FRN amplitude. A more in-depth 
analysis of the tasks is required in order to fully understand why the predicted effects 
were not observed. Finally, this study was conducted in order to replicate the reversal of 
the FRN valence effect observed in Dzyunzyak (2007). This reversal was not replicated, 
which could be due to low power or context of the task presentation (i.e., in conjunction 
with No-Control conditions rather than on its own). Nevertheless, the results of this study 
do not support the hypothesis that combination of valenced cue and high level of sense of 
control over the outcome produced the aforementioned reversal of the FRN-valence 
effect. Thus, it is likely that another characteristic of the MID task used in Dzyundzyak 
(2010) led to the observed reversal of the established FRN valence effect. 
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STUDY 2: Effects of sense of control, expectation and gambling experience on 
the activity of the ACC: An ERP Study 
The proposed model of FRN generation was tested in Study 2 by examining the 
influences of expectations and control over the outcome on the FRN amplitude. In 
contrast to Study 1 where sense of control objectively increased between conditions (i.e., 
ranging from watching the computer make a decision to outcomes depending on fast 
reaction times), in Study 2 the two tasks differed in perceived levels of control, as the 
outcomes were predetermined in both tasks and did not depend on participant’s actual 
performance. In the gambling task, participants had to guess a correct ‘door’ for a reward 
(i.e., low control) as opposed to the second task where rewards were obtained after 
accurate estimation of time (i.e., higher control). As all of the outcomes were 
predetermined, any task effects (i.e., sense of control) on the FRN would occur due to a 
difference in cognitive set between the tasks (i.e., perceptions of control) and, thus, 
would be interpreted as support for top-down flow of information (i.e., from medial 
PFC). The second factor examined in this study was the difference between probability-
based (bottom-up) and instruction-based (top-down) expectations. This was done through 
comparisons of FRNs elicited in a gambling paradigm, where participants were explicitly 
asked to make a prediction about the outcome, and a time-estimation task, where 
participants’ expectations were modulated through instructions. The second goal of the 
study was to examine associations between gambling behaviour and the FRN. Two 
groups of participants were recruited for this study: individuals without and with 
evidence of problem gambling behaviour. Previous research has shown that severity of 
gambling behaviour as well as problem gambling status were associated with changes in 
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the functioning of the reward network (e.g., activity of the ventral stratum; Chase & 
Clark, 2010; Meidl, Peters & Büchel, 2012). There has been little research examining the 
differences in EEG measures between gamblers and non-gamblers; thus, this study was 
conducted to further understand whether (a) FRN can be used as a marker for problem 
gambling behaviour, and (b) problem gamblers respond to expectations and sense of 
control modulations in a fashion different from the non-gamblers given the changes in 
the activity of the reward system observed in problem gamblers. 
Effects of expectations on the FRN 
Previous research has shown that the individual’s expectations about the outcome can 
influence the FRN amplitude (Bellebaum & Daum, 2008; Kobza et al., 2011; Liao et al, 
2011). For example, a Time Estimation task, with easy and hard blocks, was used to 
show that when expectations are modulated by the frequency of the outcomes, 
unexpected/infrequent outcomes (e.g., loss in an easy block) elicited a larger FRN than 
expected/frequent outcomes (Holroyd & Krigloson, 2007). Similar results were found 
when expectations were manipulated through variable frequency of positive outcomes 
following certain cue-response key combinations (Pfabigani, Alexopoulos, Baue, & 
Sailer, 2011). The FRN amplitude was largest after unexpected negative outcomes (i.e., 
most unfavourable outcomes) which is consistent with the reinforcement learning theory, 
such that the FRN reflects the magnitude of prediction error based on both valence and 
expectedness of the outcome. 
The nature of the FRN sensitivity to expectations has been further examined using 
PCA decomposition on the waveforms at the time of the FRN (Potts, Martin, Kamp, & 
Donchin, 2010). Participants’ expectations were manipulated by associating trial cues 
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with different probabilities of winning. The study design also included a Flanker task 
allowing for examination of ERP responses during self-generated errors (i.e., ERN) as 
opposed to reward-prediction errors (i.e., FRN). The decomposition of the FRN and ERN 
showed that these components share a central generator and another more anterior 
generator that was active only at the time of the FRN.  Thus, it appears that although 
ERN and FRN share a common generator, the FRN generation requires more complex 
activations. Baker and Holroyd (2011) expand on this idea by proposing that task-
relevant events in general (e.g., errors) elicit an N2 component at the time of the FRN, 
which is shared with the ERN. Rewards on the other hand, also elicit a positivity that is 
absent on the non-reward trials and increases in size if reward was unexpected.  Together 
the results of these studies can be interpreted as evidence for a more anterior generator 
active at the time of the FRN, which is responsible for reward positivity observed after 
gain outcomes. Thus, previous research suggests that effects of valence and expectation 
on the FRN are additive, such that prediction errors are calculated separately for events 
of positive and negative valence.  
However, in most tasks the effects of expectations on the FRN are set up by using 
different probabilities of outcomes on different types of trials. Probabilities of outcomes 
are learned by exposure to different frequencies of outcomes of each valence, which are 
usually dependent on the type of trial, which leads to unequal frequencies of a reward 
and non-rewards/punishments for each type of trial. This approach complicates any 
attempt to dissociate the effects of valence and expectations as both of these stimulus 
characteristics are necessary for behavioural adjustment. In order to clarify the relative 
sensitivity of the ACC to expectedness and valence of a stimulus, a Time Estimation task 
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with three levels of outcomes (excellent, ok, bad) was used (Ferdinand, Mecklinger, & 
Gehring, 2012). The intermediate feedback (i.e., ok) occurred often and was expected but 
did not contain any valence information. The valenced outcomes (i.e., excellent and bad) 
occurred only 20% of the time and, thus, were unexpected. The valence effects observed 
were in the expected direction, such that FRN was larger after negative feedback than 
positive. Unexpected feedback was associated with larger FRN for both positive and 
negative outcomes, suggesting that the ACC activity is modulated by valence and 
expectedness of events separately and probably in an additive fashion. If a reward is 
unexpected it will elicit larger FRN amplitude than an expected reward; however, both of 
these FRNs will be smaller than those elicited by losses. It should be noted that these 
results are inconsistent with the effects of expectations on the reward positivity, which 
was proposed to increase for unexpected rewards and, thus, lead to a smaller FRN (i.e., 
FRN following unexpected wins would be more positive compared to expected wins; 
Baker & Holroyd, 2011). Thus, currently there is some debate in the literature with 
regard to effects of expectations on the FRN elicited by positive feedback.  
More commonly, expectations on the task are set up by alerting participants to 
probabilities of a positive outcome on each trial. Hajcak, Moser, Holroyd and Simons 
(2007) examined the effects of expectations by giving participants four ‘doors’ to choose 
from and showing a cue on each trial informing them of the number of doors that 
contained a reward. Participants were asked to make explicit predictions about the 
outcome of the trial either prior to or post choice. Interestingly, expectations (i.e., 
accuracy of predictions) had no effect on the FRN amplitude elicited by feedback if the 
predictions were made prior to choosing a door. If the predictions were made after the 
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decision was made, unexpected events would elicit a larger FRN compared to expected 
outcomes. It appears as though the sensitivity of the FRN to expectation is dependent on 
the close temporal proximity of the prediction and the outcome or psychological 
investment in one’s prediction (e.g., higher confidence). It is possible that effects of 
expectations are observed only when one’s prediction is salient to the individual at the 
time of feedback presentation. In a previously described study, FRN valence effects were 
observed only if participants are given enough time to develop predictions (Bismark et 
al., 2013). Thus, in order for the effects of expectations to be observed at the time of the 
FRN, participants should be given enough time to develop these expectations but not 
long enough for the predictions to lose their salience at the time of the outcome.   
In summary, the exact nature of the effects of expectation on the FRN still remains 
controversial as some studies report larger FRNs following all unexpected outcomes 
(Hajcak et al., 2007; Ferdinand et al., 2012), whereas others suggest smaller FRNs if 
unexpected outcomes are positively valenced (Baker & Holroyd, 2011). It has also been 
shown that the effects of expectation on the FRN are transient and can be seen only if 
that characteristic of the stimulus is salient at the time of feedback delivery (Hajcak et al., 
2007; Bismark et al., 2013). Thus, the expectation effects on the FRN amplitude are 
dependent on the structure of the task used to elicit the FRN and more research is needed 
in order to clarify how this stimulus characteristic is coded by the ACC. 
The effects of expectations are usually manipulated by varying the probability of the 
outcomes on certain trials using different types of cues to inform the participant of these 
probabilities. Previous research shows that the nAcb (i.e., basal ganglia) responds during 
learning of associations (e.g., cue-outcome pairing) by reacting to the presentation of the 
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cue in a similar fashion as to presentation of the outcomes (see Shultz, 2007, for review). 
The level of activation at the time of the outcome presentation is dependent on the 
strength of the cue-outcome association, and reflects the degree of violation of 
expectations. For example, in the ‘doors’ task used by Hajcak et al. (2007), participants 
were presented with a cue signifying the probability of positive outcome such that these 
cues predicted the frequency of rewards obtained. In this task, the degree of violation of 
expectation is presumed to be coded in subcortical structures as expectations are 
dependent on the cue-outcome associations. According to the proposed model of FRN 
generation (see Figure 3.1), if expectations are modulated by true cue-outcome 
associations (i.e., cues are predictive of the outcomes) any effects of expectedness of the 
stimulus on the FRN will reflect activation of the ACC driven by projections from the 
subcortical areas (i.e., bottom-up). However, if participants are only led to believe that 
these cue-outcome associations exist, while the frequency of positive outcomes is 
identical for each type of cue, any effect of expectation on the FRN will reflect top-down 
regulation of ACC activity. For example, expectations can be manipulated through 
instructions such that the task appears to have different types of trials (e.g., easy vs. hard) 
but in reality the probabilities of obtaining a positive outcome are equal across all types 
of trials. In this case, expectations are not based on objective stimulus characteristics but 
arise due to a different cognitive state at the time of outcome presentation. According to 
the proposed model of FRN generation, any effects of subjective (rather than objective) 
stimulus characteristics will be coded in the PFC and then projected down to modulate 
the activation of the ACC. 
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Figure 3.1. Graphical representation of the propose model and predicted pathways 
for the expectation and sense of control effects tested in Study 2. 
These predictions were tested in Study 2 by comparing the effects of expectations in 
a gambling paradigm, where participants were asked to explicitly predict the outcome 
after exposure to a cue signifying probability of positive outcome, and a Time Estimation 
task, where expectations were manipulated by telling participants there are hard and easy 
trials. Outcomes in both tasks were predetermined, such that in the gambling task reward 
frequency was consistent with probabilistic cues, whereas in the Time Estimation task, 
the frequency of rewards following each cue was identical by the end of the task. It was 
hypothesized that expectations set up by instructions will modulate the FRN amplitude 
such that unexpected outcomes (e.g., win on a hard trial) will elicit a larger FRN 
compared to expected outcomes (e.g., win on an easy trial). This effect will be 
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interpreted as support for top-down control of the ACC at the time of the FRN. Any 
effects of expectation in the gambling task will be interpreted as evidence of bottom-up 
input to the ACC. 
Gambling behaviour 
The secondary goal of this study was to examine the effect of previous gambling 
behaviour on the FRN Problem gambling is one of few addictions that is purely 
behavioural and the changes in the central nervous system are not confounded with drug 
effects as is common with other addictions. There has been a great deal of research on 
the development of maladaptive gambling behaviour, environmental and personality risk-
factors as well as heterogeneity of the samples (e.g., Ledgerwood & Petry, 2006; 
Myrseth, et al., 2010; Lorains, Cowlishaw, & Thomas, 2011; for a review on gamblers 
subtypes see Milosevic & Ledgerwood, 2010). Previous research has shown that there 
are a number of neurotransmitters, including dopamine, and structures in the reward 
network related to problem gambling behaviour (for a review see Potenza, 2008). . It has 
been consistently shown that dopamine is the neurotransmitter responsible for coding of 
rewarding information (Shultz, 2007). Increases in dopamine levels are associated with 
increased seeking of rewards, which sometimes lead to maladaptive behaviours such as 
overeating or excessive gambling (Dodd et al., 2005). In order to understand why 
problem gambling behaviour might influence FRN sensitivity to stimulus characteristics, 
we must first establish that the structures involved in FRN generation show altered 
activity in individuals with problem gambling behaviour. Recently more studies have 
been conducted examining the effect of maladaptive gambling behaviour on processing 
of reward-related information more generally. 
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Previous research has shown that administration of dopamine agonists to patients 
with lowered levels of dopamine (e.g., Parkinsons, Restless leg syndrome) can lead to 
manifestation of problem gambling behaviour and inability to control impulses (Dodd, et 
al., 2005; Tippmann-Peikert, et al., 2007). In participants with Parkinson’s disease, 
increased capacity for dopamine synthesis in the ventral stratum was shown to be related 
to impulsive behaviour, particularly financial extravagance and irresponsibility 
(Lawrence, Brooks, & Whone, 2013). Additionally, patients exhibiting problem 
gambling behaviour were shown to have an increased release of dopamine in ventral 
stratum compared to their non-problem gambling counterparts (Steeves et al., 2009). If 
FRN is a marker for the dopaminergic signal relayed to the ACC, and problem gambling 
behaviour is associated with changes in the release or baseline levels of dopamine in the 
brain, then FRN should vary with variations in problem gambling status/severity. 
Similarly, if FRN reflects signalling within the reward network, any changes in the 
functioning of this network should be reflected in the FRN.  
Further evidence for changes in activity of the reward network, more specifically the 
ventral stratum, in response to dopamine agonists (i.e., changes in dopamine levels) was 
provided by Abler et al. (2009), who measured BOLD responses of patients with restless 
leg syndrome (on and off medication) while they performed a version of monetary 
incentive delay task (i.e., similar to Full-Control condition described in Study 1). In this 
version rewards were delivered at different probabilities ranging from 0 to 100%. When 
patients were off medication (i.e., low levels of dopamine in the system) ventral stratum 
activity was highest for positive prediction errors (i.e., unlikely rewards) and lowest for 
negative prediction errors (i.e., unlikely losses). This pattern was reversed when 
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participants were on medication, and had higher levels of dopamine in the system. Thus, 
the results of this study further support the role of dopamine in prediction error signals 
and provide evidence that dopamine levels in the brain can drastically change the 
response to negative consequences. As none of the participants in the study developed 
problems with gambling behaviour, it still remains to be seen if these changes underlie 
development of problem gambling behaviour. However, increased dopamine release in 
ventral striatum has been shown to be associated with increased subjective ratings of 
excitement during Iowa Gambling Task in problem gamblers but not in controls (Linnet, 
et al., 2010) suggesting that activity of dopaminergic neurons in the reward network is 
altered in this population.  Interestingly, this relationship was not significant in the non-
gambling version of the task, where participants were instructed which card to pick (i.e., 
no dopamine release). Thus, this altered reactivity of the reward network is observed 
only in specific contexts. In summary, the evidence outlined above suggests that 
dopamine plays a role in maladaptive gambling behaviour, possibly by increasing 
arousal/excitement levels in gambling context and altering the response of ventral 
stratum to prediction errors. In other words, problem gambling behaviour is associated 
with altered reactivity of the reward network such that variations in baseline dopamine 
levels affect the prediction error signal in the basal ganglia, which in turn should be 
reflected in the FRN response. Similarly, any changes in the responsivity of the reward 
network (i.e., changes in the levels of activation of the structures within the network), 
should be reflected in the FRN. So it is important to establish that problem gambling is 
also associated with altered activation of various areas within the reward network.  
104 
For example, Chase and Clark (2010) showed evidence of changes in the ventral 
stratum activity in individuals with problem gambling behaviour by examining the 
activity of ventral striatum in response to reward information in a group of problem 
gamblers and compared it to healthy controls. A slot machine task was used to deliver 
three levels of outcomes: win, near-miss and miss. Wins occurred when the two ‘wheels’ 
displayed on the screen stopped at matching icons, whereas near-miss outcomes occurred 
when the second wheel stopped one position below or above a matching icon. Wins and 
near-misses elicited a similar response in the ventral striatum in all participants, 
suggesting that the reward network is sensitive to near-miss outcomes even though these 
outcomes do not lead to a reward. More importantly, severity of gambling problems was 
predictive of this activation such that more severe behaviour problems were associated 
with increased activity of the ventral striatum to near-misses. Gambling severity was not 
related to the activity of any other areas and did not predict activations following wins. 
Thus, maladaptive gambling behaviour is associated with altered responses of the 
subcortical areas to presentation of omitted rewards at the level of ventral striatum.7   
Further evidence of altered reactivity of the reward network was provided by Meidl 
et al (2012), who conducted an fMRI study to examine the effects of delay and 
probabilistic discounting on the activations in the reward system (Meidl et al., 2012). 
Discounting is the decrease of subjective reward value that occurs either due to a delay in 
its delivery or due to low probability of the reward. The goal of the study was to examine 
if problem gambling status has a differential effect on the responsivity of the reward 
system to probabilities and delays of the rewards. The combination of delay and 
probabilistic discounting tasks used allowed the authors to calculate estimates of 
                                                           
7
 Note: Ventral striatum contains nAcb. 
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subjective reward value in each trial and examine the relationships between reward value 
and activity in the ventral striatum and orbitofrontal cortex. Individuals with problem 
gambling behaviour were less tolerant to delay of rewards (i.e., they discounted delayed 
rewards more steeply and were less sensitive to changes in subjective value of the 
stimulus due to changes in probability of the outcome compared to healthy controls. So, 
problem gambling status was associated with higher impulsivity (i.e., less willing to wait 
for rewards) and lower sensitivity to risks associated with reward attainment. The 
activation of the reward system reflected the behavioural results such that activations 
measured during the delay discounting task, but not in the probabilistic discounting task, 
were negatively correlated with gambling severity (i.e., impulsivity and not risk-taking 
was associated with changes in the activation levels). Furthermore, compared to healthy 
controls problem gamblers showed lower activations in ventral striatum and orbitofrontal 
cortex during the probabilistic task and higher activations during the discounting task, 
suggesting that these individuals are less sensitive to risks and more sensitive to delays of 
the rewards. Thus, we have further evidence that individuals engaged in maladaptive 
gambling behaviour show altered response of the reward network compared to healthy 
controls. 
Furthermore, individuals with problem gambling behaviour were also shown to 
respond preferentially to certain types of rewards, which was reflected in the activation 
of the reward network (Sescousse et al., 2013). In their task, participants were first shown 
a cue which contained information regarding the type of upcoming reward (monetary vs. 
erotic), probability of the reward (25%, 50% or 75%) and its intensity (low or high). In 
order to have a chance at obtaining the reward, participants had to successfully perform a 
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visual discrimination task. Failure on the task automatically resulted in a loss, whereas 
successful performance led to presentation of either a reward (erotic image or picture of a 
safe with the amount won) or reward omission (scrambled picture). Behavioural data and 
activations during the anticipation period of the task suggested that pathological 
gamblers are less motivated by erotic rewards than monetary incentives. Furthermore, 
subjective ratings of rewards were correlated with activity of ventral striatum such that 
healthy controls showed increased activations with higher reward values for all types of 
rewards, whereas in gamblers such relationship was observed only for monetary rewards. 
Thus, pathological gamblers seem to be driven more by monetary rewards, and this 
preference is reflected in the activity of the basal ganglia. Furthermore, gamblers also 
recruited orbitofrontal cortex during processing of monetary and erotic rewards, but 
healthy controls did so only for erotic rewards. Thus, gamblers were shown to have 
greater recruitment of the subcortical and cortical areas within the reward network in 
response to monetary rewards.  
Similar results were obtained by van Holst et al (2012) who examined activations of 
the striatum (ventral and dorsal; i.e., subcortical) and orbitofrontal cortex (i.e., cortical) in 
gamblers and healthy controls during a gambling paradigm where magnitude and 
probability of the reward were manipulated. Compared to controls, problem gamblers 
showed higher activity of the striatum to stimuli with larger magnitude and higher 
activity of both the striatum and orbitofrontal cortex to gains. There were no group 
differences for loss trials, suggesting that gambling is associated with altered response to 
rewards but not punishments. Severity of gambling was not associated with activation of 
any of these areas, but did relate inversely to amygdala activity such that individuals with 
107 
higher severity scores showed lower amygdala activity during gain trials. The results of 
this study suggest that problem gamblers process gain information differently from 
controls, both in the reward and emotion/motivation (i.e., amygdala) areas.  
Gambling behaviour and ERP research.  
In summary, previous research shows that maladaptive gambling behaviour is 
associated with changes in dopamine availability within the reward network and altered 
reactivity of this network. More specifically, individuals with problem gambling 
behaviour have differential recruitment of reward-related structures at the time of reward 
delivery and anticipation compared to healthy controls. These activations relate to 
gambling severity, subjective value and type of the reward. According to the 
reinforcement learning theory, the FRN reflects the dopaminergic signal from the 
subcortical areas of the reward network. Furthermore, the model of FRN generation 
proposed in this dissertation states that this prediction error signal is also modulated by 
cortical areas (i.e., medial PFC). If this is indeed the case, altered activations of 
dopaminergic subcortical and medial prefrontal areas suggest that effects of altered 
reward processing observed in problem gamblers can also be reflected in the EEG 
measures of feedback processing. To date, there have been only a few studies examining 
the variability in the FRN in response to gambling status. 
Oberg, Christine and Tata (2011) have shown that healthy controls and individuals 
with problem gambling behaviour differ in their FRN response during a computerized 
version of the Iowa Gambling Task. On each trial, participants were asked to choose the 
size of the bet (large vs. small) and then were shown the outcome of the trial (win vs. 
loss). In gamblers outcome valence was differentiated in the ERP waveforms earlier than 
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in healthy controls. This differentiation was localized to the medial frontal cortex and 
appeared to be an FRN with an earlier latency. The amplitude of this early FRN was 
significantly correlated with gambling severity such that FRNs became smaller (i.e., 
more positive) as severity of gambling increased. Thus, as was expected from the results 
of fMRI studies, previous history of gambling behaviour has been shown to modulate the 
activity of reward network which was reflected in the FRN.  
Further examination of the FRN sensitivity to gambling experiences was compared 
across healthy controls and individuals with problem gambling behaviour (Torres et al., 
2013). Successful task performance depended on learning of the association between 
probability of a reward and response as well as ability to adapt when these contingencies 
suddenly changed. Problem gamblers showed an attenuated FRN response to feedback 
compared to healthy controls. These results are consistent with fMRI studies showing 
altered activation of the reward network in individuals with problem gambling behaviour 
(Chase and Clark, 2010; Meidl et al., 2012), which would be expected to lead to altered 
FRN response compared to healthy controls. 
To date, there is only one other study comparing FRN response in healthy controls 
and problem gamblers (Kreussel, et al., 2013). A modified version of blackjack (the goal 
of which is to pick cards to approach as closely as possible but not exceed a total of 21) 
was used to elicit FRN response to three types of feedback: win, near loss and full loss. 
Full-loss trials were defined as trials where the final sum of the drawn cards was between 
24 and 26, whereas on the near loss trials the sum was 22 or 23. At the time of the FRN, 
healthy controls showed a larger response following near-loss trials than on full-loss ones 
suggesting that near losses were viewed as more negative compared to full losses. 
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Interestingly, this effect was not observed in gamblers, who seemed to not differentiate 
between the gradations of negative outcomes. This finding is inconsistent with Chase and 
Clark’s (2010) results who showed that near-miss outcomes led to greater activation of 
ventral stratum in problem gamblers; however, the nature of the relationship between 
activation of the ventral stratum and the size of the FRN has not been well-established. 
The dopaminergic signal can have either an excitatory or inhibitory effect on the 
receiving area, depending on the type of receptor that it binds to (Missale et al., 1998). 
Thus, activity in ventral striatum can lead to either an increased or decreased activation 
of the ACC and a larger/smaller FRN response. Nevertheless, both studies show that 
problem gamblers differ from healthy control in the recruitment of the reward network in 
response to omission of rewards.  
In summary, previous research showed that individuals with problem gambling 
behaviour show altered activity in the structures associated with reward processing. 
Similar effects were observed using EEG measures, such that FRN observed in gamblers 
was not as sensitive to the distinctions between the gradations of outcomes as FRN 
observed in healthy controls. Thus, the altered response of the reward network observed 
in previously described fMRI studies is reflected in the FRN amplitude and latency. 
Unfortunately, there are only a few studies examining the FRN response in problem 
gamblers and the results of these studies were inconsistent (e.g., earlier latency of the 
FRN in gamblers found by Oberg et al., 2011, has not been reported in other studies).  As 
there is no research examining the effects of expectations and sense of control on the 
FRN sensitivity in problem gamblers, no specific hypothesis about the direction of the 
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differences between the groups were made. However, it is expected that gamblers will 
show a differentiated FRN response (attenuated or enhanced) compared to non-gamblers.  
Hypotheses 
This study was constructed to test the proposed model of FRN generation by 
examining the effects of sense of control and expectations on the FRN in a sample of 
non-gamblers/recreational gamblers and individuals with various levels of problem 
gambling behaviour. The tasks were designed to differ on the amount of perceived 
control over the outcome; participants were expected to report higher ability to predict 
outcomes and higher confidence in their predictions after the Time Estimation task 
compared to the Doors task. Higher levels of control over the outcome were expected to 
either increase the FRN amplitude in general or increase the size of the FRN-valence 
effect due to greater investment in the outcomes in the Time Estimation task compared to 
the Doors task.  
Previous research has also shown that problem gamblers often hold cognitive 
distortions regarding their ability to control outcomes. For example, compared to 
recreational gamblers, problem gamblers report significantly higher levels of beliefs in 
their ability to control outcomes in gambling situations through the use of strategies or 
skill, beliefs in “winning streaks” or near-wins signifying increased chances of winning, 
higher levels of impaired control over own gambling habit, and memory bias (i.e., 
remembering wins and discounting losses; Johansson, et al, 2009). Some of these effects 
were replicated in another sample of recreational gamblers, who reported higher levels of 
‘fate control’ belief (i.e., belief that life events are predetermined and one has No-Control 
over the outcomes), which was positively correlated with gambling frequency (Tang & 
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Wu, 2010). Thus, this relationship was mediated by positive expectations (i.e., gambling 
leads to positive outcomes) and perception of lack of control over one’s gambling habits. 
Thus, individuals who engage in gambling behaviour (recreationally or pathologically) 
show cognitive distortions that lead to perception of increased control over the outcome. 
As the two tasks used in this study were expected to be different in perceived levels of 
sense of control over the outcome (i.e., low in the Doors task and high in the Time 
Estimation task), it is possible that gamblers would not differentiate their responses in the 
two tasks on this variable. Thus, an interaction is expected between gambling status and 
sense of control, such that any effects of sense of control on the FRN would be observed 
only in the non-gambling sample. 
The hypothesis based on the proposed model was that complex cognitive constructs 
that affect the participant’s cognitive state at the time of the task also influence the ACC 
activity and in turn the FRN. These influences are proposed to occur through frontal 
projections to the ACC. As in Study 1, any influences of the “sense of control” on the 
FRN-valence effects would be interpreted as evidence for the top-down modulation of 
the FRN. 
Effects of expectedness of the outcome on the FRN were also examined in this study. 
In the Doors task, participants were asked to predict the outcome prior to the presentation 
of feedback. The trials were then divided into expected/unexpected wins and losses. In 
the Time Estimation task, the expectedness of the outcome was manipulated through 
instructions such that participants were under the impression that the task contained easy 
and hard trials. Participants were informed of the difficulty of the trial with a cue prior to 
the time estimation period. The trials were divided into expected wins (easy trial wins), 
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expected losses (hard trial losses), unexpected wins (hard trial wins) and unexpected 
losses (easy trial losses). The task was designed to have predetermined outcomes which 
were independent of participants’ responses and resulted in equal frequency of each type 
of outcome by the end of the task.  
Effects of expectation.   
Any effects of expectations observed in the gambling task are interpreted as evidence 
for bottom-up modulation of ACC activity, as the expectations were manipulated through 
the probability and frequency of the outcomes. In the Time Estimation task, expectations 
were manipulated through instructions and, thus, expectation effects on the FRN were 
interpreted as evidence for top-down modulation of the ACC activity. 
(a) Previous research has shown that FRNs following unexpected outcomes are larger 
in amplitude compared to those following expected outcomes as long as these 
expectations are salient to the individual at the time of outcome presentation (e.g., 
Holroyd & Krigloson, 2007; Pfabigani, et al., 2011; Ferdinand et al., 2012). Thus, 
it was hypothesized that unexpected outcomes would elicit larger FRNs 
compared to expected ones. 
 (b) Additionally, if the reward positivity increases for trials with unexpected 
outcomes as was suggested by Baker and Holroyd (2011), it is possible that 
unexpected wins would elicit smallest FRN amplitude (i.e., most positive).  
(c) Currently, there is no previous literature examining the effects of expectations on 
the FRN where probability of the outcomes was not manipulated. Thus, a sub-
goal of this study was to determine whether the manipulation in the Time 
Estimation task would affect the FRN sensitivity to the expectedness of the 
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outcome in a manner similar to that of the Doors task, i.e., unexpected outcomes 
should lead to larger FRN amplitude or elicit larger reward positivity. 
(d) As there is no research to date regarding effects of expectations (whether top-
down or bottom-up) on the FRN in problem gamblers, no specific hypothesis was 
made for this group. Thus, these analyses are exploratory. 
 Sense of Control.  
In contrast to Study 1, only the perception of sense of control over the outcome was 
manipulated in this study as the outcomes on all tasks were predetermined and were 
independent from participants’ performance. Thus, any effects of sense of control (i.e., 
task effects) on the FRN are interpreted as evidence of top-down modulation of ACC 
activity. An interaction between sense of control and gambling status is expected such 
that: 
(a) Increased perception of sense of control is expected to increase the FRN valence 
effect (i.e., larger difference between win and loss FRNs)  
(b)  only in the non-problem gambling group. 
Group differences. 
Relationships between several individual difference measures (i.e., HEXACO and 
Locus of Control) and FRN elicited in each task were examined. Any potential 
differences between the two samples on these measures were also investigated. Due to 
the relatively small sample size, these analyses were considered exploratory. Finally, 
effects of frequency of gambling behaviour on the FRN were also investigated. Previous 
research had shown a relationship between activation of the reward network and severity 
of gambling (Chase & Clark, 2010; Meidl et al., 2012). Based on the hypothesized 
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dopaminergic nature of the FRN, it is expected that increased frequency of gambling 
would be related to the FRN amplitude or latency. 
 (a) Problem gamblers are expected to produce similar patterns of FRN activity 
across both tasks, whereas for non-problem gamblers, FRN sensitivity should 
change with increasing perceptions of control over the outcome as outlined 
above. 
(b) Based on the results of Oberg et al. (2011) problem gamblers are expected to 
differentiate between the valence of the outcomes earlier than non-problem 
gamblers (i.e., earlier FRN peak latency). 
(c) Torres et al. (2013) suggest that problem gambling might be associated with an 
overall attenuated FRN response, so it is hypothesised that problem gamblers will 
have smaller FRNs for all types of outcomes compared to the control group (i.e., 
non-problem gamblers). 
(d) An interaction between self-report ratings of control and gambling status is 
expected, such that only individuals not at-risk for problem gambling will rate 
their perceived control over the outcomes higher in the Time Estimation task 
compared to the Doors task. The Locus of Control measure was also included to 
examine if there are any group differences in the belief that one’s actions affect 
(internal) or do not affect (external) outcomes. It is expected that problem 
gamblers will report higher levels of external locus of control. 
(e) Previous research has shown that individuals at high risk for problem gambling 
score significantly lower than at-risk and low-risk gamblers on measures of 
Emotionality, Honesty-Humility and Conscientiousness (Twigger, 2010). 
115 
Personality factors were examined in this study with the same measure 
(HEXACO) in order to replicate these findings. Furthermore, if such differences 
are found, it is expected that measures of FRN will mediate this relationship. 
Methods 
Participants 
A total of 46 adult participants from the Niagara area community and Brock 
University campus were recruited for the study through an online ad (posted at 
www.kijiji.ca). Due to the nature of one of the tasks (doors task, see below) three 
participants did not have enough trials in the expected loss and unexpected win 
conditions and their data were removed from the analysis. Additionally two participants 
were found to be consistent outliers (±3SD) on several ERP measures and were also 
excluded from the analysis.  
The remaining sample of 41 participants contained 28 males (68.3%) and, on 
average, participants were 30.61 years old (SD=9.52; range: 19 to 50). The majority 
reported being right handed (N=34; 82.9%), White/Caucasian (N=33; 80.5%), with no 
history of neurological disorders. Most participants had some college or university 
education (N=18; 43.9%) or competed high school (N=9; 22.0%). Upon recruitment 
participants were screened on their gambling habits and risk for PG. The final sample 
consisted of 10 non-gamblers (i.e., did not engage in any gambling behaviour in the past 
year), 12 recreational gamblers (i.e., engaged in gambling behaviour in the past year but 
were not at risk for PG), five low risk PG, six moderate risk PG and eight high risk PG. 
The demographic information for each group is presented in Table 2.1. In order to 
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increase statistical power the sample was divided into no-risk PG (N=22) and at-risk for 
PG (N=19) groups.  
Materials 
Questionnaires. 
The questionnaire package is attached in Appendix 2.1. Participants were screened 
for PG behaviour using the Problem Gambling Severity Index (PGSI; Ferris & Wynne, 
2001). This measure asks participants to rate frequency of certain behaviours on a scale 
ranging from zero (never) to three (almost always). The questions assess frequency (e.g., 
Have you bet more than you could really afford to lose?) and consequences (e.g., Has 
your gambling caused any financial problems for you or your household?) of 
maladaptive behaviour using nine questions. More detailed information regarding 
gambling behaviour, such as frequency and number of different gambling activities 
engaged in, was assessed using the Gambling Behaviour Questionnaire. The GBQ asks 
participants to report how often in the past year (ranging from never = 0 to daily = 7) 
have they engaged in a variety of gambling activities (e.g., played instant-win or scratch 
cards, bet on TV show outcomes). Frequency of gambling behaviour was measured as an 
overall score on the questionnaire, regardless of the number of different activities 
reported. 
 Demographic information, such as age, sex and handedness was also collected. 
Handedness information was measured using a modified version of the Handedness 
Questionnaire (Oldfeild, 1971), where participants were asked to rate on a 5-point scale 
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which hand they would use to carry out specified everyday activities (e.g., Which hand is 
used to throw a ball?).8 
Individual differences were measured using HEXACO-PI-R (Lee & Ashton, 2004), 
which measures six personality traits: Honesty-Humility, Emotionality, Extraversion, 
Agreeableness, Consciousness, and Openness to Experience. The measure consists of 60 
questions (e.g., I prefer to do whatever comes to mind, rather than stick to a plan) and 
asks participants to rate their answer on a 5-point scale (ranging from strongly disagree 
to strongly agree).  
Participants were also asked to fill out a Locus of Control measure (Rotter, 1966) 
consisting of 29 forced choice questions. There were six filler questions and 23 scored 
questions (e.g., A. Many of the unhappy things in people's lives are partly due to bad 
luck. B. People's misfortunes result from the mistakes they make.). Participants were 
asked to indicate which statement they agreed with more. Higher scores on this 
questionnaire indicate stronger external locus of control. 
At the end of each task participants were given End of Task Questionnaires, which 
assessed participant’s perception of frequency of wins and losses as well as confidence in 
their predictions of the outcome. Both questionnaires also included open ended questions 
on the use of strategies.  
Doors Task. 
See Appendix 2.2 for instructions, details regarding visual angles and average 
number of trials for each condition. Figure 3.2 shows a schematic representation of the 
task design. This task was based on the Hajcak et al. (2007) gambling task, measuring 
                                                           
8
 Note: The study also included a number of individual difference measures that are not part of the 
dissertation (but are a part of a bigger study), and thus, are not reported here. 
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the participant’s predictions of the outcome. Participants were presented with four doors 
on the screen and told that some doors contained a reward of 5 cents behind them. A 
white ‘1’, ‘2’ or ‘3’ cue was presented underneath the doors and indicated how many 
doors contained a reward (i.e., .25, .50 and .75 probability of winning). The page stayed 
up on the screen until participants made their choice using a response box, with buttons 
numbered one through four. Once the response was made, the chosen doors was 
highlighted with a blue border for 1000 ms. Participants were the asked “Do you think 
you will win on this trial?” and responded “yes” or “no” by pressing a key on the 
response pad. The question was presented underneath the doors, with the chosen door 
highlighted in blue, until a response was made. Following their prediction (1000 ms ISI), 
the chosen door was ‘opened’ to revealed either a reward (“$”) or lack of thereof (“X”). 
The feedback stayed on the screen for 1000 ms. The intertrial interval (i.e., between the 
feedback and the onset of the cue) was 1000 ms. Unknown to the participants, the 
outcome on each trial was predetermined (i.e., everyone got the same outcome and order 
of the outcomes regardless of the door that was chosen) such that overall everyone won 
25% of the time on the 1-cue trials, 50% of the time on the 2-cue trials and 75% of the 
time on the 3-cue trials.  
The task consisted of four blocks of 84 trials (336 trials in total) and a six-trial 
practice session. The practice session was excluded from the analysis. Participants were 
informed of their running total in the task prior to the onset of the break, the length of 
which was determined by the participants. The task took approximately an hour to 
complete. As the outcomes were predetermined all participants received the same amount 
of winnings at the end of the task ($15).  
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Figure 3.2. Schematic representation of events during the Doors task. 
Time Estimation Task. 
The Time Estimation task was adapted from Miltner, Braun, and Coles (1997). See 
Figure 3.3 for the schematics of the task design. As in the original task, participants were 
1
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Duration = RT 
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ISI = 1000ms 
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informed that the goal of the task was to estimate an interval of 1 second by pressing a 
response key when they think that 1 second had elapsed relative to a cue (see Appendix 
2.2 for instructions). In this version of the task, two types of cues were used: a green 
square indicating an easy trial and a red square indicating a hard trial. In order to increase 
the strength of the manipulation easy and hard trials were presented in blocks of 10 trials 
each, with a warning slide (1000ms) which contained words “Easy” or “Hard” prior to 
the presentation of the first cue (i.e., this slide appeared every 10 trials). Each trial started 
with the presentation of the cue for 500ms, followed by a grey screen (i.e., the estimation 
period). The estimation period was terminated once the response was made or after 
2000ms. Following the termination of an estimation period, a grey screen was presented 
for 1000ms to ensure participants had a harder time estimating their performance, as well 
as preventing the contamination of the ERP waveforms by the response. Following this, 
feedback (“WIN!” or “LOSE!”) was presented for 1000ms. If the reaction time was 0 or 
longer than 2 seconds, “Too Slow!” feedback was presented. These trials were not 
analysed. 
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Figure 3.3. Schematic representation of events during the Time Estimation task. 
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Similar to the Doors task, the feedback on each trial was predetermined and was 
independent of participant’s actual response, except for “Too Slow!” trials. In order to 
disguise this, an easy set of trials started with more frequent wins and hard trials started 
with frequent losses. This was done only in the beginning of the task, with the 
assumption that after multiple trials participants will not be consciously aware of the 
frequency of wins and losses for each cue block. Thus, by the end of the task, the 
frequency of wins and losses were equal ensuring that there will be no effects of 
frequency and probability on the FRN, and allowing us to examine if the FRN can be 
manipulated solely through instructions (i.e., manipulating cognitive state of the 
participant). 
The task consisted of three blocks with 80 trials per block (240 trials in total) and 6 
practice trials, which were excluded from all of the analysis. At the end of each block 
participants were shown their running total and were given a short break. The length of 
the break was determined by the participants. The task was 20 min in length on average. 
Participants were told that each trial was worth 10 cents (i.e., they could win or lose 
10 cents per trial depending on their performance). In order to ensure that each 
participant won something at the end of the task, given equal numbers of wins and losses, 
each win trial added 16 cents to the running total and each loss trial subtracted 8 cents 
from the running total. Participants won $10 on average (with variations due to “Too 
Slow!” trials, which had no impact on the running total). 
Procedure 
An online advertisement (on www.kijiji.ca) was used to recruit participants. 
Individuals were asked to call the lab for screening and scheduling of the testing session. 
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Upon first contact, interested individuals were informed about the study (i.e., EEG 
recording procedure, short overview of the tasks as well as compensation amounts) and 
were screened for neurological disorders (e.g., epilepsy), mental health difficulties (e.g., 
depression), use of medication, head injury and age (inclusion criterion: between 19 and 
50 years). Participants were also screened using the PGSI to ensure a sufficient number 
of individuals in each group. Initially anyone scoring zero on the PGSI was admitted to 
the study, but later on interested individuals were also screened using the GBQ. This was 
necessary because the no-risk gambling group consisted mainly of recreational gamblers, 
who reported no maladaptive behaviour but engaged in almost the same amount of 
gambling activities as the at-risk gamblers.  
Eligible participants were asked to come into the Brock University Cognitive and 
Affective Neuroscience lab for a three-hour testing session. All participants were shown 
the EEG system and given a consent form (see Appendix 2.1), which was discussed with 
the experimenter and signed. The participants were then fitted with the 128-channel 
Biosemi sensor net and seated in a comfortable chair (see Appendix 1.4 for channel 
layout). During the fitting of the sensor net, participants were asked to fill out a 
questionnaire package on a laptop (using www.fluidsurveys.com). Upon completion of 
the questionnaires, participants completed the Time Estimation and the Doors tasks. The 
tasks were counterbalanced, such that 20 people completed the Doors task first. Both 
tasks were presented using E-Prime software (Psychological Software Tools, Inc., 2004). 
Participants were given the Time Estimation and Doors End of Task Questionnaires 
immediately after completing each task. 
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Upon completion of the tasks, the sensor net was removed and participants were 
allowed time to clean up. Finally, participants were debriefed regarding the nature of the 
tasks (i.e., that outcomes were not dependent on performance) and anyone who reported 
engaging in gambling activities were given a “Responsible Gambling” brochure with 
information of local helplines. All participants were paid $25 on average for their 
‘performance’ on the tasks and additional $30 for participating in the study (the rate of 
$10/hour). The study was approved by the Brock University Research Ethics Board (see 
Appendix 1.1). 
EEG Recording.  
The EEG recording process, data extraction and cleaning procedure was the same as 
in Study 1. After removal of muscle artifacts and eye blinks, the data were segmented 
around the onset of the feedback in each task, resulting in four conditions per task: 
expected win/loss and unexpected win/loss. In the Doors task, the outcomes were divided 
into expected and unexpected based on the participant’s predictions (e.g., predicted a win 
but obtained a loss = unexpected loss). In the Time Estimation task outcomes were 
divided based on the type of block, such that during ‘easy’ blocks wins were considered 
expected and losses unexpected, and vice versa for the ‘hard’ blocks. Each of the 
stimulus-locked epochs had a 200ms baseline and were 1200ms in total length. After 
segmentation, the data were further cleaned using automatic artifacts rejection tool in the 
EEGLab using default criteria values. The segments were then averaged to create a single 
segment per condition for each of the participants. A number of participants were 
missing midline channels corresponding to FCz, Fz, Cz and Pz, therefore to maintain 
consistency, these channels were interpolated by a spherical spline for all of the 
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participants. The scalp data along the midlines were then exported to ERPScore 
(Segalowitz, 1999) and manually scored for the FRN peak amplitude. The FRN was 
defined as the most negative peak between 200 and 300 ms. Difference waves were 
created for expected and unexpected conditions in each task by subtracting waveforms 
following losses from waveforms following wins. This was done to be consistent with 
current FRN literature, which suggests that the FRN consists of a negativity and a reward 
positivity occurring simultaneously (Holroyd et al., 2008). Average amplitude was then 
calculated for each of the conditions at the times of the FRN (200 to 320ms). This 
measure of the FRN-valence effect will be further referred to as the difference-wave 
measures. Both measures, peak and difference-wave amplitudes were then exported to 
SPSS for further analysis. As in Study 1, the number of original Biosemi channels was 
reduced to three midline channels (Fz, FCz and Cz) by selecting a maximal FRN peak 
amplitude. This was done in order to reduce the number of statistical comparisons and to 
take into account that there are individual differences in brain morphology yielding 
maximum amplitudes at slightly different locations.   
Data analysis 
Validity checks and behavioural data.  
A series of statistical analyses was conducted on the responses on the End of Task 
Questionnaires, frequency of predicted wins/losses as well as reaction times in each task. 
This was done in order to examine whether the tasks differed in levels of perceived sense 
of control and whether participants approached each type of trial on the tasks in a similar 
manner. Additionally, the reaction times observed on each type of trial were compared 
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between the two groups of participants (nPG and PG) to examine whether gambling 
status had an effect on behaviour during the tasks. 
ERP measures.  
A series of mixed repeated measures 2 (PG vs nPG) x 2 (Doors vs. Time Estimation) 
x 2 (Expected vs. Unexpected) x 2 (Loss vs. Win) x 3 (Fz, FCz, Cz) ANOVAs were 
conducted on the FRN peak amplitude and latency to investigate any potential 
interactions between gambling status and effects of task characteristics on the FRN. A 
follow up analysis using repeated measures ANOVAs was conducted to further examine 
any interactions. A similar analysis was carried out on the difference wave measures. 
Finally, these analyses were repeated examining any differences in the FRN measures in 
the extreme groups (i.e., non-gamblers and high risk PG).  
Individual differences.  
Prior to examination of any relationships between individual differences and ERP 
measures, a series of analyses were conducted to investigate whether the two groups 
differed on any of the measures. Additionally, correlational analyses were conducted to 
examine whether personality measures were related to the measures of gambling 
behaviour. Additionally, ERP measures were used in a multiple regression model as 
predictors of gambling behaviour to examine the relationship between the activity 
observed after each type of feedback presentation and gambling status.  
Results 
Validity Check and Behavioural Data 
In order to examine whether the two groups differed in their perception of the tasks, a 
series of Mann – Whitney U tests were conducted on the End of Task Questionnaire data. 
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Non parametric tests were chosen as the data were not normally distributed due to the 
nature of the scale (ranging from ‘0’ to ‘5’). There were no significant differences 
between the two groups in their approach (e.g., how hard did you try) or perception (e.g., 
was the feedback helpful?) of the tasks (see Table 2.2 and 2.3). There were no significant 
differences in any of the responses between groups. The proportions of participants 
reporting use of some strategy for the Time Estimation task did not differ for the two 
groups (χ2 = 0.48, p =.489). None of the participants reported using a strategy for the 
Doors task. Thus, participants reported approaching the tasks (e.g., use of strategy), 
perceiving the difficulty (e.g., how hard did you try) and proportions of winning/losing 
on each type of cue in a similar manner regardless of their PG status. 
In the Doors task, participants were explicitly asked to predict whether they would 
win on each trial. These data were analysed using a mixed 2 (nPG vs. PG) x 3 (cue type) 
ANOVA to examine if reward expectations (i.e., number of trials reward was predicted) 
varied based on group membership and type of cue. The two groups did not significantly 
differ in their overall expectations of reward (F (1,39) < 0.01, p = .957, pη2 < .001; Table 
2.4) and there was no significant group by cue interaction (F (2,78) = 0.43, p = .623, pη2 
=.011), further supporting the hypothesis that the two groups of participants approached 
the task in a similar manner. Finally, there was a main effect of cue type (F (2,78) = 
72.95, p < .001, pη2  =.652), such that participants predicted a win most often on the ‘3’ 
cue trials and least often on the cue ‘1’ trials (post hoc p < .001 for all of the 
comparisons using Bonferroni correction). Thus, the participants were aware of the 
probabilities of winning on each trial and adjusted their expectations accordingly.  
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To test the manipulation of sense of control, responses to two questions (Did you feel 
you could predict the outcome?, How confident were you in your predictions?) were 
compared between the tasks using a Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test. Participants were 
marginally more confident in their predictions during the Time Estimation task (p = 
.063), suggesting that they were under the impression that the outcomes depended on 
their performance. Although participants felt more control in the Time Estimation task, 
the self-reports of accuracy of predictions did not differ between the tasks (p = .106). If 
the FRN represents evaluation of the outcome based on expectations and participants did 
not perceive themselves to be less accurate on one task or the other (i.e., surprised more 
often on one), these data suggest that any effects of expectation on the FRN observed in 
the tasks should have a similar pattern. To examine the manipulation of expectation in 
the Time Estimation task, self-reports of effort on easy and hard trials were compared 
using the same non-parametric test. Participants reported trying significantly harder on 
the hard trials compared to easy trials (p < .001). 
In order to further ensure that the participants did not significantly differ in their 
approaches to the tasks, reaction times for nPG and PG were compared in a series of 
independent t-tests (Table 2.5). There were no significant differences between the groups 
in the average or cue-specific reactions times for either task, showing that previous 
gambling behaviour did not affect participants’ approach to the task. All of the 
participants took roughly the same time to choose a door regardless of the type of trial (F 
(2, 80) = 1.91, p = .165, pη2 = .046), suggesting that probability of the outcome did not 
influence the decision time. Similarly, the reaction times in the Time Estimation task did 
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not differ based on the type of cue (t (40) = .85, p = .399) or feedback obtained (F 
(3,120) = 0.64, p = .519, pη2 = .016).  
In summary, participants approached the tasks in a similar manner regardless of their 
gambling status. Both groups of participants were aware of probabilities of wins on each 
type of trial of the Doors task and adjusted their expectations of rewards accordingly. 
The probability of the outcome in the Doors task and type of trial (i.e., easy vs. hard) in 
the Time Estimation task had no effect on reaction times in either group. Thus, overall 
the two groups of participants approached and performed similarly on both tasks. 
ERP data 
Average ERP waveforms of all the conditions for each task (broken down by group) 
can be found in Figures 3.4 to 3.7. For overlays using original Biosemi channels see 
Appendix 2.3. 
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Figure 3.4. Average ERP waveforms elicited by the four types of feedback conditions in 
the Doors task (nPG group). 
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Figure 3.5. Average ERP waveforms elicited by the four types of feedback conditions in 
the Time Estimation task (nPG group). 
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Figure 3.6. Average ERP waveforms elicited by the four types of feedback conditions in 
the Doors task (PG group). 
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Figure 3.7. Average ERP waveforms elicited by the four types of feedback conditions in 
the Time Estimation task (PG group). 
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Peak Measures.  
Effects of sense of control, expectation and group membership on the measures of 
FRN peak amplitude, latency and average amplitude of the difference waves at the time 
of the FRN were examined through the use of repeated measures ANOVAs. It was 
expected that the FRN following loss outcomes would be larger than that following win 
outcomes on both tasks. Similarly, the FRN elicited by unexpected outcomes was 
hypothesized to be larger than that observed after expected outcomes in both tasks. The 
FRN amplitude or the FRN-valence effect observed in the Time Estimation task was 
expected to be larger than in the Doors task due to greater perceived sense of control over 
the outcome in the Time Estimation task. This effect was expected to be significant in the 
nPG group but not in individuals at risk for problem gambling.   
A 2 (Gambling group) x 2 (Task) x 2 (Expectations) x 2(Valence) x 3(Channel) 
mixed ANOVA was conducted on the peak FRN amplitude measures to examine 
potential interactions between the groups (Table 2.6). There were significant main effects 
of expectations (F (1,39) = 13.28, p < .001, pη2 = .254), valence (F (1,39) =14.92, p < 
.001, pη2 = .277) and channel (F (2,78) = 4.64, p = .017, pη2 = .106). The main effect of 
valence was superseded by two-way interactions with channel (F (2, 78) = 29.95, p < 
.001, pη2 = .434) and task (F (1,39) = 11.56, p = .002, pη2 = .229). As no specific 
hypotheses were made regarding the distribution of the effects across channels, any 
interactions with channel were not followed up.  Additionally, a task by expectation (F 
(1, 39) = 7.26, p = .010, pη2 = .157) interaction was observed (superceding the main 
effect of expectations). There were no significant between-subjects effects (F (1,39) = 
1.48, p = .231, pη2 = .037), but there was a significant three-way interaction between 
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group, task and expectations (F (1,39) = 4.56. p = .039, pη2 = .105) and a marginally 
significant three-way interaction between group, valence and channel (F(2,78) = 3.43, p 
= .057, pη2 = .081). 
In order to better understand these two interactions (task x valence, and group x task 
x expectations), a follow-up 2 (expectations) x 2 (valence) x 3 (channel) repeated 
measures ANOVA was conducted for each task. As this analysis does not directly 
address the valence by task interaction, a repeated measures 2 (task) x 2 (expectation) x 3 
(channel) ANOVAs were also conducted for each type of outcome (i.e., win/loss). It was 
hypothesized that gamblers and non-gamblers might react differently to the 
manipulations of sense of control and expectations, these analysis were conducted for 
each group of participants separately (i.e., nPG and PG).  
Task by Valence interaction. 
Participants not at risk for PG. Two repeated measures ANOVAs (one for losses and 
one for wins) were conducted to examine the task by valence interaction observed in the 
mixed ANOVA analysis (Table 2.7). For the FRNs elicited by losses, there was a main 
effect of task (F(1,21)=16.82, p=.001, pη2 = .445), such that losses elicited a larger FRN 
in the Time Estimation task (M = -2.13, SE = 0.29) compared to the Doors task (M = -
1.25, SE = 0.16). Additionally, there was a main effect of expectation (F (1,21) = 4.55, p 
= .045, pη2 = .178), such that unexpected losses (M = -1.87, SE = 0.20) were followed by 
a larger FRN than expected losses (M = -1.50, SE = 0.25). There were no significant 
main effects or interactions in the ANOVAs conducted using FRNs elicited by wins. 
Thus, in this group, any effects of sense of control and expectation on the FRN were 
driven by the FRNs elicited by loss outcomes.  
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Participants at-risk for PG. Similar to the analysis done in the nPG group, two 
repeated measures ANOVAs were run in order to address the task by valence interaction 
observed in the mixed ANOVA (Table 2.8). There was a significant interaction between 
task and valence in FRN amplitude following wins (F (1,18) = 4.50, p = .021, pη2 = .200) 
and losses (F (1,18) = 8.15, p = .011, pη2 = .312), such that unexpected outcomes 
produced larger FRNs compared to expected outcomes only in the Doors task (Figure 
3.8). FRNs following wins were also significantly different based on the expectedness of 
the outcome (F (1,18) = 7.75, p = .012, pη2 = .301), but FRNs elicited by losses were not 
(F (1,18) = 1.88, p = .188, pη2 = .094). Additionally, FRNs elicited by wins were 
significantly larger in the Doors task (M = -1.83; SE = 0.30) compared to the Time 
Estimation task (M = -1.35; SE = 0.37; F (1,18) = 4.81, p = .042, pη2 = .211). Thus, any 
sense of control and expectation effects observed in this group were driven primarily by 
the FRNs following wins. 
 
Figure 3.8. Graphical representation of the interaction between task and valence in the 
PG group.  
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Group by Task by Expectation follow up. 
Participants not at risk for PG. Repeated measures ANOVAs (2 (Expectations) x 2 
(Valence) x 3 (Channel)) were conducted for the Doors task (Table 2.9). Only the effect 
of expectation was significant (F (1,21) = 6.56, p = .018, pη2 = .238) such that 
unexpected outcomes elicited a larger FRN peak amplitude (M = -1.44, SE = 0.19) 
compared to expected feedback (M = -1.13, SE = 0.19). In the Time Estimation task, the 
effect of expectations were not significant (F (1,21) = 2.31, p = .144, pη2 = .099; Table 
2.9). However, there was a significant effect of valence in the Time Estimation task (F 
(1,21) = 14.76, p = .001, pη2 = .413) with loss outcomes (M = -2.13, SE = 0.29) having 
larger peak FRN amplitude compared to wins (M = -1.10, SE = 0.29) but not in the Doors 
task (F (1, 21) = 0.94, p  =.762, pη2 =.040). No other significant main effects or 
interactions of interest were observed. Thus, it appears that manipulation of expectations 
worked only in the Doors task and the FRN-valence effect was larger in the Time 
Estimation task. 
Participants at risk for PG. Two 2 (Expectations) x 2 (Valence) x 3 (Channel) 
repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted to examine whether the patterns of FRN 
sensitivity differed between tasks (Table 2.10). Similar to the nPG group, in the Doors 
task unexpected feedback (M = -2.20, SE = 0.35) elicited larger FRN amplitude 
compared to expected feedback (M = -1.59, SE = 0.36; F (1,18) = 14.91, p = .001, pη2 = 
.453; Table 2.10). Additionally, a significant valence by channel interaction was 
observed (F (2,36) = 8.46, p = .004, pη2 = .320) such that the FRN elicited by losses was 
larger than that elicited by wins, but only at Fz and FCz (Figure 3.9). This observation 
was statistically tested by conducting a 2 (expectation) x 2 (valence) x 2 (channel) 
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repeated measures ANOVA including only the FRNs measured at Fz and FCz. There 
was a main effect of valence (F (1,18) = 5.49, p = .031, pη2 = .234), such that losses (M 
= -2.12, SE = 0.33) elicited larger FRN compared to wins (M = -1.44, SE = 0.29). Thus, 
unlike the nPG group, outcomes in the Doors task elicited FRN-valence effects in 
individuals at risk for problem gambling behaviour.  
 
Figure 3.9. Graphical representation of interactions between valence and channel 
observed in the PG group. 
 
In the Time Estimation task, main effect of valence (F (1,18) = 8.70, p = .009, pη2 = 
.326) was significant in the expected direction (loss: M = -2.36, SE = 0.34; wins: M = -
1.35, SE = 0.37). There also was valence by channel interaction (F (2, 36) = 15.86, p < 
.001, pη2 = .468), similar to the one observed in the Doors task showing larger FRN-
valence effects at frontal channels (Figure 3.4). As was observed in the nPG group, 
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participants in the PG group did not show any significant effects of expectation on the 
FRN peak amplitude (F (1,18) = 0.24, p =.631, pη2 = .013). 
Extreme groups analysis. 
There was no support for the predicted difference in FRN response between PG and 
nPG groups as no significant effect of group membership was observed in the mixed 
measures analysis. It should be noted that both groups were heterogeneous, such that PG 
group included gamblers with low, medium and high risk of PG, whereas nPG group 
included individuals who do not gamble at all (n = 10) and recreational gamblers (i.e., 
engage in gambling activities but score “0” on the PGSI). Individuals had to score at 
least “1” on the PGSI were placed in the PG group. Thus, the reward system activation 
elicited by the feedback could have been very similar between recreational gamblers and 
those at low risk for PG. In order to confirm that problem gambling status had no effect 
on the FRN response, as suggested by the results of peak FRN amplitude analysis, the 
analysis were repeated on the two extreme groups (i.e., non-gamblers (NG, n = 10) and 
higher risk gamblers (hPG, n = 8)).  
A mixed repeated measures 2 (group) x 2 (task) x 2 (expectations) x 2 (valence) x 2 
(channel) ANOVA was conducted on the peak FRN amplitude (Table 2.11). Channels Fz 
and FCz were chosen based on the results of previous analysis, as the expectation and 
valence effects observed appeared to be more frontally distributed. There were no 
significant interactions between task/valence/expectation and group membership. Two-
way significant interactions were observed between task and valence (F (1,16) = 26.60, p 
< .001, pη2 = .624), and expectation and channel (F (1,16) = 19.32, p < .001, pη2 = .547). 
Similar to the analysis of nPG and PG groups there was a main effect of expectations (F 
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(1,16) = 4.97, p = .040, pη2 = .237). These interactions were similar to the patterns 
observed when nPG and PG groups were compared, thus no further follow up analysis 
was conducted. 
Summary.  
Summary of the analysis conducted on the peak data can be seen in Figure 3.10.  
 
Figure 3.10. Graphical representation of significant effects observed in the analysis 
of the peak FRN data. 
The hypothesis regarding effects of expectation on the FRN peak amplitude was 
partially supported such that unexpected outcomes elicited larger FRNs compared to 
expected outcomes, but only in the Doors task (i.e., bottom-up). Similarly, the hypothesis 
regarding the effects of sense of control on the FRN-valence sensitivity was partially 
supported in the nPG group, such that valence effects were observed in the Time 
Estimation task and not in the Doors task.  Both groups of participants showed an FRN-
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(effects driven by losses) 
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- Expectation: Unexpected > Expected 
Time Estimation: 
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Problem Gamblers:  
(effects driven by wins) 
Doors: 
- Expectation: Unexpected > Expected 
- Valence: Loss > Win (Fz/Fcz) 
Time Estimation: 
- Valence: Loss > Win (Fz/FCz) 
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valence effect in the Time Estimation task, but only the PG group showed valence effects 
in the Doors task. Thus, individuals at risk for problem gambling seemed to be more 
sensitive to valence information in the gambling task compared to their nPG 
counterparts. This effect was larger in the Time Estimation task (pη2 = .326) compared to 
the Doors task (pη2 = .234), suggesting that in this group higher levels of perceived 
control over the outcome led to an increase in the FRN valence effects. Finally, effects of 
expectation and sense of control were driven by FRNs elicited by losses in the nPG 
group, and mostly by the FRN elicited by wins in the PG group, suggesting that at-risk 
gamblers are less sensitive to loss outcomes and more sensitive to rewards compared to 
not at-risk individuals. 
Latency analysis.  
Previous research by Oberg et al. (2011) suggests that gambling experience can 
modulate the latency of the FRN rather than its peak amplitude. More specifically, 
gamblers were found to differentiate the valence of the outcome earlier than non-
gamblers. In order to examine this hypothesis a mixed ANOVA was conducted on the 
latencies of peak FRN amplitude. The three midline channels (Fz, FCz, Cz) were 
included in the setting up of the analysis, such that latencies analysed were consistent 
with the channel showing maximal FRN amplitude for each participant.  
In our data, contrary to the hypothesized effects, there were no significant effects or 
interaction with gambling status (Table 2.12). There was a main effect of expectation (F 
(1,39) = 4.81, p = .033, pη2 = .111) such that expected outcomes elicited an earlier FRN 
(M = 239.42, SE = 3.92) compared to unexpected feedback (M = 244.31, SE = 3.87). 
Losses were followed by a later FRN (M = 247.55, SE = 4.28) compared to wins (M = 
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236.18, SE = 4.15; F (1,39) = 8.39, p = .006, pη2 = .177). Finally, there was a main effect 
of channel (F (2, 78) = 36,86, p < .001, pη2 = .486) such that FRN peak latency 
decreased as the channels became more central (Fz: M = 252.48, SE = 4.24; FCz: M = 
243.32, SE = 4.05; Cz: M = 229.80, SE = 3.81).  Thus, in contrast to the Oberg et al. 
(2011) findings, in this study individuals at risk for PG did not differentiate between the 
valence of outcomes earlier than nPG group9. 
Difference wave analysis.  
In order to examine the effects of group membership, task and stimulus expectedness 
on the reward positivity observed at the time of the FRN, average amplitude of difference 
waves was analysed. To be consistent with the literature, loss trials for each condition 
were subtracted from the win trials (Holroyd, Pakzad-Vaezi, & Lee, 2008). It was 
expected that higher levels of sense of control in the Time Estimation task would 
increase the FRN-valence effect (i.e., more positive FRN for wins and more negative 
FRN for losses). Thus, the difference-wave amplitude was expected to be greater in the 
Time Estimation task compared to the Doors task. Based on previous research, it was 
hypothesized that unexpected wins will produce a larger reward positivity (i.e., more 
positive FRN) compared to expected outcomes (Holroyd, Krigolson, & Lee, 2011). 
Similarly, unexpected losses were hypothesized to produce larger FRNs (i.e., more 
negative FRNs; Bellebaum & Daum, 2008; Kobza et al., 2011). Thus, the average 
amplitude of the difference waves was hypothesized to be larger following unexpected 
outcomes compared to expected ones.  
                                                           
9
 Note: When this analysis was repeated using non-gamblers and high risk gamblers no significant group 
effects were observed. 
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 A mixed repeated measures ANOVA examining the effects of group membership, 
task and expectation was conducted on the four frontal midline sites representing Fz and 
FCz from the original Biosemi montage (C14, C13, C12, C11). These channels were 
chosen based on the results of the peak FRN amplitude, which showed that valence and 
expectation effects in each task were stronger at frontal channels. The data were screened 
for outliers and violations of normality prior to conducting statistical analysis. 
Significant main effects of task (F (1,39) = 33.18, p < .001, pη2 = .460) and 
expectation (F (1, 39) = 5.94, p = .020, pη2 = .132) were observed in the overall repeated 
measures ANOVA (Table 2.13). As predicted, average amplitude of the difference waves 
was larger in the Time Estimation task (M = 1.40, SE = 0.14) compared to the Doors task 
(M = 0.76, SE = 0.13) and unexpected outcomes elicited a more positive difference wave 
amplitude (M = 1.09, SE = 0.14) compared to expected outcomes (M = 0.76, SE = 0.13). 
As there were no significant interactions with the task used to elicit FRNs, the effect of 
expectation was not driven by only one of the tasks.  
It should be noted that there was no significant FRN-valence effect in the Doors task 
in the nPG group, which could have attenuated the overall reward positivity observed in 
this task, as the magnitude of the differences between win and loss conditions (i.e., 
reward positivity) is dependent on the size of the FRN-valence effect. Thus, one could 
argue that smaller reward positivity observed in the Doors task was due to participants 
not processing the valence of the outcome. In order to address this argument, the analysis 
were repeated with PG group only, as these participants showed significant FRN-valence 
effects in both tasks. 
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Results of this analysis (Table 2.14) showed that difference wave amplitude observed 
in the Time Estimation task (M = 1.49, SE = 0.20) was larger than that observed in the 
Doors task (M = 0.68, SE = 0.21; F (1,18) = 11.49, p = .003, pη2 = .390). The effects of 
expectation on the amplitude of the difference waves were only marginally significant (F 
(1,18) = 3.87, p = .065, pη2 =  .177) but were in the hypothesized direction such that 
unexpected outcomes (M = 1.20, SE  = 0.20) elicited a larger reward positivity compared 
to expected outcomes (M = 0.97, SE = 0.18). In order to examine if the effect of 
expectation observed in the mixed ANOVA was driven only by one of the groups (i.e., 
nPG) a similar analysis was conducted only including nPG participants. As in the PG 
group, the effect of expectation was also marginally significant (F (1,21) = 3.39, p = 
.080, pη2 = .139) in the expected direction (expected: M  = 0.55, SE = 0.18; unexpected: 
M = 0.97, SE = 0.20). Thus, unexpected outcomes led to a larger reward positivity 
compared to expected outcomes in both groups (Figure 3.11). Lack of significant effects 
within each group suggests that this effect is rather small and requires greater power to 
be detected (i.e., larger sample size). 
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Figure 3.11. Graphical representation of expectation effects on the reward positivity 
in each group broken down by task. 
 
In summary, the analysis of difference-wave amplitudes at the time of the FRN was 
consistent with the proposed hypotheses, such that greater positivity was observed in the 
Time Estimation task compared to the Doors task. This is likely due to the consistent 
FRN-valence effects which were observed in both groups, and a larger FRN-valence 
effect observed in the PG group, during the Time Estimation task compared to the Doors 
task. Unexpected outcomes elicited a larger positivity compared to expected outcomes; 
however, this effect was only marginally significant within each group, suggesting that 
the effect was very small and not driven by one specific task. 
Individual Differences 
In order to examine the relationship between gambling behaviour and personality, 
participants were divided as before into two groups to increase the number of subjects in 
each cell, thus increasing statistical power of the tests: no risk for PG (nPG) and at risk 
for PG (PG). There were no normality violations (i.e., tests of normality showed p > .05) 
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or outliers in the data (i.e., ±3SD). It was previously hypothesized that the groups might 
differ on some of the personality variables and these differences might be related to their 
responses to feedback stimuli. As there is no literature directly examining these 
relationships in problem gamblers, no directional hypotheses were made.  
Gambling status.  
A series of independent group t-tests were conducted to examine any potential 
differences on Locus of Control and personality (i.e., HEXACO) measures. There were 
significant differences between the groups on the subscales of Conscientiousness (t (38) 
= 2.91, p = .006) and Emotionality (t (37) = -2.33, p = .025; Table 2.15). Previous 
research (Twigger, 2010) has shown that high risk gamblers score lower on the subscales 
of Conscientiousness, Emotionality and Honesty-Humility compared to low-risk 
gamblers. Our data partially replicates these findings, such that individuals at risk for 
problem gambling reported lower levels of conscientiousness and higher levels of 
emotionality (Table 2.15). 
 It was hypothesized that any differences in personality variables observed between 
the groups would be mediated by ERP measures. As significant group differences were 
observed only using peak FRN amplitude and not latency or amplitude of the difference 
wave, FRN peak measures were chosen to test this hypothesis. If FRN response mediates 
the relationship between gambling status and personality, then variance in PGSI score 
accounted for by personality measures would decrease once FRN measures are entered in 
the model10. Prior to conducting the mediation analysis, relationships between FRN and 
PGSI score were examined to identify significant predictors that will be included in the 
model (Table 2.16). There were no significant relationships between FRN measured at Fz 
                                                           
10
 Note: Only channel Fz was used in this analysis to reduce the number of predictors. 
147 
and PGSI score, Conscientiousness or Emotionality scores. In order to conduct a 
mediation analysis first it must be shown that all of the variables in the model are 
significantly related. As no such relationships were found with FRN measures no 
mediation analysis was conducted.  
In order to examine whether the change in ACC activity in response to expectancy, 
sense of control or valence is related to measures of individual differences, residual 
scores were calculated for each effect of interest. More specifically, changes in ACC 
activity due to valence were reflected in the residual loss-FRN amplitude after adjusting 
for the variance due to win-FRN amplitude. Similarly, expectation effects were obtained 
by adjusting for variance in unexpected outcomes due to expected outcomes and sense of 
control effects were obtained by regressing FRN amplitudes elicited in the Doors task on 
those elicited in the Time Estimation task. The unstandardized residuals obtained were 
first correlated with total PGSI score (i.e., gambling severity), Conscientiousness and 
Emotionality (Table 2.17). Similar to the FRN peak analysis, there were no significant 
relationships between any of the residuals and measures of individual differences or 
gambling severity, thus no further analysis was conducted. 
Gambling behaviour. 
To examine the potential relationships between gambling behaviour and measures of 
individual differences, a series of correlations were conducted.11 More specifically, 
frequency of gambling behaviour and number of gambling activities engaged in the past 
year (measured with GBQ) were correlated with Locus of Control scores and HEXACO 
subscale scores (see Table 2.18). There was a significant correlation between the measure 
of gambling frequency and Conscientiousness (r (29) = -0.47, p = .011) and 
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 Note: Participants who reported not gambling at all (N = 10) were excluded from this analysis. 
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Honesty/Humility subscales (r (29) = -0.37, p = .049), such that individuals reporting 
higher levels of these personality traits gambled less frequently. Similarly, higher scores 
on the Agreeableness subscale was similarly related to lower frequency of gambling 
behaviour and fewer gambling activities involved in (frequency: r (28) = -0.46, p = .018; 
number of activities: r (32) = -0.42, p = .024).  
Further investigation of these relationships was done using multiple linear regression 
analysis, predicting gambling frequency from HEXACO subscales of Agreeableness, 
Consciousness and Honesty/Humility (Table 2.19). The overall model was not 
significant (F (3,22) = 2.51, p = .084), but Agreeableness uniquely predicted 15.13% of 
variability in the frequency of gambling behaviour (p = .046). None of the other 
personality subscales were uniquely significant in the model. In other words, the ability 
to let go of wrongs and willingness to compromise (i.e., agreeableness) is uniquely 
related to decreased frequency and prevalence of gambling behaviour. 
ERP measures and Gambling Behaviour.  
Potential relationships between various FRN measures and gambling behaviour were 
examined with a number of correlations and regression models. In order the reduce the 
number of comparisons made, only channel Fz (i.e., C14, C13) was included in this 
analysis as the FRNs observed were most pronounced at this site. To further examine the 
potential effects of the ACC response to expectation and valence that contribute to the 
relationship with gambling behaviour a multiple regression was conducted predicting 
gambling behaviour from FRN measures within each task. This approach was used with 
the FRN peak, latency and difference wave measures.  
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Peak FRN.  
FRN peak amplitude measured in the Doors task did not significantly predict 
gambling frequency in the past year (R2 = 0.17, F (4, 25) = 1.24, p = .321) and none of 
the predictors were uniquely significant (Table 2.20). A similar lack of effects for the 
ERP measures were observed in the Time Estimation task (R2 = 0.03, F (4, 25) = 0.17, p 
= .953). There were no relationships between number of gambling activities engaged in 
the past year and FRN peak measures in each task (Table 2.20; Doors: R2 = 0.24, F (4, 
26) = 2.10, p = .110; TE: R2 = 0.11, F (4, 29) = 0.90, p = .478). However, FRNs elicited 
in the Doors task during unexpected losses uniquely predicted 19.00% of variance in 
number of gambling activities (p = .018), such that larger FRN peak amplitude correlated 
with lower number of gambling activities engaged in (r (31) = -0.48, p = .003). There 
were no significant unique predictors of variety of games engaged in and FRN peak 
amplitude in the Time Estimation task (R2 = 0.12, F (4, 29) = 0.90, p = .478).  
Relationships between changes in ACC activity and measures of gambling behaviour 
(i.e., frequency and number of gambling activities) were examined through the use of 
residual scores (Table 2.17)12. Changes in ACC activity in response to valence of the 
outcome in the Doors task were significantly correlated with number of gambling 
activities engaged in the past year (r = -0.47, p = .007). Furthermore, self-reported 
number of gambling activities engaged in was significantly correlated with changes in 
loss-FRN (i.e., FRN following loss outcomes) in response to expectedness of the 
outcome in the Doors task (r = -0.45, p < .012). This is not surprising given that the FRN 
elicited by unexpected losses in the Doors task was significantly related to number of 
gambling activities. Thus, the results of this analysis suggest that engagement in wider 
                                                           
12
 Description of analysis done to obtain residuals was described on page 139. 
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range of gambling activities is associated with a smaller FRN-response to unexpected 
losses.  
FRN latency.  
Similar analyses were conducted using peak FRN latency as predictor (Table 2.21). 
The overall model predicting frequency of gambling behaviour from FRN peak latency 
was once again not significant in either task (Doors: R2 = 0.17, F (4, 25) = 1.30, p = .298; 
Time Estimation: R2 = 0.25, F (4, 25) = 2.09, p = .113); there were no significant unique 
predictors. Similarly, no significant effects were observed when number of gambling 
activities was used as a predictor (Doors: R2 = 0.20, F (4, 26) = 1.61, p = .202; Time 
Estimation: R2 = 0.25, F (4, 26) = 0.88, p = .492). Similar to the peak analysis, changes 
in timing of ACC activity were examined by conducting a series of correlations between 
residual FRN latency and measures of gambling behaviour (Table 2.22). There were no 
significant relationships between any of the measures in changes in timing of ACC 
activity and gambling behaviour. Thus, none of the previously observed FRN latency 
effects were related to the gambling behaviour. 
Difference wave amplitude.  
In order to examine if the measure of reward positivity was related to gambling 
behaviour, a series of regressions was conducted using average difference-wave 
amplitude in each task as predictors using channels C14 and C13. The overall models 
predicting gambling frequency or number of gambling activities engaged in were not 
significant in either task (Table 2.23). Thus, the size of reward positivity observed in 
each task was not related to any of the measures of gambling behaviour. 
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Summary.  
Two groups of participants were significantly different on measures of 
Conscientiousness and Emotionality, but neither of these measures were significantly 
related to peak FRN amplitude. Conscientiousness, Honesty/Humility and Agreeableness 
scales of the HEXACO were related to gambling frequency, but only Agreeableness 
accounted for unique variance in gambling frequency. The ERP measures were not 
significantly predictive of gambling frequency or total PGSI score. Larger FRNs 
following unexpected losses in the Doors task were predictive of lower number of 
gambling activities engaged in the past year. However, neither of the measures of ACC 
responsivity were related to personality variables of interest (i.e., Conscientiousness and 
Emotionality). Thus, the hypothesis of ACC activity mediating the relationships between 
personality and gambling severity was not supported. 
Discussion 
This study was conducted to examine the effects of expectations, sense of control and 
gambling behaviour on the FRN.13 Sense of control was manipulated through the use of 
two tasks: Doors (low control) and Time Estimation (high control). In the Doors task 
participants were explicitly asked to predict the outcome; the feedback was divided into 
expected and unexpected outcomes based on these predictions. In the Time Estimation 
task, expectations were manipulated through instructions by telling participants that there 
were easy and hard trials. Wins were labeled as expected if the trial was easy, unexpected 
if the trial was hard and vice versa for loss outcomes. Frequency of wins and losses in 
each condition (i.e., easy vs. hard) did not differ by the end of the Time Estimation task. 
                                                           
13
 The interpretation of these results in light of the proposed model for FRN generation is presented in the 
General Discussion. 
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In the Doors task, the frequency of outcomes also did not differ by the end of the task as 
in the Time Estimation task, but varied within each type of trial (i.e., based on probability 
of winning signified by each cue). The outcomes were independent of participants’ 
choices and performance in both tasks. Three measures of FRN variability were 
examined in this study: peak amplitude, latency of the peak amplitude and average 
amplitude of difference waves at the time of the FRN. 
Within-subject effects 
It was hypothesized that FRN would be modulated by expectation such that 
unexpected outcomes in both tasks would lead to larger FRN compared to expected 
outcomes. This hypothesis was supported only in the Doors task, where participants were 
explicitly asked to predict outcomes after being informed about probability of the reward. 
Consistent with previous research (Hajcak et al., 2007) this manipulation affected the 
FRN, supporting the hypothesis that ACC activity is modulated by probability-based 
expectations. In the Time Estimation task, expectations were manipulated through 
instructions and cues labeling the trials as ‘easy’ or ‘hard’. Lack of significant effects of 
this manipulation on the FRN amplitude suggests either that (a) the manipulation did not 
work, or (b) the FRN is not modulated by non-probability based outcomes. Participants 
did report trying significantly harder on hard trials compared to easy trials, suggesting 
that expectations of success were lower in the “hard” trials”. It is also possible that the 
FRN is modulated only by expectations based on probabilities of the outcome. However, 
given previous research showing that FRN is modulated by cognitive states and 
constructs (e.g., Yang, Gu, Tang, & Luo, 2013) it is unlikely that activity of the ACC, 
which was proposed to partially reflect prediction error signal generated in the reward 
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network, would not account for the subjective state of the individual. It is more likely 
that manipulations of cognitive state of the participant for each trial (i.e., expectations in 
the Time Estimation task) had an effect at a later stage of processing, after the initial 
prediction error signal and thus was not reflected in the FRN response. 
Previous research has shown that both tasks elicit an FRN valence effect, such that 
losses are followed by a larger FRN compared to wins (e.g., Hajcak et al., 2007; Miltner 
et al., 1997). Thus, it was expected that all participants would show an FRN-valence 
effect. Furthermore, it was hypothesized that this effect would be increased in the Time 
Estimation task, due to a higher level of perceived control over the outcome (i.e., more 
investment in the outcome). Participants in the nPG group showed a significant FRN 
valence effect only in the Time Estimation task, partially supporting the hypothesis. 
Examination of FRN valence effects in the PG group, showed a larger effect size in the 
Time Estimation task (pη2 = .326) compared to the Doors task (pη2 = .234). Thus, as 
hypothesized, perceived control over the outcome led to significantly larger FRN valence 
effects. To be consistent with current literature, effects of sense of control and 
expectations on reward positivity were examined through the analysis of average 
amplitude at the time of the FRN in difference waves (win – loss). Based on previous 
research, it was hypothesized that unexpected outcomes would lead to a larger reward 
positivity compared to expected outcomes (Holroyd et al., 2011). The results of this 
study supported this hypothesis as the amplitude of the difference wave was larger after 
unexpected outcomes in both tasks. Similarly and as hypothesized, a greater sense of 
control over the outcome led to larger reward positivity (i.e., larger positivity in the Time 
Estimation task). As the FRN peak analysis showed, the differences observed between 
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the tasks were not driven by the FRN size to one type of valence/expectedness of the 
outcome. Thus, greater investment in the task and unexpected outcomes led to a larger 
positivity at the time of the FRN. Greater positivity after unexpected outcomes supports 
the proposal that reward positivity reflects prediction error signal (Holroyd & Coles, 
2002; Holroyd et al., 2008). If this is indeed the case, the results of this study show that 
greater investment (i.e., control over the outcome) leads to an increase in prediction error 
signal. Previous research has shown that the dopaminergic signal from ventral tegmental 
area (i.e., within basal ganglia) reflects salience of a stimulus rather than reward per se 
such that dopamine changes in the striatum (i.e., basal ganglia) reflect “excitement and 
arousal” (Stavarache, Pfaff, & Schober, 2009, pg. 337). Results of this study support this 
notion that the dopaminergic signal of prediction error, projected to ACC and measured 
at the scalp, reflects stimulus salience which increases with increasing cognitive 
investment at the time of the outcome. 
 Talmi, Atkinson and El-Deredy (2013) have proposed that the FRN is a marker for 
the salience of prediction errors in general rather than being reward-specific. Participants 
were asked to perform a task where the aversive stimulus was either monetary (a loss) or 
physical (pain), with high/low magnitude and expectedness (probability-based). For each 
type of trial, the outcome could either be delivered or omitted. The FRN was observed 
regardless of the modality of aversive outcome and was larger for ‘no gain’ and pain 
stimuli compared to ‘win’ and ‘pain omission’ outcomes. The FRN was also sensitive to 
the expectedness of the outcome such that unexpected stimuli in either modality were 
followed by a larger FRN amplitude compared to expected ones. Additionally, the effect 
of these factors on the reward positivity, observed at the time of the FRN in both 
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conditions, was examined.  The difference in waveforms between ‘reward-no reward’ 
conditions was similar in topography and timing as the difference between ‘no 
punishment-punishment’ conditions. They suggested that the ACC activation at the time 
of the FRN reflects prediction error in general, such that any salient stimulus (e.g., 
omission of pain) elicits a prediction error regardless of reward value. Thus, the FRN and 
reward positivity reflect magnitude of the prediction error that is not necessarily based on 
rewarding stimuli only.  
Between subject effects 
Electrophysiological differences. 
Having addressed what the FRN appears to reflect with respect to cognitive 
processes (i.e., its functional significance), we now turn to individual differences in terms 
of gambling behaviour. It was hypothesized that there will be group differences in the 
FRN measures, such that participants at risk for PG will not be sensitive to the sense-of-
control manipulation (i.e., would have a similar pattern of results in the two tasks). It was 
assumed that individuals at risk for problem gambling behaviour would hold cognitive 
distortions regarding their ability to control the outcome, and thus would feel an equal 
sense of control in both tasks. This hypothesis was not supported, as both groups of 
participants showed a larger FRN-valence effect in the Time Estimation task compared to 
the Doors task. Furthermore, participants in the PG group did not report being more 
confident or more accurate in their predictions of the outcome in the Doors task 
compared to their nPG counterparts. Similarly, both groups of participants were equally 
aware of different levels of probabilities of reward in the Doors task and adjusted their 
expectations accordingly. Thus, the results of this study suggest that at-risk gamblers did 
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not differ in perception of control over the outcome or probability of rewards in a 
gambling context (i.e., the Doors task). Furthermore, due to the probabilistic nature of 
gambling activities, skill or strategy rarely increases chances of winning. Previous 
research has shown that at-risk/problem gamblers report higher levels of cognitive 
distortions regarding the role strategy and skill have on chance-based games (Johansson, 
et al, 2009). In our study, no one reported using a strategy in the Doors task, suggesting 
that none of the participants were under the impression that a strategy might increase 
one’s ability to win. Thus, any cognitive distortions held by PG participants were not 
perceived to be relevant to the task and did not play a role at the time of outcome 
evaluation, explaining lack of support for the hypothesised results. 
Although the two groups of participants were similar in their sensitivity to sense of 
control and expectation manipulations, the ACC response in each group differed based 
on the type of outcomes (i.e., win/loss). More specifically, for participants in the nPG 
group sense of control and expectations modulated the ACC response following losses, 
whereas in the PG group these effects were observed mostly following the ACC response 
to wins. Thus, individuals at risk for gambling behaviour (in contrast to those not at risk) 
showed altered ACC response following both rewards and punishments, such that they 
were more sensitive to characteristics of the rewarding outcomes and less sensitive to the 
characteristics of punishments. These results are consistent with previous research 
showing that problem gamblers have more activation of the ventral striatum (i.e., basal 
ganglia) in response to rewards of different magnitude compared to controls (van Holst et 
al., 2012). Similarly, other studies have shown that problem gamblers have higher 
activation of basal ganglia following near-wins and monetary rewards (Chase & Clark, 
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2010; Sescousse et al., 2013). The results of Study 2 can be interpreted as evidence for 
altered reward processing in individuals at-risk for problem gambling. As these 
individuals showed effects of both top-down and bottom-up influences on the ACC 
activity, it is likely that this altered reward processing can arise from changes in the 
response of subcortical areas as well as altered PFC functioning. This may help explain 
the diversity of factors (e.g., preference for reward type, cognitive distortions) leading to 
problem gambling behaviour. 
It was originally expected that all participants would show FRN-valence effects (i.e., 
larger FRN following losses than wins) in both tasks. However, only participants in the 
PG group significantly differentiated between the valence of the outcomes in the Doors 
task. If the FRN reflects prediction an error signal based on salient stimuli, these results 
suggest that, in a gambling context, valence was a salient characteristic of outcomes to 
individuals at risk for problem gambling behaviour but not to individuals who were not 
at-risk. This interpretation would be consistent with previous research showing that 
contextual cues associated with addictive behaviour elicit urges to engage in the 
addictive behaviour (e.g., Kushner et al., 2007), which is reflected in the activity of the 
reward network (for a review of neural basis of addiction see Koob & Volkow, 2010). 
For example, increased activity of the PFC and ACC were observed in smokers during 
presentation of smoking cues (ashtray, lighter; Lee, Lim, Wiederhold, & Graham, 2005).  
Similarly, gambling cues (e.g., casino table) were shown to elicit greater activation of the 
PFC (ventromedial and dorsolateral) compared to neutral cues (Goudriaan et al., 2010). 
Furthermore, variation in the genes responsible for regulation of dopaminergic 
neurotransmission was shown to modulate the activation of the reward network in 
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response to smoking cues in smokers (McClernon, Hutchison, Rose, & Koznik, 2007). 
Taken together these findings suggest that individuals with addiction are more sensitive 
to stimuli related to their addiction (e.g., casino table, smoking) and that this reactivity is 
reflected in the reward network which is modulated by the functioning of the 
dopaminergic system.  
If the FRN reflects a prediction error signal in response to salient outcomes, it would 
be expected that gambling contexts or cues would elicit more pronounced responses to 
stimuli in individuals with maladaptive gambling behaviour, compared to controls, by 
increasing the overall levels of arousal or excitement. The Doors task was designed to 
resemble a gambling context, such that the delivery of rewards was probabilistic and the 
outcomes seemed to depend on participants’ choices (i.e., similar to a games of chance). 
The results of this study were consistent with the notion of FRN reflecting salient 
prediction errors such that individuals in the PG group were more sensitive to the valence 
of the outcomes, especially rewards, in the gambling task (i.e., Doors) compared to their 
nPG counterparts. 
It was expected that individuals at risk for problem gambling behaviour would have 
an earlier FRN. The latency analysis was conducted primarily in order to replicate the 
findings of Oberg et al. (2011) who found that gamblers differentiated between the 
valence of the outcome earlier than non-gamblers. It was also hypothesised that FRN 
peak amplitude would be attenuated in the PG group, replicating the effects found by 
Torres et al. (2013). Neither of these hypotheses were supported, as there were no group 
differences in latency or size of the FRN. Although, inability to replicate previous 
findings could be due to the relatively low power of this study, it is also possible that the 
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relationships between gambling status and FRN are very small considering the FRN 
represents a neural response from one structure of the brain (i.e., ACC), whereas 
gambling behaviour is a product of multiple areas within a network. Furthermore, in both 
studies (i.e., Oberg et al., 2011; Torres et al., 2013), problem gamblers were identified 
using clinical criteria, whereas in our study PG group consisted of individuals identified 
as at-risk for problem gambling (i.e., our sample included participants with less severe 
gambling addiction). It is possible that the activity of the ACC does not vary gradually 
with increased levels of gambling behaviour, but instead problem gambling behaviour 
results from changes in the reward system (pre-existing or as a result of related 
behaviour, cognitions or environment) and that these changes are reflected in the FRN 
only when the behaviour becomes clinically maladaptive. However, results of this study 
suggest that the FRN can be used as a marker for the altered functioning of the reward 
network if the task is designed to have outcomes with different characteristics (e.g., 
expectedness). Individuals at risk for problem gambling behaviour show increased 
sensitivity to the characteristics of win outcomes compared to not-at-risk individuals. 
Thus, maladaptive gambling behaviour is marked by higher sensitivity to rewards that is 
reflected in the change in ACC activity (i.e., comparisons of FRN effects) rather than 
absolute magnitude of the response in general (i.e., size of the FRN).  
Previous research has shown that severity of problem gambling related to the activity 
of the reward network, but these relationships were examined mostly in a clinical sample 
of problem gamblers (Mield et al., 2012; Oberg et al., 2011). Further research is needed 
to examine if the sensitivity of the reward network changes gradually as individuals 
develop gambling addictions rather than with increased severity of an established 
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addiction, and if these changes are reflected in the activity of the ACC in a similar 
manner (i.e., gradual change). If this is indeed the case, then analysis of FRN responses 
could aid in identifying individuals at risk for pathological gambling. However, the 
results of our study suggest that changes in FRN response can be observed only through 
comparisons of reward outcomes (e.g., expected versus unexpected) in individuals who 
are at-risk for problem gambling. Otherwise, the activity of ACC, as reflected in the FRN 
size and timing, is altered only after gambling behaviour becomes clinically maladaptive 
as neither of the measures of gambling severity (i.e., PGSI scores; frequency of gambling 
behaviour) or measures of individual differences, that differentiated between the groups, 
were related to the FRN amplitude of latency. However, the FRN following unexpected 
losses in the gambling context (i.e., in the Doors task) was related to the diversity of 
gambling activities engaged in by the individual such that larger ACC response was 
associated with fewer gambling activities. As at-risk participants also showed lower 
sensitivity of the FRN to the characteristics of loss outcomes observed in the PG group it 
is possible that as an individual engages in more gambling activities, the response of the 
reward system changes from being loss-oriented (i.e., as in nPG group) to gain-oriented 
(i.e., as was seen in the PG group).   
Problem Gambling and Personality 
Examination of personality differences between the two groups revealed that 
individuals at-risk for problem gambling reported higher levels of Emotionality and 
lower levels of Conscientiousness compared to their not at-risk counterparts. 
Furthermore, lower levels of Conscientiousness, Honesty/Humility and Agreeableness 
were related to higher frequency of gambling behaviour, but only Agreeableness 
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uniquely predicted gambling frequency. These relationships were not mediated by or 
correlated with any of the FRN measures, suggesting that personality plays a role in 
development/maintenance of PG behaviour that is distinct from the cortical response to 
rewards and punishments. 
There has been only one study to date examining the relationships between 
HEXACO personality factors and problem gambling. Consistent with the results of this 
study, Twigger (2010) reported that high-risk gamblers reported lower levels of 
Conscientiousness and Honesty/Humility. Lower levels of these traits were also shown to 
be associated with more willingness to take risks and increased perception of benefits 
following risk-taking (Weller & Tikir, 2011). A later study revealed that 
Honesty/Humility was negatively correlated with risk-taking regardless of valence of the 
outcome (i.e., to achieve wins or avoid losses), whereas lower Conscientiousness was 
related to greater risk taking to achieve gains (Weller & Thulin, 2012). Thus, the results 
of this study are consistent with previous literature such that Conscientiousness levels 
differentiated between individuals at-risk and not-at-risk for maladaptive gambling 
behaviour.  
Although there was no significant difference in Honesty/Humility between the 
groups, PG group reported slightly lower scores on this trait compared to nPG (i.e., the 
relationship was in the right direction). It is possible that this difference was not 
significant due to relatively small sample size. In this study, Honesty/Humility was 
related to the frequency of gambling suggesting that lower levels of this trait can 
exacerbate maladaptive gambling behaviour. This interpretation is consistent with 
theoretical construct of Honesty/Humility, such that individuals low in this trait desire to 
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have money and to have more than others (Lee & Ashton, 2012) and, thus, are driven to 
engage in gambling behaviour more often. More specifically, the combination of low 
Conscientiousness and low Honesty/Humility has been interpreted as a risk factor for 
development of problem gambling as these individuals are greatly motivated by 
monetary gains and have trouble controlling own impulses (Lee & Ashton, 2012).   
Further support for the role of personality traits in problem gambling comes from 
research using the Big Five Factor model (Goldberg, 1990; McCrae and Costa, 1999), 
which are very similar to the constructs measured by the HEXACO. For example, 
Conscientiousness and Agreeableness factors are similar to those measured by the 
HEXACO model, and Neuroticism highly overlaps with the domain of Emotionality in 
the HEXACO model. Problem gamblers consistently report lower levels of 
Conscientiousness, Agreeableness and Neuroticism (MacLaren et al., 2011; Reid et al., 
2011; Hwang et al., 2012) and combination of these characteristics were also shown to be 
predictive of treatment compliance (Ramos-Grille et al., 2013). More specifically, 
individuals who score low on domains of Neuroticism and Conscientiousness are more 
likely to relapse after treatment, while those who score low on Agreeableness in addition 
to the other two domains are more likely to drop out of treatment (Ramos-Grille et al., 
2013). Individuals with low levels of Agreeableness are stubborn, ready to take offence, 
get angry fast when provoked and have trouble forgiving past injustices (Lee & Ashton, 
2012). It is then not surprising that individuals exhibiting these characteristics are more 
likely to drop-out of treatment. In this study, lower levels of Agreeableness were 
predictive of higher frequency of gambling and greater variety of gambling activities 
engaged in during the past year. If individuals low in Agreeableness readily assume that 
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someone is taking advantage of them (e.g., a casino) and have trouble letting go of 
losses, it is reasonable to assume that they will try to win their money back more often 
(i.e., gamble more frequently) and switch from one type of gambling activity to another 
often to avoid supposedly ‘rigged’ games.  
Constructs of Emotionality and Neuroticism measure characteristics such as worry, 
desire to share concerns with others, and anxiety in stressful situations, among other 
things (Lee & Ashton, 2012). High levels of Neuroticism have been associated with 
development of depression and other mental health difficulties (e.g., Merino, Ferrerio, & 
Senra, 2013; Zakiee, Rostami, & Kamasi, 2014). Additionally, individuals low in 
Conscientiousness and high in Neuroticism have been shown to be more vulnerable to 
stress and have maladaptive coping strategies (Vollarth & Torgersen, 2000; Boyes & 
French, 2012). Conscientiousness, on the other hand, taps into one’s ability to delay 
gratification, control desires, goal-directedness and need for accuracy and precision (Lee 
& Ashton, 2012). In other words, people high on Conscientiousness have good self-
regulating abilities. Problem gamblers have been consistently shown to score lower in 
this domain compared to healthy controls (e.g., Hwang et al., 2012), suggesting that these 
individuals have trouble regulating desires and affect. 
Individuals at-risk for problem gambling seem to have lower thresholds for 
stressful events, have poor coping skills and impaired self-regulation abilities. In fact, 
problem gamblers who report gambling to ‘escape’ stressful situations have been shown 
to score higher on Neuroticism subscales compared to those who gamble for other 
reasons (Reid et al., 2011). Thus, previous research and results of the current study 
suggest that in individuals low in Conscientiousness and high in 
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Neuroticism/Emotionality, problem gambling behaviour is a product of maladaptive 
effort to regulate affect and deal with stress in one’s life.  
Interestingly, Emotionality/Neuroticism did not relate to the frequency of gambling 
behaviour, suggesting that low scores in this domain are risk-factors for maladaptive 
gambling behaviour but do not play a role in severity of such behaviour. This notion is 
consistent with the interpretation that PG develops due to poor coping skills and 
reactions to stressors: if these skills are absent individuals might turn to gambling, but the 
degree of such deficits play no role in the severity of the problem behaviour. 
Conscientiousness, on the other hand, reflects one’s ability to control impulses and 
desires, so lower levels of self-regulation ability could lead to greater severity of 
maladaptive behaviour.  
In summary, the results of this study suggest that individuals with poor coping 
skills and impaired ability to self-regulate turn to gambling as a strategy to cope with 
stressful events. This maladaptive gambling behaviour is further exacerbated by beliefs 
in entitlement, desires to get rich quick (i.e., low Honesty/Humility) and inability to let 
go of negative events (i.e., low Agreeableness). As none of these traits were related to 
EEG measures, one possibility is that the effects of these risk factors operate separately 
from any changes in the functioning of the reward system in processing of decision 
outcomes. It may also be the case that the neurobiological factors moderate or enable the 
severity of problem gambling. Unfortunately, testing this possibility will need to await a 
much larger study combining the personality and ERP measures. 
Conclusions 
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In summary, the results of this study suggest that FRN is sensitive to the salient 
characteristics of a stimulus as defined by the task goals, such that more salient 
characteristics (e.g., loss or unexpectedness) lead to larger FRN amplitude. Outcomes in 
the Time Estimation task and unexpected outcomes in general elicited a larger positivity 
at the time of the FRN, which is also consistent with the idea of ‘salience’ positivity 
proposed by Talmi et al. (2013), such that salient stimulus characteristics elicit a 
positivity after stimulus presentation. Participants at risk for PG were sensitive to the 
valence of the outcome in the Doors task, whereas their nPG counterparts were not, 
suggesting that gambling contexts (i.e., tasks/games of chance) increase the sensitivity of 
the reward system to valence of the outcome in individuals at risk for problem gambling 
behaviour. Furthermore, results of this study support the hypothesis that maladaptive 
gambling behaviour leads to an increased sensitivity of the reward network to reward 
characteristics and a decreased response to different loss outcomes. Thus, the results of 
this study support the hypothesis that previous history of maladaptive gambling 
behaviour is related to altered responses of the reward network. Furthermore, as the 
results of this study did not replicate previous research using pathological gamblers (i.e., 
defined using clinical measures), it is likely that the FRN size and latency does not 
change gradually with increasing risk of maladaptive behaviour. Instead, changes in 
ACC activity reflected by the FRN in general can be observed only after behaviour 
becomes clinically maladaptive or through comparison between different types of 
gain/loss outcomes.  
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General Discussion 
The studies in this dissertation were conducted in order to test a model of FRN 
generation which includes modulating inputs from the medial PFC on the activity of the 
ACC. In the proposed model, these projections (i.e., top-down) carry information 
regarding subjective characteristics of the stimulus/task (e.g., relevance to current goals). 
Relatively low level (objective) stimulus characteristics (e.g., valence) are processed in 
the subcortical areas (basal ganglia); this information is then projected to the ACC (i.e., 
bottom-up input). Clear dissociation between the effects of these stimulus/task 
characteristics (i.e., objective vs. subjective) at the level of the FRN was proposed to 
support a model of direct relay of subjective information from the medial PFC to the 
ACC (Figure 4.1).  
 
Figure 4.1. Schematic representation of the model of FRN generation that was tested 
in the studies in the dissertation research. 
Stimulus 
(Reward/No Reward) 
Basal Ganglia (bottom-up) 
Objective stimulus characteristics 
(Study 1: cue effects; 
Study 2: probability effects)  
ACC 
Predictability of the outcome based 
on both factors 
PFC (top-down) 
Subjective stimulus characteristics 
(Study 1: sense of control; 
Study 2: expectations through 
instructions, sense of control) 
FRN 
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More specifically, it was proposed that complex cognitive states, such as perception 
of sense of control over the task outcome, will influence FRN activity through top-down 
projections from frontal cortical areas to the ACC. Simpler characteristics such as 
valence of the stimulus or probability of a certain outcome were proposed to influence 
ACC activity through bottom-up projections from the basal ganglia. In Study 1 this 
model was examined by comparing the effects of presence or absence of informative 
cues (bottom-up) and three levels of (top-down) perceived feeling of control over the 
outcome. In Study 2, sense of control was manipulated by the type of task (top-down) 
and expectations were based on probability (bottom-up) or instructions (top-down). 
Thus, effects of projections from both basal ganglia and PFC to ACC were indirectly 
examined in both studies. 
Effects of cue  
Presence of informative cues attenuated the FRN-valence response as was predicted. 
In Study 1, half of the tasks performed by participants included an informative cue. 
Previous research has shown that presence of informative cues affects FRN amplitude at 
the time of outcome presentation (Holroyd, Krigloson, & Lee, 2011; Xu et al., 2011). 
Results of Study 1 showed that in gambling paradigms (i.e., Some-Control tasks), 
presence of an informative cue attenuated FRN amplitude elicited by the presentation of 
outcomes on each trial (no cue: pη2= .192; cue: pη2= .405). Research on reward 
processing in the nAcb shows that cues associated with rewards elicit a similar 
dopaminergic response as the presentation of the reward (Knutson, Adams, Fong, & 
Hommer, 2001), and in some cases attenuates it (Holroyd et al., 2011). If the valence 
information present in the informative cues elicited a similar response in the nAcb (i.e., 
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in the basal ganglia) as was observed in Shultz’s work, the dopaminergic signal from the 
basal ganglia would also be attenuated. Thus, the hypothesis that the presence of stimulus 
characteristics that can be coded in the basal ganglia will attenuate the response of the 
FRN was supported. The effects of the cue further support the theory of dopaminergic 
nature of the FRN generation proposed by Holroyd and Coles (2002).  
Broyd et al. (2012) examined the effects of cue valence (gain or loss) on the P3 
amplitude associated with the cue and CNV that followed the cue. The CNV amplitude is 
a reflection of anticipatory response to the stimuli (i.e., preparation for action), and it has 
been shown to be attenuated by lower levels of dopamine in the brain (for review see 
Brunia, van Boxtel, & Böcker, 2012; Linssen et al., 2011). This component was also 
shown to vary in amplitude in response to the attentional demands of the task, arousal 
levels and relate to behavioural performance (Tecce, 1972; Funderud et al., 2012; 
Schevernels et al., 2014). Thus, the CNV is often interpreted as a marker for motor and 
attentional preparation to respond. Broyd et al. (2012) found that the valence of the cue 
did not affect the CNV, indicating that this measure was not sensitive to any differences 
in arousal/attention allocation needs resulting from positive versus negative cues, if there 
were any. The valence of cues was dissociated in another component; P3 amplitude was 
larger following gain cues. Unfortunately, the N2 components elicited by the cue were 
not reported, so it is unclear whether the ACC response to the cue was similar to that 
observed after outcomes. If these responses were similar, that would provide further 
support for the modulation of ACC activity to reward information in general. 
Nevertheless, Broyd et al.’s results are indicative that the valence of the cue is processed 
at the time of its presentation (i.e., P3 effects) and does not modulate the anticipatory 
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activity EEG measures (i.e., CNV). Thus, the effects of the cue on the FRN observed at 
the time of presentation of the outcome are not due to differential activity during the 
anticipatory phase of the task.  
Given that any activity at the time of the cue did not influence the components 
observed during the anticipatory period, it is likely that whatever perturbations in the 
system caused by the cue were short lived. However, there are effects at the time of the 
FRN, and this suggests the cue-information might change the baseline activation of the 
nAcb that then affects the feedback-ERP response. If presence of the cues caused a 
change in activity in the nAcb, these effects would not be observed in our EEG signal 
because the subcortical areas do not project a signal to the scalp. However, change in 
nAcb activity can influence the dopaminergic signal projected to the ACC at the time of 
the outcome and in turn, affect the FRN. Consistent with predictions of the proposed 
model, the results of this study support the presence of bottom-up modulation of the 
ACC at the time of the FRN. 
Effects of sense of control 
The results of Study 1 suggest that the manipulation of sense of control did not affect 
the FRN as expected. Levels of sense of control were differentiated such that when 
participants knew their outcome depended only partially on their response (Some-
Control), the FRN-valence effects were most reliable. Thus, any effects of control over 
the outcome should be interpreted with caution. As there were no other effects in terms 
of sense of control on the FRN amplitude, the results of the study are inconsistent with 
predictions based on the proposed model. It was hypothesized that greater sense of 
control would increase the valence effects observed in the FRN as individuals would be 
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more invested in the outcome. This hypothesis was based on previous research showing 
that diminished sense of responsibility attenuates the FRN valence in a similar fashion 
(Li et al., 2011) as was seen in tasks where participants were not actively making 
decisions (Yeung, Holroyd, & Cohen, 2005; Bismark, Hajcak, Whitworth, & Allen, 
2011). Feeling in control over the outcome is a complex cognitive construct and, thus, it 
was assumed it would be represented by the top-down projections from the frontal 
cortices to the ACC. There was no consistent influence of perception of control as 
defined by the manipulations on the FRN and, thus, the hypothesis of top-down 
modulation of ACC at the time of the FRN was not supported.  
There was some support for the effects of sense of control on the FRN in Study 2, 
such that FRN-valence effects were observed to be larger in the Time Estimation task. 
However, as there were no valence effects observed in the Doors task in the nPG group, 
it is hard to conclude that the difference in the perceived sense of control alone caused an 
increase in the valence effects. As previous research suggests that non-gamblers should 
differentiate between the valence of the outcome in the Doors task (Hajcak, Moser, 
Holroyd, & Simons, 2007), it is possible that the combination of the two tasks led 
participants in the nPG to discount the valence of the outcome and process the outcomes 
based on its expectation value. The tasks were different in the levels of perceived sense 
of control over the outcome as well as emphasis on prediction of the outcome. More 
specifically, participants had greater sense of control over the outcome in the Time 
Estimation task, but were not asked to explicitly predict the outcomes as was done in the 
Doors task. As no consistent FRN valence effects were observed in the Doors task in this 
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group, it is hard to be sure that the observed patterns were due to the difference in levels 
of control rather than emphasis on other stimulus characteristics (i.e., expectedness). 
The effects of sense of control were much clearer in the PG group, who showed 
FRN-valence effects in both tasks such that FRN-valence effects observed in the Doors 
task (pη2= .234) were smaller than those observed in the Time Estimation ask (pη2= 
.326). Thus, the hypothesis regarding higher perceived control over the outcome 
increasing the FRN-valence effects was supported. The results of this study are 
consistent with previous literature (Li et al., 2011; Bismark et al., 2011), and show that 
modulation of the FRN can be achieved by changing the participant’s perception of 
control in the task. Greater perception of control over the outcome leads to greater 
cognitive investment in the outcome, thus increasing the sensitivity of the ACC to the 
valence of the outcome.  
Reconciling Study 1 and Study 2 
According to the proposed model, an increase in the level of perceived control over 
the outcome should have increased the FRN-valence effects through top-down 
projections to the ACC from the PFC. This hypothesis was supported by the pattern of 
results observed in Study 2 and not in Study 1. However, lack of consistent valence 
effects in all tasks and larger FRNs in the intermediate condition (i.e., Some-Control) 
could be a sign that the manipulation of sense of control in Study 1 was not effective, 
which would explain the lack of effects in the expected direction (i.e., FRNs should be 
largest in Full-Control, followed by Some and No-Control conditions). Further research 
is needed to identify an effective way to manipulate the sense of control in order to draw 
more definite conclusions about its effects on the FRN amplitude. The results of Study 2 
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supported the hypothesis for top-down modulation of ACC activity, such that perception 
of control over the outcome led to an increased FRN-valence effect. This effect was more 
pronounced in a group of at-risk problem gamblers compared to not at-risk individuals. If 
the PFC directly modulates ACC activity at the time of the FRN, the effects of task 
characteristics that would modulate this activity (e.g., sense of control) should be 
dissociable from objective stimulus characteristics (e.g., valence) and, thus, be easily 
observable at the time of the FRN. The analysis conducted in this dissertation shows that 
these effects are small (i.e., nPG group) but can be amplified in certain populations (i.e., 
in the PG group), suggesting that these influences are processed through a non-direct 
pathway (i.e., through other structures such as basal ganglia) rather than through direct 
links with PFC. 
Effects of expectations 
According to the proposed model, any effects of expectations on the FRN were to be 
interpreted as activations from bottom-up projections if judgements were based on 
probabilities;  on the other hand, if expectations were modulated through instructions 
(i.e., through a change in ‘cognitive set’), influences on the FRN were to be interpreted 
as top-down modulations of ACC activity. These effects were examined in Study 2; 
judgements in the Doors task were based on probability of the trial and judgements in the 
Time Estimation task were based on the type of the ‘cue’. Significant effects of 
expectations were observed in the Doors task, where unexpected stimuli led to a larger 
FRN amplitude. Thus, only the hypothesis about bottom-up influences on the ACC 
activity was supported.  
179 
There were no significant differences in the FRN based on the expectedness of the 
stimulus in the Time Estimation task. Although it is possible that the manipulation of 
expectations did not work in the Time Estimation task, the self-reported ratings obtained 
in Study 2 show that participants did try harder on the ‘hard’ trials ‘than on the ‘easy’ 
trials in the Time Estimation task, suggesting that the instructional manipulation in the 
Time Estimation task led participants to have lower expectations for success on ‘hard’ 
trial. So it is more likely that manipulation of expectations through instructions had a 
delayed effect on behaviour (i.e., after an initial prediction error signal was signalled by 
the FRN) and, thus the effects were reflected in self-report measures but not the FRN. If 
this is the case, then this manipulation would not have an influence on the FRN response 
as the information from higher cortical areas responsible for processing cognitive 
information (e.g., “green cue means an easy trial, so I expect to win”) would be 
integrated into the system at a later stage (e.g., during re-evaluation of behaviour). Thus, 
the lack of expectation effects on the FRN in either group suggests that the effect of this 
manipulation, if any, was small and the hypothesis of cognitive factors directly 
influencing the ACC activity through the medial PFC (top-down) projections was not 
supported. 
Re-evaluation of the proposed model  
The studies in this dissertation were conducted to test the predictions based on the 
proposed model of FRN generation and modulation of ACC activity. The model 
proposed a division of stimulus characteristics into subjective and objective factors, 
which are coded in the medial PFC and basal ganglia, respectively. The latter part of the 
model was based on the reinforcement learning theory of FRN/ERN generation (Holroyd 
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& Coles, 2002) and neurobiological evidence from research on response of structures in 
the basal ganglia to reward (e.g., nAcb; Schultz & Dickinson, 2000). These influences 
were tested by examining the effects of valenced cues (Study 1) and probability-based 
expectations (Study 2: Doors task) on the FRN measures. There was consistent evidence 
for proposed bottom-up modulations of ACC activity such that informative cues 
attenuated the FRN-valence effect and unexpected outcomes elicited larger FRN 
amplitude. As these factors could be dissociated from the manipulation of subjective 
stimulus/task characteristics in each study, it was concluded that this information is 
indeed coded in subcortical areas and then projected to the ACC.  
Previous research has shown that complex cognitive constructs such as cognitive 
state during the outcome presentation (Yang, Gu, Tang, & Luo, 2013), sense of 
responsibility over the outcome (Li et al., 2010), trustworthiness of a partner (Long, 
Jiang, & Zhou, 2012) and personality (Santesso & Segalowitz, 2009; Segalowitz & 
Dywan, 2009; Santesso, Dzyundzyak, & Segalowitz, 2011) influence the FRN elicited by 
the outcomes in the tasks. It was assumed that such complex constructs arise form 
integration of information across a number of cortical areas, which then project to frontal 
cortices for modulation of behavioural response. Medial PFC has been shown to play a 
role in updating the incentive value of stimuli, generation of expectancies and selection 
of goals (Roberts & Parkinson, 2006). Maturation of medial PFC has been associated 
with improved ability to regulate behaviour (e.g., Luna et al, 2004; for a review see 
Ernst, Romeo, & Andersen, 2009) and damage to this area has been shown to result in 
inappropriate and uninhibited behaviour (Spinella & Miley, 2004; Chan et al., 2005). 
Furthermore, medial PFC has been shown to be sensitive to subjective value of the 
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stimulus (O’Doherty & Dolan, 2006; Kheramin et al, 2004; Kable & Glimcher, 2007) 
and have direct projections to the ACC and nAcb (Vogt & Pandya, 1987; Devinsky, 
Morrell, & Vogt, 1995). Thus, it was proposed that projections from the medial PFC to 
the ACC carry information regarding the subjective value of the stimulus given the task 
goals and structure. If this is indeed the case, then subjective characteristics of the 
stimulus should be dissociable at the level of ACC activity (i.e., effects of objective and 
subjective stimulus characteristics are additive), and would be reflected in the FRN 
measures.  
This hypothesis was tested via tasks varying in sense of control over the outcome 
(Study 1 and Study 2) as well as manipulation of expectations through instructions 
(Study 2). Sense of control manipulation did not support the hypothesis of top-down 
inputs in Study 1 as FRN did not consistently increase with increasing sense of control 
(i.e., No-Control < Some-Control < Full-Control). In Study 2, increased perception of 
control did increase FRN valence effects as participants showed larger effect sizes in the 
Door task compared to Time Estimation. However, there were no effects of expectations 
in the Time Estimation task (manipulated through instructions) in either of the groups. 
Thus, the evidence for top-down modulations of ACC activity was not consistent and 
only partially supported the proposed model. These manipulations and measures 
provided an indirect way to test the proposed model, and thus only consistent evidence of 
additive effects at the time of the FRN was considered sufficient to support the model. 
 Lack of such consistent support for the hypothesis based on top-down pathways of 
information suggests it is more likely that information about subjective characteristics is 
used to change the baseline levels of activity in lower cortical areas early in the task. In 
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terms of the model, information regarding subjective factors is relayed from the medial 
PFC directly to the subcortical areas (i.e., basal ganglia), changing the baseline activity 
of these areas. The output signal of subcortical areas, a result of interactions between 
objective and subjective characteristics, is then projected to the ACC. Thus, the two 
models (original and updated) are similar in that ACC receives information regarding 
both subjective and objective stimulus characteristics. In the originally proposed model 
ACC was the area where these two signals were reconciled, which was marked by the 
generated FRN. In the updated model, subjective and objective characteristics are 
combined at the level of basal ganglia, leaving open the question of what part of this 
information is projected to the ACC and reflected in the FRN. 
Functional significance of the FRN.  
Current research suggests that the FRN reflects reward prediction error, such that 
negative prediction errors (i.e., when predicted reward was omitted) elicit a negativity 
following the presentation of the outcome and positive prediction errors (i.e., unpredicted 
rewards) lead to a reward positivity (Holroyd et al., 2011). Most of previous research 
done on the FRN concentrated on the factors affecting the FRN-valence effects by 
manipulating frequency, probability and magnitude of the rewards (e.g., San Martin et 
al., 2010). FRN has also been shown to be modulated by perceptual characteristics of the 
stimulus (e.g., similar/dissimilar: Donkers & van Boxtel, 2005; Gehring, Liu, Orr & 
Carp, 2012). The latter findings would be consistent with the theory that ACC is 
sensitive to conflicts between motor responses that arise in the system (Yeung, 
Botvinick, & Cohen, 2004). The main difference between the two theories, is that the 
conflict–model suggests that mismatch in possible behavioural responses modulates the 
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FRN, whereas in the reinforcement learning theory, mismatch between the predicted and 
obtained outcomes modulates the FRN. In other words, either mismatch in future 
behaviour (conflict) or obtained stimuli (reinforcement learning) affect the FRN. Emric 
et al. (2008) have shown that ACC cells in primates generates local field potentials in 
response to errors and feedback, but not to conflict-related signals (i.e., choice between 
conflicting eye-gaze responses). Furthermore, as the FRN has been observed even in the 
absence of motor outputs (e.g., Yeung et al., 2005), it is unlikely that FRN is a marker for 
conflict between competing motor signals. 
Reinforcement learning theory suggests that the FRN is a marker for prediction error 
signal occurring in the subcortical areas. These prediction errors can be based either on 
the incentive value of the stimulus (i.e., valence, magnitude) or other stimulus 
characteristic (e.g., context – win/loss block). Talmi and colleagues (2013) showed that 
similar FRN-valence effects can be elicited by monetary (win/loss) and physical (pain/no 
pain) outcomes. Positive outcomes (monetary win/no pain) led to smaller FRN amplitude 
compared to negative outcomes (monetary loss/pain) regardless of the modality of 
presentation. The authors have suggested that FRN represents a prediction error based on 
salient stimuli and is not specific to rewards. 
Another study showed that the ACC activity was sensitive to changes in stimulus 
characteristics in response to changes in task demands (van Noordt, Desjardins, & 
Segalowitz, 2012). Participants were asked to complete a version of a Go/Nogo task, 
where two stimulus characteristic were manipulated: colour of the fixation cross and of 
the box surrounding the fixation. Nogo trials occurred when the colour of the fixation 
changed from white to black. The colour of the fixation box signified the type of trial, 
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such that two of the colours coded for a certain block (i.e., zero Nogo trials present) and 
the other two alerted the participant that this block contained some Nogo trials (possible 
block). Participants were informed of the colour-block (certain/possible) associations 
prior to starting the task. The analysis of the data showed that the ACC was sensitive to 
the changes of the box colours, regardless of what type of block it would represent (i.e., 
safe vs. Nogo block). More specifically, this activation was observed even when the 
block-type did not change (i.e., possible to possible blocks). These results further support 
the notion that the ACC is responsive to changes in stimuli that signal the need for 
attentional control (i.e., salient characteristics). 
Some of the results outlined in this dissertation research were also consistent with the 
proposal that FRN reflects prediction errors based on salient stimulus characteristics. In 
Study 2, healthy individuals showed a larger FRN response to unexpected outcomes in 
the Doors task and loss outcomes in the Time Estimation task. The expectedness of the 
outcome was emphasized in the Doors task by explicitly asking participants to predict the 
outcome. Thus, congruency between predicted and obtained outcomes was evaluated at 
the time of outcome presentation (i.e., “Was I right or wrong?”), which was reflected in 
the FRN amplitude. On the other hand, participants were under the impression that 
accurate responses in the Time Estimation task would lead to positive outcomes. In this 
task, valence of the outcome could be used to improve future performance and maximize 
winnings, whereas congruency with expectations based on trial type (i.e., easy vs. hard) 
would not provide further information regarding improvement of performance. 
Therefore, FRN amplitude reflected only the distinction between valence of the outcome 
(i.e., loss – too slow/too fast vs. win – on time).  
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Currently, FRNs generated by the ACC are interpreted in light of reinforcement 
learning theory such that ACC activity is a response to reward prediction error signal 
from subcortical areas (Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Holroyd, Pakzad-Vaezi, & Krigolson, 
2008). The results of this dissertation research (Study 2) suggest that the ACC activity is 
modulated by the magnitude of prediction errors based on salient characteristics of the 
stimuli rather than reward specific characteristics. Although the hypothesis of projections 
from the medial PFC modulating the ACC activity was only partially supported, 
cognitive constructs and states have been previously shown to modulate ACC response 
to outcomes (e.g., Yang et al., 2013). Thus, it is likely that this information (i.e., 
subjective factors) is integrated in the dopaminergic response of subcortical areas prior to 
its relay to the ACC, possibly through changes in the baseline activity of the basal 
ganglia. Furthermore, individuals at risk for problem gambling were shown to be 
responsive to the manipulation of control at the level of the FRN, suggesting that this 
information was integrated in the dopaminergic response of the reward system. As 
medial PFC has direct connections to nAcb and ventral stratum, it is possible for this 
information to be processed in cortical areas and then relayed to the subcortex bypassing 
the ACC. Prediction errors would be generated based on the discrepancy between 
previous experience/goals (i.e., medial PFC information) and objective outcomes (i.e., 
basal ganglia). Thus, the FRN reflects the relative degree of these prediction errors based 
on salient stimulus characteristics (e.g., valence, expectedness), where saliency is 
determined by stimulus characteristics, task goals and cognitive state at the time of 
feedback presentation. In other words, activity of the ACC is modulated by stimulus 
characteristics that are important for future behavioural adjustment (i.e., salient). 
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Theoretically, this signal of ‘something important has happened’ can then be relayed to 
the frontal cortices for updating of goals and expectations.  
This reinterpretation of the functional significance of the FRN is consistent with a 
relatively recent model of reinforcement learning, the predicted response-outcome (PRO) 
model, proposed by Alexander and Brown (2010). In this model, activity of the neurons 
in the medial PFC codes for predicted outcomes based on probability and timing of the 
outcome. If the predicted outcome occurs these neurons are then inhibited, and if 
predicted outcome fails to occur this activity increases until it reaches its maximum, thus 
coding for omitted outcomes. In the PRO model, responsivity of the ACC to stimuli is 
viewed as part of a larger medial PFC response (i.e., the function of each structure in 
predicting responses is not specified, e.g., Alexander & Brown, 2011). In this dissertation 
functions of medial PFC and ACC were considered to be separable, such that medial 
PFC is responsible for relaying information about subjective stimulus characteristics to 
the basal ganglia, which then projects this signal to the ACC. Results of this dissertation 
research suggest that the FRN is a marker for a prediction error signal based on the most 
salient stimulus characteristics. If we assume that the assumption of the medial PFC 
‘learning to anticipate the value of actions’ (Alexander & Brow, 2011, pg 1338) made in 
the PRO model is correct, then it is plausible to assume that medial PFC should receive a 
signal regarding the accuracy of these predictions. Results of this dissertation research 
suggest that the FRN is a marker for this process, such that only prediction errors 
regarding the outcomes of the most salient (i.e., important for future improvement of 
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performance) characteristics of the outcome are relayed (Figure 4.2). 
 
Figure 4.2. Schematic representation of sequence of events in the reinforcement 
learning pathway. 
In other words, when feedback is presented, objective stimulus characteristics are 
processed by the basal ganglia, baseline activity of which is modulated by the 
information regarding task goals and subjective factors (e.g., cognitive state) projected 
from the cortical areas. Dopamine concentration within the basal ganglia is then either 
increased (i.e., reward) or decreased (i.e., no reward) depending on the outcome (i.e., 
objective characteristics). These changes in dopamine levels lead to changes in the 
baseline activity of the ACC, thus reflecting a summary of the prediction errors 
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signalling errors (i.e., only for salient stimulus characteristics). This signal is then 
projected to the medial PFC, where it can inhibit its activation if the response is 
consistent with prediction, or it can further increase activation if the outcome was 
unpredicted, training the network to formulate better predictions and allowing the 
organism to learn from previous experience. Thus, the reinterpretation of the functional 
significance of the FRN as a marker of prediction errors for salient stimulus 
characteristics is consistent with current models of reinforcement learning.   
Implications and Future Directions 
Research conducted for this dissertation suggests that FRN reflects prediction 
errors based on salient stimulus characteristics that are identified by the system as a 
function of the context (e.g., gambling related context), cognitive set (e.g., sense of 
control) and individual differences (e.g., personality). For example, to an individual 
reporting high levels of harm avoidance (Person A) losses might be equally salient in any 
context, whereas to someone with high levels of sensation seeking (Person B) all 
outcomes including losses would be more salient in arousing situations (e.g., gambling). 
In this case, Person A’s FRNs will not differentiate between contexts but Person B’s 
FRNs will vary depending on the context such that FRNs will vary with stimulus 
characteristics more in the arousing contexts.  
Research shows that the brain changes with experience such that stimuli or 
characteristics that stand out in our environment (i.e., considered salient) are defined by 
our previous experiences. For example, individual with addictions show greater arousal 
in contexts with stimuli that are linked to their addictions (e.g., slot machines or casinos 
for problem gamblers) suggesting that these stimuli are more salient (e.g., Lee, Lim, 
189 
Wiederhold, & Graham, 2005; Kushner et al., 2007). Individuals at risk for PG showed 
less differentiation between the contexts of loss outcomes than not-at-risk controls, 
suggesting that losses are less salient to persons with maladaptive gambling behaviour. 
Interestingly, these individuals did not fail to differentiate between the two tasks, but this 
differentiation was observed only in their response to wins. Thus, the reward system was 
responsive to all stimulus characteristics but its ‘focus’ had switched from a loss- to a 
win-orientation. Given that experiences can lead to changes in the brain, it is unclear if 
these changes in the ‘focus’ of the reward system from negative outcomes to positive 
ones are a result of extensive gambling experiences or if these neurological differences 
are a risk-factor for development of problem gambling. In this dissertation FRN 
measures were not related to severity of gambling; however, other studies have shown 
such differences (by Oberg, Christine & Tata, 2011; Kreussel et al., 2013; Torres et al., 
2013). Thus, it is possible that responsiveness of the reward system changes further as 
addiction develops. However, it is also possible that more severe gambling behaviour is a 
consequence of the functioning of the reward system. Only a longitudinal study 
examining change in neurological responses with development of problem gambling 
behaviour can address this issue.  
Regardless of the direction of effects, it is clear that persons with maladaptive 
gambling behaviour show altered responses of the reward system compared to not-at-risk 
individuals. Once these responses are quantified and can be predicted, they can serve as 
markers for addiction risk-factors. Currently much more research on the topic is needed 
to get the field to this point, but results of this dissertation suggest that altered FRN 
responses account for unique variance in the changes linked to PG and this variance is 
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not shared with measures of variability in personality. Thus electrophysiological 
measures provide another piece of the puzzle, unique from effects of personality, which 
might bring us closer to understanding this type of behavioural addiction.  
Although we do not fully understand the mechanism behind the development of 
addictions, every piece of the puzzle provides us with another way to help individuals 
overcome such behaviour. For example, research has shown that pathological gamblers 
hold a number of cognitive distortions and at least some of these individuals use 
gambling as a coping mechanism. Currently, it is still unclear why some people turn to 
gambling as means of coping rather than any other activities; however, given the nature 
of the relationship, it is possible that teaching recovering problem gamblers alternative 
coping strategies can prevent relapsing. Similarly, it has been shown that experiences and 
cognitions can change the responses of the reward system (e.g., cognitive reframing can 
attenuate FRN response; Yang et al., 2013). It is possible that teaching individuals to 
actively concentrate on losses and not wins in gambling situations might make the 
system to be more loss-focused (i.e., train the system to treat losses as more salient). 
Similar effects might already be achieved through cognitive-behaviour therapy which 
addresses cognitive distortions that are often held by problem gamblers, as such 
cognitions might be a by-product of reward-oriented state of the system. Much more 
research is needed to examine if such treatments would be effective and whether 
recovery process is reflected in electrophysiological measures.  
It has also been proposed that there are several types of problem gamblers but there 
is no research examining potential differences between different types of gamblers and 
functioning of the reward system. In this study changes in the electrophysiological 
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responses did not explain the relationship between individuals’ gambling behaviour and 
personality. If measures of responsivity of the reward system account for variance unique 
from personality and other cognitive constructs, it is possible that they can also help 
differentiate between types of PG and provide better tools for personalizing prevention 
and treatment strategies for individuals at-risk.  
Lastly, it would be interesting to examine the differences, if any, in the functioning 
of the reward system and potential interactions with other individual differences can be 
used to identify protective factors. Not all individuals at-risk for problem gambling 
develop an addiction severe enough to meet clinical criteria of pathological gambling. 
There is also a subset of individuals who do not view gambling as an enjoyable activity. 
Identifying factors that prevent someone from engaging in gambling in the first place or 
developing an addiction can further inform treatment options and government 
regulations. Compared to personality or cognitions, changes in the brain are more rapid 
and thus reflect the state of the system more accurately. Electrophysiological measures 
could provide the most up to date reflection of treatment progress and could potentially 
aid in timely identifications of individuals at-risk for relapsing.  
The relationship between gambling experience and functioning of the reward 
system is a relatively new avenue for research. The methods available for such 
examination are constantly improving and becoming more widely available. There is still 
a large gap in the literature linking differences in personality and cognitions held by 
individuals with PG and responsivity of the reward system. Understanding of the 
interplay of these factors will provide us with a better understanding of development of 
192 
addictions as well as the role of the reward system in every day behaviour and individual 
differences. 
Summary 
The research conducted for this dissertation suggests that any influences of medial 
PFC on the activity of the ACC that occur in the context of incentive tasks are not direct. 
The FRN, which was defined to be a marker of ACC activity, was shown to be sensitive 
to salient stimulus characteristics and likely to reflect a general (not only reward-specific) 
prediction error signal. Dopamine is one of the neurotransmitters implicated in incentive 
learning and the FRN is thought to be a product of the dopaminergic signal from the 
subcortical areas to the ACC. Thus, it should not be surprising that the same signal can 
be used in coding information salient for learning. The results of this dissertation 
partially support the reinforcement learning theory, in that the FRN is a marker for 
dopaminergic signal of prediction error. However, the pattern of results outlined here 
suggests that prediction errors are based on salient stimulus characteristics and is not 
reward specific. Thus, the model of FRN generation should be updated such that 
prediction errors relayed to the ACC are based on a combination of salient stimulus 
characteristics valuable for learning and future behavioural adjustment. Further testing of 
this model in individuals at-risk for addictions can aid in identifying biological markers 
of at-risk factors and inform prevention and treatment options.   
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Table 1.1 
Average amount of money earned by participants in each condition of the task. 
Task Experiment 1 Experiment 2 
Cue – No-Control M = 6.43 
SD = 1.68 
M = 5.41 
SD = 1.72 
Cue – Some-Control M = 8.77 
SD = 3.31 
M = 7.89 
SD = 2.94 
Cue – Full-Control M = 8.73 
SD = 0.56 
M = 8.83 
SD = 1.19 
No Cue – No-Control M = 13.25 
SD = 2.62 
NA 
No cue – Some-Control M = 13.75 
SD = 0.63 
M = 13.5 
SD = 0.81 
No Cue – Full-Control M = 8.61 
SD = 0.51 
M = 8.13 
SD = 1.58 
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Table 1.2 
Means and standard deviations of responses on the End of Task questionnaires, broken 
down by sense of control condition, for Experiments 1 (N = 12). 
 
  
 Experiment 1 
Question No-Control Some-Control Full-Control 
Were you paying attention to the cues? 
M = 2.50 
SD = 1.24 
M = 2.92 
SD = 1.73 
M = 3.00 
SD = 1.60 
Were the cues helpful (red/green vs mixed)? M = 2.25 
SD = 1.42 
M = 2.67 
SD = 1.50 
M = 3.08 
SD = 1.73 
Did you have a feeling of control over the 
outcome? 
M = 0.50 
SD = 0.67 
M = 1.58 
SD = 1.31 
M = 2.50 
SD = 1.45 
Could you predict the outcome? 
M = 0.67 
SD = 0.78 
M = 1.18 
SD = 1.08 
M = 2.25 
SD = 1.49 
How accurate were you at predicting the outcome? 
M = 0.67 
SD = 0.78 
M = 1.67 
SD = 1.07 
M = 2.18 
SD = 1.25 
How confident were you in your predictions? 
M = 0.75 
SD = 0.75 
M = 1.67 
SD = 1.16 
M = 2.17 
SD = 1.64 
How often did you feel you would win? 
M = 2.17 
SD = 0.72 
M = 2.25 
SD = 0.97 
M = 2.42 
SD = 0.90 
How often did you feel you would lose? 
M = 2.25 
SD = 0.62 
M = 2.27 
SD = 1.27 
M = 2.73 
SD =.65 
Were you paying attention to the feedback? 
M = 2.50 
SD = 1.17 
M = 3.25 
SD = 1.55 
M = 3.58 
SD = 1.24 
Was the feedback helpful? 
M = 2.17 
SD = 1.40 
M = 3.25 
SD = 1.42 
M = 3.58 
SD = 1.08 
How tiered/bored are you? 
M = 3.00 
SD = 1.41 
M = 2.33 
SD = 1.72 
M = 2.42 
SD = 1.40 
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Table 1.3 
Results of repeated measures ANOVA comparing the variability in reaction times across 
different levels of sense of control in Experiment 1 (N = 12). 
Source df
 effect, df error F p pη2 
No-Control     
Cue 1, 11 2.51 .141 .186 
Valence 3, 33 1.52 .242 .122 
Cue x Valence 3, 33 2.25 .101 .169 
Some-Control     
Cue 1, 11 0.27 .616 .024 
Valence 3, 33 1.53 .225 .122 
Cue x Valence 3, 33 0.72 .548 .061 
Full-Control     
Cue 1, 11 1.98 .187 .153 
Valence* 3, 33 58.01 >.001 .841 
Cue x Valence 3, 33 2.35 .117 .176 
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Table 1.4 
Means and standard deviations for the reaction times in each condition of the task, 
broken down by four types of outcomes, in Experiment 1. 
Task Condition Win No Win No Loss Loss 
Experiment 1     
No-Control - Cue 
M = 235.70 
SD = 45.21 
M = 248.78  
SD = 42.24 
M = 234.68 
SD = 39.59 
M = 246.42  
SD = 42.11 
No-Control – No Cue 
M = 231.91  
SD = 28.20 
M = 230.32 
SD = 34.33 
M = 226.21 
SD = 27.13 
M = 222.99 
SD = 30.29 
Some-Control - Cue 
M = 240.74  
SD = 34.26 
M = 239.73  
SD = 42.17 
M = 252.25  
SD = 45.34 
M = 242.10  
SD = 45.17 
Some-Control – No 
Cue 
M = 244.43  
SD = 41.34 
M = 236.17  
SD = 36.12 
M = 244.76  
SD = 34.84 
M = 239.99  
SD = 35.12 
Full-Control - Cue 
M = 165.21  
SD = 29.37 
M = 249.52  
SD = 49.68 
M = 167.28  
SD = 27.59 
M = 242.08  
SD = 35.41 
Full-Control – No 
Cue 
M = 162.21  
SD = 27.66 
M = 267.57  
SD = 61.28 
M = 166.84 
SD = 26.69 
M = 254.03  
SD = 50.48 
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Table 1.5 
Repeated measures ANOVA for the FRN amplitude elicited by the feedback across three 
midline channels (Fz, FC and Cz) in Experiment 1 ( N = 12). 
Source df
 effect, df error F p pη2 
Cue 1,11 0.31 .586 .028 
Sense of Control (S of C) 2,22 0.97 .397 .081 
Valence* 1,11 5.62 .037 .338 
Channel 2,22 1.26 .290 .103 
Cue x S of C 2,22 0.99 .387 .083 
Cue x Valence 1,11 0.13 .722 .012 
S of C x Valence 2,22 0.21 .730 .019 
Cue x S of C x Valence 2,22 0.06 .940 .006 
Cue x Channel 2,22 2.02 .179 .155 
S of C x Channel 4,44 1.39 .266 .112 
Cue x S of C x Channel 4,44 0.63 .528 .054 
Valence x Channel 2,22 1.35 .275 .109 
Cue x Valence x Channel 2,22 0.03 .941 .003 
S of C x Valence x Cue 4,44 2.30 .131 .173 
Cue x S of C x Valence x Channel 4,44 0.26 .739 .023 
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Table 1.6 
Means and standard errors for the FRN amplitude following wins and losses across the 
six task conditions from Experiment 1 (N = 12). 
Task Condition  
Loss Fz FCz Cz Marginal Mean 
Cue – Full-
Control 
M = -2.25 
SD = 2.63 
M = -1.88 
SD = 1.74 
M = -1.63 
SD = 1.85 
M = -1.92 
SE = .49 
Cue – Some-
Control 
M = -2.37 
SD = 2.06 
M = -1.77 
SD = 2.15 
M = -1.67 
SD = 1.71 
M = -1.93 
SE = 0.48  
Cue – No-Control 
M = -2.82 
SD = 2.45 
M = -2.16 
SD = 2.43 
M = -1.69 
SD = 1.79 
M = -2.22  
SE = 0.62 
No Cue – Full-
Control 
M = -1.88 
SD = 1.32 
M = -1.48 
SD = 1.42 
M = -1.44 
SD = 1.72 
M = -1.96  
SE = 0.39 
No Cue – Some-
Control 
M = -2.36 
SD = 1.91 
M = -1.77 
SD = 1.73 
M = -1.60 
SD = 1.86 
M = -1.91  
SE = 0.48 
No Cue – No-
Control 
M = -2.21 
SD = 1.50 
M = -2.18 
SD = 1.51 
M = -1.92 
SD = 1.56 
M = -2.10  
SE = 0.41 
Marginal Means 
M = -2.31 
SE = 0.48 
M = -1.87 
SE = .44 
M = -1.66 
SE = .42 
M = -1.95  
SE = 0.41 
Win Fz FCz Cz Marginal Mean 
Cue – Full-
Control 
M = -2.08 
SD = 2.47 
M = -1.51 
SD = 2.14 
M = -1.53 
SD = 2.05 
M = -1.70 
SE = 0.54 
Cue – Some-
Control 
M = -1.58 
SD = 1.76 
M = -0.98 
SD = 1.36 
M = -1.63 
SD = 1.43 
M = -1.39 
SE = 0.36 
Cue – No-Control 
M = -2.32 
SD = 1.58 
M = -2.00 
SD = 1.18 
M = -1.23 
SD = 1.25 
M = -1.85 
SE = 0.34 
No Cue – Full-
Control 
M = -1.78 
SD = 2.29 
M = -1.29 
SD = 1.48 
M = -1.24 
SD = 1.62 
M = -1.44 
SE = 0.43 
No Cue – Some-
Control 
M = -1.51 
SD = 1.90 
M = -1.46 
SD = 1.59 
M = -1.95 
SD = 1.64 
M = -1.64  
SE = 0.34 
No Cue – No-
Control 
M = -1.95 
SD = 2.03 
M = -1.85 
SD = 2.00 
M = -1.53 
SD = 1.33 
M = -1.78  
SE = 0.47 
Marginal means 
M = -1.87 
SE =.49 
M = -1.51  
SE = .38 
M = -1.52  
SE = .33 
M = -1.63  
SE = 0.35 
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Table 1.7 
Results of repeated measures ANOVA comparing the FRN amplitude in No Cue/Some-
Control and Cue/Full-Control conditions in Experiment 1 (N = 12). 
Source df
 effect, df error F p pη2 
Task 1,11 0.02 .895 .002 
Valence 1,11 1.57 .237 .125 
Channel 2,22 0.42 .661 .037 
Task x Valence 1,11 0.01 .936 .001 
Task x Channel 2,22 0.45 .558 .039 
Valence x Channel 2,22 2.41 .141 .180 
Task x Valence x Channel 2,22 2.18 .156 .165 
204 
Table 1.8 
Means and standard deviations of responses on the End of Task questionnaires, broken 
down by sense of control condition, for Experiments 2 (N =12). 
 
  
 Experiment 2 
Question No-Control Some-Control Full-Control 
Were you paying attention to the cues? 
M = 2.63 
SD = 1.73 
M = 3.50 
SD = 1.31 
M = 3.67 
SD = 0.99 
Were the cues helpful (red/green vs mixed)? M = 1.42 
SD = 1.58 
M = 2.17 
SD = 1.12 
M = 2.83 
SD = 1.64 
Did you have a feeling of control over the 
outcome? 
M = 0.50 
SD = 1.29 
M = 2.18 
SD = 1.40 
M = 3.42 
SD = 1.56 
Could you predict the outcome? 
M = 0.25 
SD = 0.62 
M = 2.00 
SD = 1.54 
M = 2.50 
SD = 1.83 
How accurate were you at predicting the outcome? 
M = 1.50 
SD = 1.19 
M = 2.00 
SD = 1.41 
M = 2.42 
SD = 1.68 
How confident were you in your predictions? 
M = 0.92 
SD = 1.20 
M = 2.25 
SD = 1.29 
M = 2.75 
SD = 1.29 
How often did you feel you would win? 
M = 1.86 
SD = 1.85 
M = 2.50 
SD = 1.00 
M = 3.33 
SD = 0.99 
How often did you feel you would lose? 
M = 2.38 
SD = 0.98 
M = 2.67 
SD = 1.07 
M = 2.75 
SD = 0.97 
Were you paying attention to the feedback? 
M = 1.29 
SD = 1.25 
M = 3.50 
SD = 1.38 
M = 3.92 
SD = 0.90 
Was the feedback helpful? 
M = 1.42 
SD = 1.65 
M = 2.92 
SD = 1.73 
M = 3.75 
SD = 1.22 
How tiered/bored are you? 
M = 3.12 
SD = 1.32 
M = 2.58 
SD = 1.44 
M = 2.33 
SD = 1.44 
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Table 1.9 
Results of repeated measures ANOVA comparing the variability in reaction times across 
different outcomes (i.e., loss/no loss/win/no win) and levels of sense of control in 
Experiment 2 (N = 12). 
Source df
 effect, df error F p pη2 
No-Control      
Valence* 3,33 6.12 .002 .358 
Some-Control     
Cue 1, 11 0.29 .602 .025 
Valence 3, 33 2.13 .115 .162 
Cue x Valence 3, 33 2.73 .060 .119 
Full-Control     
Cue 1, 11 0.11 .748 .010 
Valence 3, 33 3.11 .099 .220 
Cue x Valence 3, 33 0.63 .599 .054 
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Table 1.10 
Means and standard deviations for the reaction times in each condition of the task, 
broken down by four types of outcomes, in Experiment 2 (N = 12). 
Task Condition Win No Win No Loss Loss 
No-Control - Cue 
M = 276.44  
SD = 54.30 
M = 272.30  
SD = 57.59 
M = 285.63  
SD = 60.23 
M = 294.43 
SD = 62.69 
Some-Control - 
Cue 
M =263.29  
SD = 36.50 
M = 280.61  
SD = 41.52 
M = 266.92  
SD = 26.52 
M = 277.49  
SD = 31.95 
Some-Control – No 
Cue 
M = 272.45 
SD = 36.85 
M = 274.61  
SD = 39.27 
M = 285.21  
SD = 42.16 
M = 270.10  
SD = 47.02 
Full-Control - Cue 
M = 164.45  
SD = 36.04 
M = 191.41  
SD = 64.55 
M = 160.70  
SD = 42.08 
M = 190.09  
SD = 65.52 
Full-Control – No 
Cue 
M = 160.43  
SD = 42.60 
M = 187.91  
SD = 65.56 
M = 164.53  
SD = 36.83 
M = 181.93  
SD = 72.60 
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Table 1.11 
Repeated measures ANOVA for the FRN amplitude elicited by the feedback across three 
midline channels (Fz, FC and Cz) for Experiment 2 (N = 12). 
Source df
 effect, df error F p pη2 
Cue 1,11 1.96 .189 .151 
Sense of Control (S of C) 1,11 2.50 .142 .185 
Valence * 1,11 8.29 .015 .430 
Channel 2,22 3.22 .086 .226 
Cue x S of C* 1,11 6.54 .027 .373 
Cue x Valence 1,11 0.01 .912 .001 
S of C x Valence 1,11 0.42 .530 .037 
Cue x S of C x Valence 1,11 1.10 .316 .091 
Cue x Channel 2,22 2.03 .178 .156 
S of C x Channel 2,22 0.09 .828 .008 
Cue x S of C x Channel 2,22 0.28 .668 .025 
Valence x Channel 2,22 2.15 .165 .163 
Cue x Valence x Channel 2,22 1.33 .285 .108 
S of C x Valence x Cue* 2,22 9.08 .001 .452 
Cue x S of C x Valence x Channel 2,22 2.11 .165 .161 
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Table 1.12 
Repeated measures ANOVA for the FRN amplitude elicited by the feedback in the Cue 
conditions across three midline sites for Experiment 2 (N = 12). 
Source df
 effect, df error F p pη2 
Sense of Control (S of C)* 2,22 3.71 .041 .252 
Valence* 1,11 6.34 .029 .366 
Channel 2,22 0.90 .222 .424 
S of C x Valence! 2,22 0.11 .898 .010 
S of C x Channel 4,44 1.71 .206 .135 
Valence x Channel 2,22 1.31 .285 .107 
S of C x Valence x Channel 4,44 1.57 .220 .125 
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Table 1.13 
Repeated measures ANOVA for the FRN amplitude following feedback in the No Cue 
conditions across the midline sites for Experiment 2 (N = 12). 
Source df
 effect, df error F p pη2 
Sense of Control (S of C) 1,11 0.25 .628 .248 
Valence* 1,11 4.90 .049 .308 
Channel 2,22 1.06 .336 .088 
S of C x Valence 1,11 1.27 .283 .104 
S of C x Channel 2,22 0.04 .890 .003 
Valence x Channel 2,22 1.07 .341 .089 
S of C x Valence x Channel* 2,22 8.40 .005 .433 
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Table 1.14 
Repeated measures ANOVA for the FRN amplitude elicited by the feedback in the No 
Cue conditions conducted at each midline channel, in Experiment 2 (N = 12). 
Source df
 effect, df error F p pη2 
Fz     
Sense of Control (S of C) 1, 11 0.20 .663 .151 
Valence * 1, 11 6.14 .031 .358 
S of C x Valence * 1, 11 5.74 .035 .343 
FCz     
Sense of Control (S of C) 1, 11 1.34 .272 .108 
Valence 1, 11 0.09 .765 .008 
S of C x Valence 1, 11 1.96 .189 .151 
Cz     
Sense of Control (S of C) 1, 11 0.20 .661 .018 
Valence 1, 11 3.53 .087 .243 
S of C x Valence 1, 11 1.91 .194 .148 
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Table 1.15 
Repeated measures ANOVA for the FRN amplitude, elicited by the feedback, conducted 
across midline channels for each level of sense of control conditions in Experiment 2 (N 
= 12). 
Source df
 effect, df error F p pη2 
Non-informative cue     
No-Control NA 
Some-Control     
Valence * 1, 11 7.50 .019 .405 
Channel 2, 22 1.22 .302 .099 
Valence x Channel * 2, 22 5.52 .028 .334 
Full-Control     
Valence 1, 11 0.58 .461 .050 
Channel 2, 22 0.48 .537 .042 
Valence x Channel 2, 22 2.84 .097 .205 
Informative cue     
No-Control     
Valence 1, 11 2.79 .123 .202 
Channel * 2, 22 0.04 .884 .003 
Valence x Channel 2, 22 0.64 .492 .055 
Some-Control     
Valence 1, 11 2.63 .134 .192 
Channel * 2, 22 7.68 .011 .411 
Valence x Channel 2, 22 2.46 .119 .183 
Full-Control     
Valence 1, 11 4.66 .054 .298 
Channel 2, 22 3.10 .077 .220 
Valence x Channel 2, 22 1.20 .308 .098 
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Table 1.17 
Results of the repeated measures 2 (cue) x 2 (sense of control) x 4 (channel) ANOVA on 
the difference wave amplitude at the central channel locations (Experiment 2). 
Source df
 effect, df error F p pη2 
Cue 1, 11 0.92 .358 .077 
Sense of Control (SofC) 1, 11 0.93 .355 .078 
Channel 7, 77 1.61 .231 .128 
Cue x SofC 1, 11 0.02 .904 .001 
Cue x Channel 7, 77 0.60 .588 .051 
SofC x Channel * 7, 77 4.09 .045 .271 
Cue x SofC x Channel 7, 77 2.70 .089 .197 
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Table 1.18 
Repeated measures ANOVA conducted on the average amplitude measures of the 
difference waves following the onset of feedback in the Some and Full-Control 
conditions (Experiment 2; N = 12). 
Source df
 effect, df error F p pη2 
Some-Control     
Cue  1, 11 0.34 .574 .030 
Channel * 7, 77 6.92 .011 .386 
Cue x Channel 7, 77 1.73 .184 .136 
Full-Control     
Cue  1, 11 0.81 .387 .069 
Channel 7, 77 0.22 .708 .020 
Cue x Channel 7, 77 1.41 .265 .114 
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Table 1.19 
Repeated measures ANOVA conducted on the average amplitude measures of the 
difference waves following the onset of the outcome in the No Cue and Cue condition of 
the Experiment 2 (N = 12). 
Source df
 effect, df error F p pη2 
No Cue     
Sense of Control (S of C) 1,11 2.08 .177 .159 
Channel 7,77 0.85 .420 .072 
S of C x Channel* 7,77 5.16 .024 .319 
Cue     
Sense of Control (S of C) 2,22 1.11 .347 .092 
Channel 7,77 0.71 .513 .061 
S of C x Channel 14,154 1.20 .326 .098 
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Table 1.20 
Repeated measures ANOVA conducted on the average amplitude measures of the 
difference waves following the onset of the outcome in the No Cue condition at the 
central/posterior and frontal sites (Experiment 2; N = 12). 
Source df
 effect, df error F p pη2 
Central/Posterior     
Sense of Control (S of C) 1,11 3.09 .107 .219 
Channel 3,33 2.13 .159 .162 
S of C x Channel 3,33 1.29 .295 .105 
Frontal     
Sense of Control (S of C) * 1,11 7.34 .020 .400 
Channel 3,33 1.19 .322 .098 
S of C x Channel 3,33 0.76 .460 .064 
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Table 1.21 
Summary of the effects found at the time of the FRN (200 – 320 ms) after conducting a 
robust 2(cue) x 2 (valence) ANOVA conducted for each subject. 
 Time period of significant effects 
Participant ID Main effect of Cue Main effect of 
Valence 
Cue by Valence 
Interaction 
T14 246 - 269 205 - 223; 249 - 266 none 
T15 207- 216; 246 - 267; 
294 - 317 
209 - 218 none 
T16 before 200 None none 
T17 278 - 284 269 - 275 none 
T18 227 - 248; 286 - 308 202 - 213; 247 - 258 none 
T19 279 - 287 216 – 227 none 
T20 217 - 236; 269 - 287 197 - 207; 238 - 278 none 
T21 286 - 315 283 - 360 none 
T22 265 - 277 None none 
T23 225 - 247 240 - 259; 277 - 288 none 
T24 None 214 - 222 none 
T25 None 209 - 221 none 
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Table 2.1 
Demographic information split by gambling behaviour and risk group. 
 
Non-gamblers (N=10) Recreational gamblers (N=12) Low risk PG (N=5) 
Moderate risk PG 
(N=6) High risk PG (N=8) 
Age M = 27.40 
SD = 9.90 
Range: 19-50 
M = 34.17 
SD =10.88 
Range: 20-50 
M = 30.80 
SD =10.94 
Range: 19-44 
M = 29.17 
SD =5.49 
Range: 22-37 
M =30.25 
SD =8.83 
Range: 20-44 
Sex Mode: N = 9 Male 
(90.0%) 
Mode: N = 8 Female 
(66.7%) 
Mode: N = 4 Males 
(80.0%) 
Mode: N = 4 Males 
(33.3%) 
Mode: N = 7 Males 
(87.5%) 
Handedness Mode: N = 9 Right 
(90.0%) 
Mode: N = 8 Right 
(66.7%) 
Mode: N = 5 Right 
(100%) 
Mode: N = 6 Right 
(100.0%) 
Mode: N = 6 Right 
(75.0%) 
Highest level 
of education 
Mode: N = 9 Some 
college/university 
(90.0%) 
Mode: N = 4 High 
school/equivalent 
(33.3%) 
Mode: N = 3 Some 
college or university 
(60.0%) 
Mode:  N = 4 Some 
college or university 
(66.7%) 
Mode: N = 4 High 
school/equivalent 
(50.0%)  
Ethic 
background 
Mode: N = 8 
White/Caucasian 
(80.0%) 
Mode: N = 7 
White/Caucasian 
(58.3%) 
Mode: N = 5 
White/Caucasian 
(100.0%) 
Mode: N = 6 
White/Caucasian 
(100.0%) 
Mode: N = 7 
White/Caucasian 
(87.5%) 
Smoking 
frequency 
N = 15 Non-smoker 
(50.0%) 
Mode: N = 10 Non-
smoker (83.3%) 
Mode: N = 3 Smoker 
(60.0%) (n = 3 
cigarettes a day) 
Mode: N = 4 Non-
smoker (66.7%) 
N = 4 Non-smoker 
(50.0%) *Range: 2-10 
cigarettes a day 
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Table 2.1 (cont’d) 
 
Non-gamblers (N=7) Recreational gamblers (N=12) Low risk PG (N=5) 
Moderate risk PG 
(N=6) High risk PG (N=8) 
Drinking 
frequency 
Mode: N = 2 ~6 drinks 
a week (range: .10 – 6) 
*Do not drink: N = 4 
(40.0%) 
Mode: N = 7 Do drink 
(58.3%), but for 2 data 
is missing (range: 0-24 
drinks a week) 
Mode: N = 4 Do drink 
(80.0%), but for 1 data 
is missing (range: 0.5-
24) 
Mode: N = 3 ~4 drinks 
a week (50.0%.3%; 
range: 1-60) 
*Do not drink: N = 0 
Range: ~1-30 drinks a 
week (no mode) 
*Do not drink N = 3 
(37.5%) 
Gambling 
frequency*** NA 
M = 5.67 
SD =6.30 
M = 15.50 
SD =11.21 
M = 24.33 
SD = 20.34 
M = 21.88 
SD =9.03 
# of 
Gambling 
activities NA 
M = 3.83 
SD =3.10 
Mode: N = 4, 4 
activities (33.3%) 
M = 7.00 
SD =4.64 
Mode: N = 2, 7 
activities (40.0%) 
M = 9.50 
SD = 3.51 
Range from 5 to 14 
activities (no mode) 
M = 9.50 
SD =2.07 
Mode: N = 2, 9 and 10 
activities (25.0% each) 
PGSI Score 
NA NA 
M =1.2 
SD = 0.44 
Mode: N = 4, Score of 
1 (80.0%) 
M = 4.67 
SD =1.21 
Mode: N = 2, Score of 
4 and 6 (33.3% each) 
M = 10.0 
SD = 2.14 
Mode: N = 3, Score of 
8 (37.5% each) 
*No significant age effects (F(4,36)=0.72, p=.584 
**Significant difference in distribution of: 
- males across groups (χ2=10.64, p=.031) (7 cells less than 5 expected) 
- handedness across groups (χ2=7.07, p=.529) (12 less than 5 expected) 
- education level (χ2=26.86, p=.043) (24 less than 5 expected) 
- ethnic background (χ2=9.62, p=.886) (22 less than 5 expected) 
- smoking behaviour (χ2=4.44, p=.350) (8 cells less than 5 expected) 
- alcohol consumption (χ2=4.09, p=.394) (7 cells less than 5 expected) 
 
***Higher numbers, means more often, but can be the same game 
****Significant difference between the groups (i.e., gamblers only) on 
gambling frequency (F(3,26)=4.89, p=.008) or number of gambling 
activities engaged in the past year (F(3,26)=6.60, p=.002). Such 
that at risk for PG differed from no risk, but no differences between 
gamblers. 
 
.
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Table 2.2 
Descriptive Information and Results of Statistical Analysis for the End of Task 
Questionnaire following the Doors Task comparing ‘no risk for PG’ and ‘at risk for PG’ 
groups. 
Question  No Risk for 
PG 
(N = 22) 
At Risk for 
PG 
(N = 19) 
Results of 
Statistical Analysis 
Conducted 
How often did you win on a 1-
cue trial? 
M = 2.95 
SD = 1.43 
M = 3.73 
SD =1.33 U = 194.5, p = .682 
How often did you win on a 2-
cue trial? 
M = 2.48 
SD = 0.91 
M = 2.84 
SD = 0.60 U = 156.0, p = .137 
How often did you win on a 3-
cue trial? 
M = 3.41 
SD = 1.22 
M = 3.95 
SD = 0.97 U = 159.5, p = .179 
Did you feel you could predict 
the outcome?* 
M = 1.91 
SD = 1.31 
M = 2.44 
SD = 1.30 U = 160.5, p = .289 
How confident were you in your 
predictions? 
M = 2.33 
SD = 1.24 
M = 2.95 
SD = 1.03 U = 151.0, p = .171 
How accurate were you at 
predicting the outcome?* 
M = 2.41 
SD = 1.14 
M = 2.89 
SD = 0.83 U = 154.5, p = .207 
Did you have a strategy? Yes: N = 0 Yes: N =0 NA 
*Several individuals in the ‘at risk for PG’ group failed to respond to these questions 
(one participant per question), thus N = 18. 
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Table 2.3 
Descriptive Information and Results of Statistical Analysis for the End of Task 
Questionnaire following the Time Estimation Task comparing ‘no risk for PG’ and ‘at 
risk for PG’ groups. 
Question  No Risk for 
PG 
(N = 22) 
At Risk for 
PG 
(N = 19) 
Results of 
Statistical Analysis 
Conducted 
Were the cues helpful? M = 2.95 SD =1.43 
M = 3.74 
SD = 1.33 p = .064 
Did you have a feeling of 
control over the outcome? 
M = 2.82 
SD = 1.40 
M = 3.32 
SD = 1.70  p = .120 
How often did you feel you 
would win on an easy cue? 
M = 3.05 
SD = 1.05 
M = 3.36 
SD = 1.01 p = .330 
How often did you feel you 
would lose on a hard trial? 
M = 3.00 
SD = 0.82 
M = 2.95 
SD = 0.97 p = .989 
How confident were you in your 
predictions? 
M = 3.33 
SD = 0.91 
M = 3.05 
SD = 1.65  p = .767 
How accurate were you at 
predicting the outcomes? 
M = 2.86 
SD = 0.83 
M = 2.74 
SD = 1.05 p = .856 
How hard did you try on an 
easy cue?* 
M = 3.90 
SD = 1.02 
M = 3.83 
SD = 1.15 p = .898 
How hard did you try on a hard 
cue?* 
M = 4.36 
SD = 0.58 
M = 4.63 
SD = 0.76 p = .056 
Was the feedback helpful? M = 3.68 SD = 1.13 
M = 3.78 
SD = 0.65 p = .864 
Did you have a strategy? Yes: N = 18 Yes: N = 19 p =.489 
 
*Compare how hard did they try on a easy/hard cue: Z = -3.70, p < .001   
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Table 2.4 
Results of a mixed ANOVA Examining the Effects of Cue Type and Group Membership 
(nPG and PG) on the Number of Times Participants Predicted a Win in the Doors task. 
Trial Type No Risk for PG 
(N =22) 
At Risk for PG 
(N = 19) 
Overall 
(N = 41) 
Cue 1 
 
M = 38.45 
SD = 35.63 
M = 39.89 
SD = 27.64 
M = 39.19 
SD = 31.79 
Cue 2 
 
M = 73.86 
SD = 30.68 
M = 78.32 
SD = 23.87 
M = 75.93 
SD = 27.49 
Cue 3 
 
M = 104.63 
SD = 11.78 
M = 99.63 
SD = 16.76 
M = 102.31 
SD = 14.34 
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Table 2.5 
Descriptive Information and Results of Independent t-test Comparing Reaction Times for 
the ‘no risk for PG’ and ‘at risk for PG’ groups. 
Condition No Risk for PG (N = 22) 
At Risk for PG 
(N = 19) 
Results of Statistical 
Analysis Conducted 
Doors Task (F (1,20) = 1.91, p = .165, pη2 = .046) 
Cue ‘1’ Trial M = 1479.61 SD = 786.57 
M = 1239.85 
SD = 722.58 
t (39) = 1.01, p = .319 
Cue ‘2’ Trial M = 1422.23 SD = 757.96 
M = 1189.51 
SD = 718.25 t (39) = 1.00, p = .321 
Cue ‘3’ Trial M = 1425.83 SD = 740.34 
M = 1153.72 
SD = 614.77 t (39) = 1.27, p = .212 
Average RT (all 
trials) 
M = 1442.56 
SD = 748.78 
M = 1194.36 
SD = 673.46 t (39) = 1.11, p = .274 
Time Estimation Task 
‘Easy’ Trial* M = 829.08 SD = 385.36 
M = 628.97 
SD = 313.33 t (39) = 1.81, p = .079 
‘Hard’ Trial* M = 832.38 SD = 395.97 
M = 602.55 
SD = 316.03 t (39) = 2.03, p = .049 
Loss on Easy Trial M = 850.20 SD = 400.01 
M = 656.62 
SD = 351.43 t (39) = 1.63, p = .111 
Win on Easy Trial M = 851.81 SD = 406.08 
M = 660.45 
SD = 332.63 t (39) = 1.63, p = .110 
Loss on Hard Trial M = 837.45 SD = 389.56 
M = 641.29 
SD = 342.82 t (39) = 1.70, p = .097 
Win on Hard Trial M = 853.62 SD = 424.25 
M = 644.14 
SD = 383.32 t (39) = 1.65, p = .107 
Average RT (all 
trials) 
M = 830.73 
SD = 390.09 
M = 615.76 
SD = 310.30 t (39) = 1.93, p = .061 
* Easy versus Hard cue comparison: t(40) = 0.85, p = .399
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Table 2.6 
Mixed repeated measures ANOVA for the FRN amplitude elicited by the feedback at 
across the three midline channels. 
Source df
 effect, df error F p pη2 
Task (T) 1, 39 1.22 .277 .030 
Task x Gambling group (PG Gr) 1, 39 1.99 .166 .049 
Expectations (E) 1, 39 13.28 .001 .254 
Expectations x PG Gr  1,39 > 0.01 .994 > .001 
Valence (V) 1,39 14.92 > .001 .277 
Valence x PG Gr 1,39 0.62 .437 .016 
Channel (C) 2,78 4.64 .017 .106 
Channel x PG Gr 2,78 1.43 .246 .035 
Task x Expectations 1,39 7.26 .010 .157 
Task x Expectation x PG Gr 1,39 4.56 .039 .105 
Task x Valence 1,39 11.36 .002 .229 
Task x Valence x PG Gr 1,39 1.02 .320 .025 
Expectations x Valence 1,39 0.42 .521 .011 
Expectations x Valence x PG Gr 1,39 0.19 .607 .005 
T x E x V 1,39 0.22 .640 .006 
T x E x V x PG Gr 1,39 2.77 .104 .066 
Task x Channel 2,78 0.67 .474 .017 
Task x Channel x PG Gr 2,78 0.70 .463 .018 
Expectations x Channel 2,78 3.95 .029 .092 
Expectations x Channel x PG Gr 2,78 0.18 .811 .004 
T x E x C 2,78 0.89 .397 .022 
T x E x C x PG Gr 2,78 0.14 .822 .004 
Valence x Channel 2,78 29.95 > .001 .434 
Valence x Channel x PG Gr 2,78 3.43 .057 .081 
T x V x C 2,78 3.49 .051 .082 
T x V x C x PG Gr 2,78 0.23 .725 .006 
E x V x C 2,78 0.48 .574 .012 
E x V x C x PG Gr 2,78 1.00 .358 .025 
T x E x V x C 2,78 0.11 .817 .003 
T x E x V x C x PG Gr 2,78 0.68 .456 .017 
Between subjects effects 
Gambling group 1,39 1.48 .231 .037 
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Table 2.7 
Repeated measures ANOVAs for wins and losses examining the FRN amplitude at 
midline channels elicited in both tasks in individuals not at risk for Problem Gambling.  
Source df
 effect, df error F p pη2 
Loss     
Task (T) 1, 21 16.82 .001 .445 
Expectations (E) 1, 21 4.55 .045 .178 
Channel (C) 2, 42 3.52 .059 .144 
Task x Expectations 1, 21 1.17 .293 .053 
Task x Channel 2, 42 0.64 .496 .030 
Expectations x Channel 2, 42 3.60 .058 .146 
T x E x C 2, 42 0.53 .547 .025 
Win     
Task (T) 1, 21 0.91 .352 .041 
Expectations (E) 1, 21 1.77 .198 .078 
Channel (C) 2, 42 2.84 .085 .119 
Task x Expectations 1, 21 3.33 .082 .137 
Task x Channel 2, 42 0.31 .701 .014 
Expectations x Channel 2, 42 0.21 .733 .010 
T x E x C 2, 42 0.41 .622 .019 
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Table 2.8 
Repeated measures ANOVAs for wins and losses examining the FRN amplitude at 
midline channels elicited in both tasks in individuals at risk for Problem Gambling.  
Source df
 effect, df error F p pη2 
Loss     
Task (T) 1, 18 0.78 .389 .042 
Expectations (E) 1, 18 1.88 .188 .094 
Channel (C) 2, 36 1.11 .335 .058 
Task x Expectations * 1, 18 8.15 .011 .312 
Task x Channel 2, 36 0.02 .955 .001 
Expectations x Channel 2, 36 0.96 .377 .051 
T x E x C 2, 36 0.34 .618 .019 
Win     
Task (T) 1, 18 4.81 .042 .211 
Expectations (E) 1, 18 7.75 .012 .301 
Channel (C) 2, 36 7.60 .002 .297 
Task x Expectations 1, 18 4.50 .048 .200 
Task x Channel 2, 36 4.89 .021 .212 
Expectations x Channel 2, 36 0.53 .577 .029 
T x E x C 2, 36 4.34 .021 .194 
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Table 2.9 
Repeated measures ANOVA for the FRN amplitude elicited by the feedback at midline 
channels in individuals not at risk for Problem Gambling.  
Source df
 effect, df error F p pη2 
Doors     
Expectations (E) 1,21 6.56 .018 .238 
Valence (V) 1,21 0.94 .762 .040 
Channel (C) 2,42 1.34 .269 .060 
Expectations x Valence 1,21 0.41 .528 .019 
Expectations x Channel 2,42 1.53 .233 .068 
Valence x Channel 2,42 2.40 .130 .102 
E x V x C 2,42 0.54 .565 .025 
Time Estimation Task     
Expectations (E) 1,21 2.31 .144 .099 
Valence (V) 1,21 14.76 .001 .413 
Channel (C) 2,42 2.11 .153 .091 
Expectations x Valence 1,21 2.72 .114 .115 
Expectations x Channel 2,42 1.01 .359 .046 
Valence x Channel 2,42 7.03 .004 .251 
E x V x C 2,42 1.01 .356 .046 
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Table 2.10 
Repeated measures ANOVA for the FRN peak amplitude elicited by the feedback in 
Doors task in individuals at risk for Problem Gambling.  
Source df
 effect, df error F p pη2 
Doors     
Expectations (E) 1,18 14.91 .001 .453 
Valence (V) 1,18 2.58 .126 .125 
Channel (C) 2,36 1.66 .212 .084 
Expectations x Valence 1,18 0.90 .356 .047 
Expectations x Channel 2,36 1.75 .164 .088 
Valence x Channel 236 8.46 .004 .320 
E x V x C 2,36 0.35 .617 .019 
Time Estimation     
Expectations (E) 1,18 0.24 .631 .013 
Valence (V) 1,18 8.70 .009 .326 
Channel (C) 2,36 3.84 .033 .176 
Expectations x Valence 1,18 0.11 .750 .006 
Expectations x Channel 2,36 0.49 .586 .027 
Valence x Channel 236 15.86 > .001 .468 
E x V x C 2,36 0.36 .617 .020 
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Table 2.11 
Results of the mixed ANOVA for the FRN amplitude elicited by the feedback across 
three midline channels in non-gamblers and high-risk gamblers. 
Source df
 effect, df error F p pη2 
Task (T) 1,16 1.33 .265 .077 
Task x Gambling group (PG Gr) 1,16 3.54 .078 .181 
Expectations (E)* 1,16 4.97 .040 .237 
Expectations x PG Gr  1,16 0.47 .501 .029 
Valence (V)* 1,16 21.03 <.001 .568 
Valence x PG Gr 1,16 0.08 .774 .005 
Channel (C)* 1,16 2.46 .136 .133 
Channel x PG Gr 1,16 4.27 .055 .211 
Task x Expectations* 1,16 2.10 .166 .116 
Task x Expectation x PG Gr 1,16 2.52 .132 .136 
Task x Valence* 1,16 26.60 <.001 .624 
Task x Valence x PG Gr 1,16 1.08 .314 .063 
Expectations x Valence 1,16 0.04 .844 .002 
Expectations x Valence x PG Gr 1,16 0.56 .467 .034 
T x E x V 1,16 2.10 .166 .116 
T x E x V x PG Gr 1,16 0.21 .656 .013 
Task x Channel 1,16 0.00 .977 .000 
Task x Channel x PG Gr 1,16 0.13 .727 .008 
Expectations x Channel* 1,16 19.32 <.001 .547 
Expectations x Channel x PG Gr 1,16 0.67 .426 .040 
T x E x C 1,16 2.86 .110 .152 
T x E x C x PG Gr 1,16 0.75 .398 .045 
Valence x Channel 1,16 3.69 .073 .187 
Valence x Channel x PG Gr 1,16 0.02 .897 .001 
T x V x C 1,16 0.54 .473 .033 
T x V x C x PG Gr 1,16 0.51 .486 .031 
E x V x C 1,16 0.49 .494 .030 
E x V x C x PG Gr 1,16 0.23 .642 .014 
T x E x V x C 1,16 0.63 .440 .038 
T x E x V x C x PG Gr 1,16 0.16 .690 .010 
 
Gambling group 1,16 0.25 .624 .015 
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Table 2.12 
Results of the mixed ANOVA for the FRN latency elicited by the feedback across three 
midline channels. 
Source df
 effect, df error F p pη2 
Task (T) 1,39 3.55 .067 .084 
Task x Gambling group (PG Gr) 1,39 0.01 .929 .000 
Expectations (E)* 1,39 4.89 .033 .111 
Expectations x PG Gr  1,39 0.54 .465 .014 
Valence (V)* 1,39 8.39 .006 .177 
Valence x PG Gr 1,39 < 0.01 > .999 <.001 
Channel (C)* 2,78 36.86 .000 .486 
Channel x PG Gr 2,78 1.07 .322 .027 
Task x Expectations 1,39 0.42 .519 .011 
Task x Expectation x PG Gr 1,39 0.84 .364 .021 
Task x Valence 1,39 1.09 .303 .027 
Task x Valence x PG Gr 1,39 0.89 .350 .022 
Expectations x Valence 1,39 2.32 .136 .056 
Expectations x Valence x PG Gr 1,39 0.71 .403 .018 
T x E x V 1,39 0.07 .793 .002 
T x E x V x PG Gr 1,39 0.05 .818 .001 
Task x Channel 2,78 1.89 .170 .046 
Task x Channel x PG Gr 2,78 2.96 .074 .071 
Expectations x Channel 2,78 0.52 .543 .013 
Expectations x Channel x PG Gr 2,78 0.41 .604 .010 
T x E x C 2,78 0.50 .569 .013 
T x E x C x PG Gr 2,78 0.90 .394 .022 
Valence x Channel 2,78 2.53 .106 .061 
Valence x Channel x PG Gr 2,78 0.27 .683 .007 
T x V x C 2,78 1.33 .268 .033 
T x V x C x PG Gr 2,78 0.02 .956 .001 
E x V x C 2,78 2.07 .141 .051 
E x V x C x PG Gr 2,78 2.05 .144 .050 
T x E x V x C 2,78 0.38 .683 .010 
T x E x V x C x PG Gr 2,78 1.85 .165 .045 
Between subjects 
Gambling group 1,39 2.81 .102 .067 
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Table 2.13 
Results of the mixed ANOVA for the average difference wave amplitude at the time of 
the FRN across the midline channels. 
Source df
 effect, df error F p pη2 
Task (T)* 1,39 33.18 < .001 .460 
Task x Gambling group (PG Gr) 1,39 0.68 .414 .017 
Expectations (E)* 1,39 5.94 .020 .132 
Expectations x PG Gr  1,39 0.45 .507 .011 
Channel (C) 3,177 3.20 .057 .076 
Channel x PG Gr 3,177 0.37 .650 .009 
Task x Expectations 1,39 3.07 .088 .073 
Task x Expectation x PG Gr 1,39 2.00 .166 .049 
Task x Channel* 3,177 13.67 < .001 .259 
Task x Channel x PG Gr 3,177 0.25 .761 .006 
Expectations x Channel 3,177 2.00 .155 .049 
Expectations x Channel x PG Gr 3,177 0.15 .798 .004 
T x E x C 3,177 2.45 .102 .059 
T x E x C x PG Gr 3,177 0.51 .572 .013 
Between subjects 
Gambling group 1,39 1.99 .167 .048 
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Table 2.14 
Results of the repeated measures ANOVA for the average difference wave amplitude at 
the time of the FRN across the midline channels for each group. 
Source df
 effect, df error F p pη2 
Not at risk for problem gambling     
Task (T)* 1,21 7.78 .018 .414 
Expectations (E) 1,21 2.36 .153 .177 
Channel (C) 3,33 0.68 .466 .059 
Task x Expectations 1,21 4.32 .062 .282 
Task x Channel* 3,33 12.10 < .001 .524 
Expectations x Channel 3,33 0.64 .471 .055 
T x E x C 3,33 1.19 .318 .098 
At risk for problem gambling     
Task (T)* 1,18 11.49 .003 .390 
Expectations (E) 1,18 3.87 .065 .177 
Channel (C) 3,54 1.51 .238 .077 
Task x Expectations 1,18 0.10 .761 .005 
Task x Channel* 3,54 4.57 .026 .203 
Expectations x Channel 3,54 1.64 .215 .083 
T x E x C 3,54 0.76 .460 .040 
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Table 2.15 
Means, Standard Deviations and Results of the Independent t-tests for the Locus of 
Control and HEXACO measures comparing ‘no risk for PG’ and ‘at risk for PG’ groups. 
Individual Difference 
Measure 
No Risk for 
PG 
At Risk for PG 
t-test Results 
Locus of Control 
 
N =21 
M = 8.67 
SD = 5.24 
N = 16 
M = 7.25 
SD = 6.13 
t (35) = 0.76, p = .454 
Honesty-Humility 
 
N = 21 
M = 31.28 
SD = 6.60 
N = 19 
M = 28.63 
SD = 5.09 
t (38) = 1.41, p = .166 
Emotionality 
 
N = 21 
M = 28.76 
SD = 6.43 
N = 18 
M = 33.39 
SD = 5.89 
t (37) = -2.33, p = 
.025 
Extraversion 
 
N = 21 
M = 34.05 
SD =7.96 
N = 19 
M = 33.32 
SD = 4.40 
t (38) = 0.36, p = .725 
Agreeableness 
 
N = 21 
M = 33.00 
SD = 5.36 
N = 18 
M = 29.56 
SD = 6.75 
t (37) = 1.76, p = .084 
Conscientiousness 
 
N = 22 
M = 36.82 
SD = 6.32 
N = 18 
M = 31.39 
SD = 5.26 
t (38) = 2.91, p = .006 
Openness to Experience 
 
N = 21 
M = 38.81 
SD = 6.93 
N = 17 
M = 36.06 
SD = 6.86 
t (36) = 1.22, p = .229 
*Note: The degrees of freedom are different for each test as some participants had not 
responded to all of the questions on the questionnaires, resulting in a missing 
score on one of the subscales but not on others.
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Table 2.16 
Correlations between FRN peak amplitude, total PGSI score, Conscientiousness and 
Emotionality. 
FRN measure PGSI Total 
(N = 41) 
Conscientiousness 
(N = 40) 
Emotionality 
(N = 39) 
Doors    
Expected Loss -0.14 -0.08 -0.25 
Expected Win -0.07 0.04 -0.13 
Unexpected Loss -0.19 -0.08 -0.02 
Unexpected Win -0.12 -0.01 -0.05 
Time Estimation    
Expected Loss -0.07 0.16 -0.24 
Expected Win 0.05 -0.15 -0.11 
Unexpected Loss 0.11 -0.12 0.10 
Unexpected Win 0.17 -0.14 -0.01 
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Table 2.17 
Correlations between personality and residual scores of the FRN peak amplitude. 
  
Total PGSI Score 
(N=31) 
Conscientiousness 
(N=30) 
Emotionality 
(N=30) 
Number of 
Gambling 
Activities 
(N=31) 
Gambling 
Frequency 
(N=30) 
Valence effects (DV: Loss) 
Doors: Unexpected -0.17 -0.07 0.04 -0.47** -0.32 
Doors: Expected -0.13 -0.17 -0.16 -0.23 0.01 
Time Estimation: Unexpected < 0.01 0.05 0.07 -0.06 -0.05 
Time Estimation: Expected -0.18 0.32 -0.15 -0.22 -0.10 
Expectation effects (DV: Unexpected) 
Doors: Loss -0.11 -0.04 0.20 -0.45* -0.35 
Doors: Win -0.10 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.14 
Time Estimation: Loss 0.18 -0.14 0.21 0.13 0.04 
Time Estimation: Win 0.22 0.01 0.09 0.17 0.07 
Sense of control effects: (DV: Time Estimation) 
Loss: Unexpected 0.13 0.05 0.07 0.17 0.10 
Loss: Expected -0.07 0.29 -0.01 -0.16 -0.11 
Win: Unexpected 0.22 -0.13 0.07 0.03 -0.02 
Win: Expected 0.05 -0.22 0.05 -0.12 -0.02 
*p < .05 
**p < .01
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Table 2.18 
Correlations between Gambling Frequency, Number of Gambling Activities Participated 
in, Locus of Control and HEXACO Subscales. 
 Gambling 
Frequency 
Number of Gambling 
Activities Engaged In 
Locus of Control (N = 26, N = 27) -0.06 -0.07 
Openness to Experience (N = 27; N = 28) -0.13 -0.07 
Conscientiousness (N = 29; N = 30) -0.47* -0.29 
Extraversion (N = 29; N = 30) 0.15 0.07 
Agreeableness (N = 28; N = 29) -0.45* -0.42* 
Emotionality (N = 29; N = 30) -0.18 -0.12 
Honesty-Humility (N = 29; N = 30) -0.37* -0.16 
* p < .05 
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Table 2.19 
Results of the Multiple Regression Analysis using Conscientiousness and Agreeableness 
to predict Gambling Frequency (N = 26). 
 B SE B β sr2 
Conscientiousness -0.42 0.50 -0.16 0.02 
Agreeableness -0.82 0.39 -0.41 0.15 
Honesty-Humility -0.14 0.47 -0.06 < 0.01 
*R2 = .256, F (3,22) = 2.52, p = .084 
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Table 2.20 
Results of the Multiple Regression Analysis using FRN peak amplitude at Fz to predict 
Gambling Frequency and Number of Gambling Activities engaged in the past year. 
 B SE B β sr2 p 
Gambling Frequency      
Doors Task  
Expected Loss 3.06 2.59 0.29 0.05 .248 
Expected Win -2.99 2.85 -0.26 0.04 .303 
Unexpected Loss -4.26 2.17 -0.43 0.13 .061 
Unexpected Win 1.48 2.40 0.14 0.01 .542 
Time Estimation Task  
Expected Loss -1.80 2.75 -0.19 0.02 .518 
Expected Win -0.88 2.60 -0.10 < 0.01 .737 
Unexpected Loss 0.67 2.57 0.07 < 0.01 .797 
Unexpected Win 1.66 2.30 0.15 0.01 .617 
Number of Gambling Activities 
Doors Task  
Expected Loss 0.14 0.71 0.04 < 0.01 .851 
Expected Win 0.39 0.77 0.12 0.01 .616 
Unexpected Loss -1.55 0.61 -0.52 0.19 .018 
Unexpected Win -0.03 0.67 -0.01 < 0.01 .964 
Time Estimation Task  
Expected Loss -1.15 0.73 -0.40 0.08 .126 
Expected Win -0.52 0.73 -0.19 0.02 .486 
Unexpected Loss 0.56 0.71 0.19 0.02 .440 
Unexpected Win 0.72 0.60 0.31 0.05 .244 
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Table 2.21 
Results of the Multiple Regression Analysis using FRN peak latency at Fz to predict  
Number of Gambling Activities engaged in the past year. 
 B SE B β sr2 p 
Gambling Frequency      
Doors Task  
Expected Loss -0.04 0.08 -0.14 0.01 .582 
Expected Win -0.06 0.12 -0.15 0.01 .624 
Unexpected Loss 0.01 0.08 0.02 < 0.01 .953 
Unexpected Win -0.09 0.09 -0.25 0.03 .322 
Time Estimation Task  
Expected Loss -0.06 0.06 -0.21 0.03 .335 
Expected Win 0.03 0.07 0.10 0.01 .656 
Unexpected Loss -0.02 0.08 -0.05 < 0.01 .824 
Unexpected Win -0.14 0.09 -0.40 0.08 .107 
Number of Gambling Activities 
Doors Task  
Expected Loss -0.01 0.02 -0.10 0.01 .682 
Expected Win -0.02 0.03 -0.14 0.01 .630 
Unexpected Loss 0.02 0.02 0.17 0.01 .502 
Unexpected Win -0.04 0.03 -0.37 0.22 .125 
Time Estimation Task  
Expected Loss -0.01 0.02 -0.15 0.01 .521 
Expected Win 0.02 0.02 0.18 0.02 .449 
Unexpected Loss < 0.01 0.02 0.05 < 0.01 .874 
Unexpected Win -0.04 0.03 -0.36 0.07 .174 
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Table 2.22 
Correlations between measures of personality/gambling severity/behaviour and residual scores of the FRN peak latency. 
  
Total PGSI Score 
(N=31) 
Conscientiousness 
(N=30) 
Emotionality 
(N=30) 
Number of 
Gambling 
Activities 
(N=31) 
Gambling 
Frequency 
(N=30) 
Valence effects (DV: Loss) 
Doors: Unexpected 0.13 0.20 0.30 0.04 -0.13 
Doors: Expected -0.18 0.14 0.11 0.05 -0.06 
Time Estimation: Unexpected 0.05 -0.16 0.13 -0.03 -0.10 
Time Estimation: Expected -0.11 0.15 0.06 -0.20 -0.31 
Expectation effects (DV: Unexpected) 
Doors: Loss 0.31 0.07 0.26 -0.03 -0.12 
Doors: Win 0.07 -0.26 -0.05 -0.28 -0.16 
Time Estimation: Loss 0.06 -0.17 0.05 -0.08 -0.14 
Time Estimation: Win -0.16 0.23 -0.13 -0.31 -0.40 
Sense of control effects: (DV: Time Estimation) 
Loss: Unexpected -0.02 -0.13 0.04 -0.16 -0.27 
Loss: Expected -0.03 0.19 0.02 -0.14 -0.34 
Win: Unexpected -0.17 0.23 -0.12 -0.26 -0.16 
Win: Expected 0.30 -0.21 0.25 0.16 0.03 
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Table 2.23 
Results of the Multiple Regression Analysis using average difference wave amplitude at 
C14 and C13 to predict Gambling Frequency and Number of Gambling Activities. 
 B SE B β sr2 p 
Gambling Frequency      
Doors Task 
    
 
C14: R2 = 0.02, F (2,27) =0.32 , p = .730 
Expected -2.70 3.63 -0.17 0.02 .463 
Unexpected 1.60 2.48 0.15 0.02 .525 
C13: R2 = 0.04, F (2,27) = 0.56, p =.580 
Expected -2.41 2.91 -0.18 0.02 .414 
Unexpected 2.56 2.62 0.21 0.03 .337 
Time Estimation Task 
C14: R2 = 0.14, F (2,27) = 2.13, p =.138 
Expected 4.04 1.99 0.37 0.13 .052 
Unexpected -1.5 1.81 -0.15 0.02 .415 
C13: R2 = 0.08, F (2,27) = 1.17, p =.327 
Expected 3.21 2.10 0.29 0.08 .138 
Unexpected -0.49 1.83 -0.05 < 0.01 .793 
Number of Gambling Activities 
Doors Task 
    
 
C14: R2 = 0.07, F (2,28) = 0.97, p = .392 
Expected 0.49 1.05 0.10 < 0.01 .641 
Unexpected 0.60 0.72 0.18 0.02 .409 
C13: R2 = 0.07, F (2,28) = 1.10, p = .347 
Expected 0.46 0.83 0.12 0.01 .580 
Unexpected 0.68 0.76 0.19 0.03 .378 
Time Estimation Task 
C14: R2 = 0.13, F (2,28) = 2.00, p = .155 
Expected 1.17 0.59 0.36 0.12 .057 
Unexpected -0.35 0.54 -0.12 0.01 .520 
C13: R2 = 0.10, F (2,28) = 1.48, p =.244 
Expected 1.03 0.60 0.32 0.10 .096 
Unexpected -0.21 0.53 -0.07 0.01 .692 
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Study 1 Research Ethics Board Clearance Certificate 
  
243 
Study 2 Research Ethics Board Clearance Certificate 
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Date: 
Project Title: Brainwave Responses to Winning Money 
Principal Investigator: 
Angela Dzyundzyak, PhD Candidate 
Department of Psychology 
Brock University 
905-688-5550 x3034, ad03cr@brocku.ca 
Faculty Supervisor: 
S.J. Segalowitz, Professor 
Department of Psychology 
Brock University 
(905) 688-5550 Ext. 3465, 
ssegalowitz@brocku.ca 
INVITATION 
You are invited to participate in a study that involves research. The purpose of this study is to 
measure brain activity while performing a computerized task with various levels of 
difficulty. 
 
WHAT’S INVOLVED 
As a participant, you will be asked to answer some questionnaires assessing activity 
preferences and experience in participating in gambling behaviours. Then a brainwave sensor 
net will be placed on your scalp. You will be asked to complete some tasks on the computer 
requiring you to respond with a button press. There are three versions of the task such that 
you are asked to (a) press a button to let computer choose a card for you, (b) pick one of the 
two cards, or (c) respond within allotted amount of time in order to win or avoid losing. Once 
you have responded you will be given feedback indicating whether you won (or avoided a 
loss), or whether you lost (or simply won nothing). Each task will be divided into 6 blocks, 5 
minutes each. After each version of the task the running total will be recorded and at the end 
of the experiment you will draw a number of the task at random. The amount accumulated 
during that task will be given to you as a monetary reward. Once the computer tasks are 
finished, the sensors will be removed. Participation will take approximately 3 hours of your 
time. 
 
POTENTIAL BENEFITS AND RISKS 
Possible benefits of participation include the chance to see your brain activity on a computer 
screen, and ask questions of the researchers about EEG procedures and brain health. There 
are no known or anticipated risks associated with participation in this study. 
 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
All information you provide is considered confidential; your name will not be included or, in 
any other way, associated with the data collected in the study. Furthermore, because our 
interest is in the average responses of the entire group of participants, you will not be 
identified individually in any way in written reports of this research. 
Data collected during this study will be kept for 5 years after final publication of results and 
stored in a limited access area of the Brock Neuropsychology laboratory. Only researchers 
associated with the Brock Neuropsychology laboratory will have access to the data. 
 
VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION 
Participation in this study is voluntary. If you wish, you may decline to answer any questions 
or participate in any component of the study. Further, you may decide to withdraw from this 
study at any time and may do so without any penalty or loss of benefits to which you are 
entitled. Participation hours will be awarded to the nearest half hour. Monetary compensation 
will be based on the amount of money won at the end of the tasks. 
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PUBLICATION OF RESULTS 
Results of this study may be published in professional journals and presented at conferences. 
Feedback about this study will be available through Angela Dzyundzyak 
(ad03cr@brocku.ca). As EEG data takes a long time to analyze, we do not anticipate full 
results of the study to be ready until September 2013. 
 
CONTACT INFORMATION AND ETHICS CLEARANCE 
If you have any questions about this study or require further information, please contact the 
Principal Investigator or the Faculty Supervisor using the contact information provided 
above. This study has been reviewed and received ethics clearance through the Research 
Ethics Board at Brock University (REB #07- 217). If you have any comments or concerns 
about your rights as a research participant, please contact the Research Ethics Office at (905) 
688-5550 Ext. 3035, reb@brocku.ca. 
Thank you for your assistance in this project. 
 
CONSENT FORM 
I agree to participate in the study described above. I have made this decision based on the 
information I have read in the Information-Consent Letter. I have had the opportunity to 
receive any additional details I wanted about the study and understand that I may ask 
questions in the future. I understand that I may withdraw this consent at any time. 
 
I am participating in this experiment for ____ hours of research participation in a psychology 
course as well as monetary reward ($10 to $15). 
 
 
           
   
Signature of participant  Course for participation   Signature of 
experimenter 
 
OR 
 
I am participating in this experiment for a monetary reward ($10 to $15). This experiment 
will not count toward research participation hours in a psychology course. 
 
 
           
   
Signature of participant       Signature of 
experimenter 
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Subject ID __________________         Date: _________________ 
 
1. How old are you?      What is your major/occupation?  
 
2. Sex: M F    What are your goals after the completion of your current degree? 
 
3.  Have you ever been diagnosed/experienced any neurological conditions (e.g. epilepsy, stroke, concussion etc)? 
 
 
4.  Do you smoke cigarettes? Y  N 
If yes, approximately how many a day?  
 
5. Have you experienced any recent stressor (e.g. death in the family, birth of a child, etc)? 
6. For each of these activities, please decide which hand you normally use but checking the box. In each case, imagine that 
you are actually carrying out the activity before answering. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 Always 
Left 
Usually 
Left 
Either 
Hand 
Usually 
Right 
Always 
Right 
Not Sure 
1. Which hand do you use to write?       
2. Which hand is used to throw a ball? 
      
3. Which hand is used to draw? 
      
4. Which hand is used to cut with a knife? 
      
5. Which hand is used to hold a tennis racquet? 
      
6. Hammer in a nail, which hand wields the hammer? 
      
7. Which hand uses scissors? 
      
8. Which hand strikes a match? 
      
9. Thread a needle, which hand moves? 
      
10. Which hand deals the cards? 
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 Problem Gambling Severity Index  
This self-assessment is based on the Canadian Problem Gambling Index. It will give you 
a good idea of whether you need to take corrective action.  
Thinking about the last 12 months…  
 
 
Never Sometimes Most of the time 
Almost 
always 
1. Have you bet more than you could really afford 
to lose?  0 1 2 3 
2. Still thinking about the last 12 months, have you 
needed to gamble with larger amounts of money 
to get the same feeling of excitement?  
0 1 2 3 
3. When you gambled, did you go back another day 
to try to win back the money you lost?  0 1 2 3 
4. Have you borrowed money or sold anything to 
get money to gamble?  0 1 2 3 
5. Have you felt that you might have a problem 
with gambling?  0 1 2 3 
6. Has gambling caused you any health problems, 
including stress or anxiety?  0 1 2 3 
7. Have people criticized your betting or told you 
that you had a gambling problem, regardless of 
whether or not you thought it was true?  
0 1 2 3 
8. Has your gambling caused any financial 
problems for you or your household?  0 1 2 3 
9. Have you felt guilty about the way you gamble 
or what happens when you gamble?  0 1 2 3 
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Gambling Behaviour Questionnaire 
Frequency of the behaviour 
PART  A Please use THIS definition of gambling when you answer the rest of the questions on this survey. 
Gambling is betting / risking money on anything that is valuable to you (e.g, a CD, your bicycle, your 
computer, etc.) on an activity with an uncertain outcome. 
The activities listed below are different types of gambling activities. How many times in the PAST YEAR have 
you done the following: 
 
NEVE
R 
IN 
THE 
PAST 
YEAR 
1-5 
TIMES 
IN 
THE 
PAST 
YEAR 
6-11 
TIMES 
A 
YEAR 
ABOU
T 
ONCE 
A 
MONT
H 
2-3 
TIMES 
A 
MONT
H 
ABOU
T 
ONCE 
A 
WEEK 
2-6 
TIMES 
A 
WEEK 
DAILY 
Played the lottery (i.e., 649, Super 7 or Pick 
3)  
        
Played instant-win or scratch tickets 
        
Bought raffle tickets or fundraising tickets 
        
Played break open or pull tab tickets 
        
Played Sports Select/Pro-line 
        
Played bingo 
        
Bet on TV show outcomes (i.e. Survivor, Big 
Brother, The Bachelor, etc.) 
        
Played cards, board games with family or 
friends for money 
        
Played games of skill such as pool, golf, or 
darts for money 
        
Played arcade or video games for money 
        
Bet/gambled on the internet (i.e., poker, 
fantasy drafts, Facebook sports pools, games, 
etc.) 
        
Flipped coins / played dice games for money 
        
Played slot machines / poker or gambling 
machines / VLTs 
        
Bet on sports teams (e.g., hockey pools, 
football pools, any sports pools, etc.) 
        
Bet on horse races 
        
Played card or dice games at a  casino 
        
Bet on sports with a bookie 
        
Bet money or objects on another 
game/activity that is not listed above (please 
specify): __________________ 
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End of task Questionnaire (NC/SC/FC) 
Please answer the following questions regarding your experiences during the tasks using 
the scales provided. 
1. Were you paying attention to the cues? 
Not at all     All the time 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
2. Were the cues helpful (red/green vs mixed)? Much more 
helpful Not at all     
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
3. How much did you feel that your responses controlled the outcome?/Did you have a 
feeling of control over the outcome? 
Not at all     Very much  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
4. Could you predict the outcome? All the 
time Not at all     
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
5. How often did you feel you would win? 
Not at all     Usually 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
6. How confident were you in your predictions? Very 
confident Not at all     
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
7. Were you paying attention to the feedback (e.g., win, loss)? All the 
time Not at all     
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
8. How often did you feel you would lose?  
Not at all     Usually 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
9. How accurate were you at predicting the outcome? Very 
accurate Not at all     
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
10. Was the feedback helpful? Most of 
the time Not at all     
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
11. How tired/sleepy/bored are you?  
Not at all     Very much 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
12. Did you develop any strategy in your responding? If yes, please explain below. 
13. Do you have any other comments about the task that we did not address? If yes, please use 
the space below to expand 
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Feedback Form: Brainwave Responses to Winning Money 
Dear Participant, 
Thank you for taking part in this study. Without the help of volunteers these types of 
studies could not be done. 
The tasks you’ve completed today are designed to elicit a specific brain wave response - a 
feedback related negativity (FRN), which is a negative deflection in the event-related 
potential waveforms occurring about 200ms after the presentation of feedback (i.e., win or 
loss). This negativity has been found to vary depending on the context of the task, individual 
differences (e.g., sensitivity to punishment) as well as gambling experience. More 
specifically, larger FRNs were found for losses compared to wins (e.g., Gehring & 
Willoughby, 2002; Yeung & Sanfey, 2004) and for unexpected compared to expected 
outcomes (e.g., Bellebaum & Daum, 2008). The FRN is thought to reflect either (a) violation 
of expectation (i.e., larger for unexpected) or (b) failure to meet task goals (i.e., losing). 
Additionally, individuals with problem gambling behaviours showed earlier FRNs compared 
to non-gamblers (Oberg, et al., 2011), suggesting that their brain reacts to feedback 
information in a different way; however, it is unclear why this difference occurs (e.g., due to 
perceiving task gals differently or having different expectations). 
One of the factors that has been shown to contribute to the development of problem 
gambling behaviour is perceived sense of control over the outcome. More specifically the 
higher levels of illusion of control, where individuals incorrectly feel sense of control over 
the outcome, are associated with higher risk for problem gambling behaviour (Johansson, et 
al., 2009). Thus, the purpose of this experiment was to examine the effect of sense of control 
(i.e., having a computer choose a card - No-Control, picking the card - Some-Control or 
responding fast enough - control) and predictive information (i.e., the cues) on the FRN 
amplitude. The results of this experiment will let us identify the best task to use in a follow 
up study examining brain activation of individuals with problem gambling habits. 
Due the nature of the FRN and its sensitivity to probability (i.e., FRN is larger for low 
probability and low-frequency outcomes), we had to ensure comparable number of wins and 
losses across the conditions. In order to do this the outcomes in the tasks were either 
predetermined (No-Control and Some-Control conditions) or had a fixed difficulty level 
(control condition). This design allowed us to examine effects of sense of control and 
minimized any effects outcome frequency would have on the FRN. 
If you would like to learn more about the results of this study you could call Angela 
Dzyundzyak at the 905-688-5550, Ext. 3034, or email her at ad03cr@brocku.ca. It takes a lot 
of time to do the analyses though so the results are not likely to be ready before September 
2013; however, if you are interested in the results feel free to leave your email and we will 
let you know when the results are available. 
If you have any concerns or would like to find out more about gambling-related issues the 
Niagara Alcohol and Drug Assessment Services (NADAS) website is a good resource 
(http://www.nadas.on.ca/). Additionally, NADAS (24-hour on call service: 905-684-1859) as 
well as the Student Development Center at Brock University (ext. 3240 or 5484) offer 
counselling services for individuals with gambling problems. Thank you again for taking 
part. Your help was very much appreciated. 
If you have any issues you would like to discuss regarding your involvement in the study, 
you could call the Brock Research Ethics Board through the Research Office at 905-688-
5550, Ext. 3035. 
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Study 1: Task instructions  
(condition titles were not presented to the participants) 
No Cue/No-Control condition 
“A cue indicating the start of the trial will appear on the screen. The trials are either a 
potential WIN where the worst you can do is not win money, OR a potential LOSS 
trial where the best you can do is avoid losing money. The cue will not inform you of 
the type of trial. 
After the cue, two cards will appear on the screen. Either card can lead to a good 
outcome (win/no loss) or a bad outcome (loss/no win). The computer will chose a 
card for you after you press 4.  
You have to press 4 while the cards are still on the screen. 
The computer will show you which card was chosen by highlighting it with a blue 
border. A red border around the cards indicates that you did not press any button. 
Start with a 4 trial practice.” 
Cue/No-Control condition 
“A cue indicating the start of the trial will appear on the screen. The trials are either a 
potential WIN where the worst you can do is not win money, OR a potential LOSS 
trial where the best you can do is avoid losing money. 
A GREEN cue means it’s a potential WIN trial and RED cues mean it’s a potential 
LOSS trial. 
After the cue, two cards will appear on the screen. Either card can lead to a good 
outcome (win/no loss) or a bad outcome (loss/no win). The computer will chose a 
card for you after you press 4.  
You have to press 4 while the cards are still on the screen. 
The computer will show you which card was chosen by highlighting it with a blue 
border. A red border around the cards indicates that you did not press any button. 
Start with a 4 trial practice.” 
No Cue/Some-Control condition 
“A cue indicating the start of the trial will appear on the screen. The trials are either a 
potential WIN where the worst you can do is not win money, OR a potential LOSS 
trial where the best you can do is avoid losing money. The cue will not inform you of 
the type of trial. 
After the cue, two cards will appear on the screen. Either card can lead to a good 
outcome (win/no loss) or a bad outcome (loss/no win). Your job is to pick a card. 
Press 1 to choose the card on the left.  
Press 4 to choose a card on the right. 
You have to make your decision while the cards are still on the screen. 
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The computer will show you which card was chosen by highlighting it with a blue 
border. A red border around the cards indicates that you did not press any button. 
Start with a 4 trial practice.” 
Cue/Some-Control condition 
“A cue indicating the start of the trial will appear on the screen. The trials are either a 
potential WIN where the worst you can do is not win money, OR a potential LOSS 
trial where the best you can do is avoid losing money. 
A GREEN cue means it’s a potential WIN trial and RED cues mean it’s a potential 
LOSS trial. 
After the cue, two cards will appear on the screen. Either card can lead to a good 
outcome (win/no loss) or a bad outcome (loss/no win). Your job is to pick a card. 
Press 1 to choose the card on the left.  
Press 4 to choose a card on the right. 
You have to make your decision while the cards are still on the screen. 
The computer will show you which card was chosen by highlighting it with a blue 
border. A red border around the cards indicates that you did not press any button. 
Start with a 4 trial practice.” 
 
No Cue/Full-Control condition 
“A cue indicating the start of the trial will appear on the screen. The trials are either a 
potential WIN where the worst you can do is not win money, OR a potential LOSS 
trial where the best you can do is avoid losing money. The cue will not inform you of 
the type of trial. 
After the cue, two cards will appear on the screen. To win or to avoid losing press 4 
WHILE THE TWO CARDS ARE STILL ON THE SCREEN. 
The two cards will reappear with a blue border to indicate that your response has 
been acknowledged by the computer. A red border around the cards indicates that 
you did not press any button. 
Start with a 4 trial practice.” 
 
Cue/Full-Control condition 
“A cue indicating the start of the trial will appear on the screen. The trials are either a 
potential WIN where the worst you can do is not win money,  OR a potential LOSS 
trial where the best you can do is avoid losing money. 
A GREEN cue means it’s a potential WIN trial and RED cues mean it’s a potential 
LOSS trial. 
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After the cue, two cards will appear on the screen. To win or to avoid losing press 4 
WHILE THE TWO CARDS ARE STILL ON THE SCREEN. 
The two cards will reappear with a blue border to indicate that your response has 
been acknowledged by the computer. A red border around the cards indicates that 
you did not press any button. 
Start with a 4 trial practice.” 
256 
Study 1: Counterbalancing order 
Order # Experiment 1 Experiment 2 
1 
1. No-Control: (a) Cue (b) No Cue 1. No-Control 
2. Some-Control: (a) Cue (b) No Cue 2. Some-Control: (a) Cue (b) No Cue 
3. Full-Control: (a) Cue (b) No Cue 3. Full-Control: (a) Cue (b) No Cue 
2 
1. No-Control:  (a) Cue (b) No Cue 1. No-Control 
2. Full-Control: (a) Cue (b) No Cue 2. Full-Control: (a) Cue (b) No Cue 
3. Some-Control: (a) Cue (b) No Cue 3. Some-Control: (a) Cue (b) No Cue 
3 
1. Some-Control: (a) Cue (b) No Cue 1. Some-Control: (a) Cue (b) No Cue 
2. Full-Control: (a) Cue (b) No Cue 2. Full-Control: (a) Cue (b) No Cue 
3. No-Control: (a) Cue (b) No Cue 3. No-Control 
4 
1. Some-Control: (a) Cue (b) No Cue 1. Some-Control: (a) Cue (b) No Cue 
2. No-Control: (a) Cue (b) No Cue 2. No-Control 
3. Full-Control: (a) Cue (b) No Cue 3. Full-Control: (a) Cue (b) No Cue 
5 
1. Full-Control: (a) Cue (b) No Cue 1. Full-Control: (a) Cue (b) No Cue 
2. No-Control: (a) Cue (b) No Cue 2. No-Control 
3. Some-Control: (a) Cue (b) No Cue 3. Some-Control: (a) Cue (b) No Cue 
6 
1. Full-Control: (a) Cue (b) No Cue 1. Full-Control: (a) Cue (b) No Cue 
2. Some-Control: (a) Cue (b) No Cue 2. Some-Control: (a) Cue (b) No Cue 
3. No-Control: (a) Cue (b) No Cue 3. No-Control 
7 
1. No-Control: (a) No Cue (b) Cue 1. No-Control 
2. Some-Control: (a) No Cue (b) Cue 2. Some-Control: (a) No Cue (b) Cue 
3. Full-Control: (a) No Cue (b) Cue 3. Full-Control: (a) No Cue (b) Cue 
8 
1. No-Control: (a) No Cue (b) Cue 1. No-Control 
2. Full-Control: (a) No Cue (b) Cue 2. Full-Control: (a) No Cue (b) Cue 
3. Some-Control: (a) No Cue (b) Cue 3. Some-Control: (a) No Cue (b) Cue 
9 
1. Some-Control: (a) No Cue (b) Cue 1. Some-Control: (a) No Cue (b) Cue 
2. Full-Control: (a) No Cue (b) Cue 2. Full-Control: (a) No Cue (b) Cue 
3. No-Control: (a) No Cue (b) Cue 3. No-Control 
10 
1. Some-Control: (a) No Cue (b) Cue 1. Some-Control: (a) No Cue (b) Cue 
2. No-Control: (a) No Cue (b) Cue 2. No-Control 
3. Full-Control: (a) No Cue (b) Cue 3. Full-Control: (a) No Cue (b) Cue 
11 
1. Full-Control: (a) No Cue (b) Cue 1. Full-Control: (a) No Cue (b) Cue 
2. No-Control: (a) No Cue (b) Cue 2. No-Control 
3. Some-Control: (a) No Cue (b) Cue 3. Some-Control: (a) No Cue (b) Cue 
12 
1. Full-Control: (a) No Cue (b) Cue 1. Full-Control: (a) No Cue (b) Cue 
2. Some-Control: (a) No Cue (b) Cue 2. Some-Control: (a) No Cue (b) Cue 
3. No-Control: (a) No Cue (b) Cue 3. No-Control 
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Study 1: Visual Angles 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Vertical Horizontal Presentation on the screen 
Cue 5.06 5.06 
 
Target 5.06 11.89 
 
Feedback    
Win 1.05 3.25 
 
Loss 1.05 4.20 
 
No Win 1.05 6.49 
 
No Loss 1.05 7.44 
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Study 1: Average number of trials used for FRN analysis in each condition (after artifact 
rejection). 
Wave 1 
Cue No Cue 
Win 
(Win/No Loss) 
Loss 
(Loss/No Win) 
Win 
(Win/No Loss) 
Loss 
(Loss/No Win) 
No-Control 70 52 70 51 
range: 57-78 46-57 33-80 32-56 
Some-Control 59 62 60 61 
range: 48-68 54-70 50-69 55-71 
Full-Control 81 47 80 46 
range: 73-89 35-54 73-89 33-52 
 
Wave 2 
Cue No Cue 
Win 
(Win/No Loss) 
Loss 
(Loss/No Win) 
Win 
(Win/No Loss) 
Loss 
(Loss/No Win) 
No-Control 72 51 -- -- 
range: 52-83 36-57 -- -- 
Some-Control 60 62 61 63 
range: 48-78 53-69 55-70 52-73 
Full-Control 81 52 82 53 
range: 70-91 46-60 73-91 47-58 
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128 channel Biosemi Montage  
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Figure 2.X. Averaged ERP waveforms for the two types of cues and two types of 
outcomes received in the No Control versions of the task Experiment 1. 
 
  
No Control 
Cue – Loss No Cue – Loss 
Cue – Win No Cue – Win 
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Figure 2.7. Averaged ERP waveforms for the two types of cues and two types of 
outcomes received in the Some Control versions of the task Experiment 1. 
 
  
Some Control 
Cue – Loss No Cue – Loss 
Cue – Win No Cue – Win 
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Figure 2.8. Averaged ERP waveforms for the two types of cues and two types of 
outcomes received in the Full Control versions of the task in Experiment 1. 
  
Full Control 
Cue – Loss No Cue – Loss 
Cue – Win No Cue – Win 
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Figure 2.10. Averaged ERP waveforms for the two types of cues and two types of 
outcomes received in the No Control versions of the task observed in Experiment 2 
No Control 
Cue – Loss Cue – Win 
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Figure 2.11. Averaged ERP waveforms for the two types of cues and two types of 
outcomes received in the Some Control versions of the task observed in Experiment 2 
Some Control 
Cue – Loss No Cue – Loss 
Cue – Win No Cue – Win 
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Figure 2.12. Averaged ERP waveforms for the two types of cues and two types of 
outcomes received in the Full Control versions of the task observed in Experiment 2. 
 
Full Control 
Cue – Loss No Cue – Loss 
Cue – Win No Cue – Win 
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Informed Consent Form 
 
Date:    
 
Project Title: The Role of Reward in Brain Electrical Responses 
 
Investigator Investigator Faculty Supervisor 
Angela Dzyundzyak Diane Santesso S.J. Segalowitz, Professor  
Department of Psychology  
Brock University  
905-688-5550 x3034, 
ad03cr@brocku.ca 
Gambling Research Team 
University of Waterloo 
519-888-4567 Ext. 31302, 
dlsantesso@yahoo.com 
Department of Psychology  
Brock University 
(905) 688-5550 Ext. 3465, 
ssegalowitz@brocku.ca 
 
INVITATION 
You are invited to participate in a study that involves research. The purpose of this study is to 
measure brain activity while performing a computerized task as well as examine personal style 
and an individual’s experiences relate to the brain patterns. 
WHAT’S INVOLVED 
As a participant, you will be asked to answer some questionnaires assessing activity preferences 
and experience in participating in gambling behaviors. Then a brainwave sensor net will be 
placed on your scalp. You will be asked to complete two tasks on the computer. In one of the 
tasks, you will be asked to estimate one second interval after disappearance of a cue. This task 
will have three types of trials (easy, normal and hard) and you will be given feedback on your 
performance (correct or incorrect) at the end of each trial. This task will be divided into 8 blocks, 
5 minutes each. In the second task you will be asked to make a choice between four doors, each 
one of which can contain a reward. In some cases one, two or three doors can contain a reward. 
After your choice, you will be asked to estimate if you’ve won or lost on the trial. Once the 
response is made you will be shown if you’ve won or lost on the trial. This task will be divided 
into 12 blocks and the running total of your winnings will be shown at the end of each block. 
You will have an opportunity to take a break every 5 minutes, and a longer break between the 
two tasks.  Once the computer tasks are finished, the sensors will be removed. Participation will 
take approximately 3 hours of your time.  
POTENTIAL BENEFITS AND RISKS 
Possible benefits of participation include the chance to see your brain activity on a computer 
screen, and ask questions of the researchers about EEG procedures and brain health. There are no 
known or anticipated risks associated with participation in this study. 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
All information you provide is considered confidential; your name will not be included or, in any 
other way, associated with the data collected in the study. Furthermore, because our interest is in 
the average responses of the entire group of participants, you will not be identified individually in 
any way in written reports of this research. 
DATA STORAGE AND USE 
Data collected during this study will be kept for 7 years after final publication of results and 
stored in a limited access area of the Brock Neuropsychology laboratory. Only researchers 
associated with the Brock Neuropsychology laboratory will have access to the data.   
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VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION 
Participation in this study is voluntary. If you wish, you may decline to answer any questions or 
participate in any component of the study. Further, you may decide to withdraw from this study 
at any time and may do so without any penalty or loss of benefits to which you are entitled. 
Monetary compensation will be based on the amount of money won at the end of the tasks. 
PUBLICATION OF RESULTS 
Results of this study may be published in professional journals and presented at conferences. 
Feedback about this study will be available through Angela Dzyundzyak (ad03cr@brocku.ca). 
As EEG data takes a long time to analyze, we do not anticipate full results of the study to be 
ready until September 2013. 
CONTACT INFORMATION AND ETHICS CLEARANCE 
If you have any questions about this study or require further information, please contact the 
Principal Investigator or the Faculty Supervisor using the contact information provided above. 
This study has been reviewed and received ethics clearance through the Research Ethics Board at 
Brock University (REB #11-224).  If you have any comments or concerns about your rights as a 
research participant, please contact the Research Ethics Office at (905) 688-5550 Ext. 3035, 
reb@brocku.ca.  
Thank you for your assistance in this project.  
CONSENT FORM 
I agree to participate in the study described above. I have made this decision based on the 
information I have read in the Information-Consent Letter. I have had the opportunity to receive 
any additional details I wanted about the study and understand that I may ask questions in the 
future. I understand that I may withdraw this consent at any time. 
 
I am participating in this experiment for a monetary reward ($40 for participation and up to $25 
depending on performance on the tasks). This experiment will not count toward research 
participation hours in a psychology course. 
_________________________________  
 ___________________________ 
Signature of participant        Signature of experimenter 
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Subject ID __________________         Date: _________________ 
 
7. How old are you?      What is your major/occupation?  
 
8. Sex: M F    What are your goals after the completion of your current degree? 
 
9.  Have you ever been diagnosed/experienced any neurological conditions (e.g. epilepsy, stroke, concussion etc)? 
 
 
10.  Do you smoke cigarettes? Y  N 
If yes, approximately how many a day?  
 
11. Have you experienced any recent stressor (e.g. death in the family, birth of a child, etc)? 
12. For each of these activities, please decide which hand you normally use but checking the box. In each case, imagine that 
you are actually carrying out the activity before answering. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 Always 
Left 
Usually 
Left 
Either 
Hand 
Usually 
Right 
Always 
Right 
Not Sure 
1. Which hand do you use to write?       
2. Which hand is used to throw a ball? 
      
3. Which hand is used to draw? 
      
4. Which hand is used to cut with a knife? 
      
5. Which hand is used to hold a tennis racquet? 
      
6. Hammer in a nail, which hand wields the hammer? 
      
7. Which hand uses scissors? 
      
8. Which hand strikes a match? 
      
9. Thread a needle, which hand moves? 
      
10. Which hand deals the cards? 
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 Problem Gambling Severity Index  
This self-assessment is based on the Canadian Problem Gambling Index. It will give you 
a good idea of whether you need to take corrective action.  
 Thinking about the last 12 months…  
 
 
 Never Sometimes Most of the time 
Almost 
always 
1. Have you bet more than you could really afford 
to lose?  0 1 2 3 
2. Still thinking about the last 12 months, have 
you needed to gamble with larger amounts of 
money to get the same feeling of excitement?  
0 1 2 3 
3. When you gambled, did you go back another 
day to try to win back the money you lost?  0 1 2 3 
4. Have you borrowed money or sold anything to 
get money to gamble?  0 1 2 3 
5. Have you felt that you might have a problem 
with gambling?  0 1 2 3 
6. Has gambling caused you any health problems, 
including stress or anxiety?  0 1 2 3 
7. Have people criticized your betting or told you 
that you had a gambling problem, regardless of 
whether or not you thought it was true?  
0 1 2 3 
8. Has your gambling caused any financial 
problems for you or your household?  0 1 2 3 
9. Have you felt guilty about the way you gamble 
or what happens when you gamble?  0 1 2 3 
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Gambling Behaviour Questionnaire 
 
PART  A Please use THIS definition of gambling when you answer the rest of the questions on this survey. 
Gambling is betting / risking money on anything that is valuable to you (e.g, a CD, your bicycle, your 
computer, etc.) on an activity with an uncertain outcome. 
The activities listed below are different types of gambling activities. How many times in the PAST YEAR have 
you done the following: 
 
NEVE
R 
IN 
THE 
PAST 
YEAR 
1-5 
TIMES 
IN 
THE 
PAST 
YEAR 
6-11 
TIMES 
A 
YEAR 
ABOU
T 
ONCE 
A 
MONT
H 
2-3 
TIMES 
A 
MONT
H 
ABOU
T 
ONCE 
A 
WEEK 
2-6 
TIMES 
A 
WEEK 
DAILY 
Played the lottery (i.e., 649, Super 7 or Pick 
3)  
        
Played instant-win or scratch tickets 
        
Bought raffle tickets or fundraising tickets 
        
Played break open or pull tab tickets 
        
Played Sports Select/Pro-line 
        
Played bingo 
        
Bet on TV show outcomes (i.e. Survivor, Big 
Brother, The Bachelor, etc.) 
        
Played cards, board games with family or 
friends for money 
        
Played games of skill such as pool, golf, or 
darts for money 
        
Played arcade or video games for money 
        
Bet/gambled on the internet (i.e., poker, 
fantasy drafts, Facebook sports pools, games, 
etc.) 
        
Flipped coins / played dice games for money 
        
Played slot machines / poker or gambling 
machines / VLTs 
        
Bet on sports teams (e.g., hockey pools, 
football pools, any sports pools, etc.) 
        
Bet on horse races 
        
Played card or dice games at a  casino 
        
Bet on sports with a bookie 
        
Bet money or objects on another 
game/activity that is not listed above (please 
specify): __________________ 
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LOCUS OF CONTROL SCALE 
DEVELOPED BY ROTTER (1989) 
For each item, indicate which sentence you agree with by choosing either sentence (a) or 
sentence (b). Choose which item you agree with the most.  
1. A Children get into trouble because their patents punish them too much. 
B The trouble with most children nowadays is that their parents are too easy with 
them. 
2. A Many of the unhappy things in people's lives are partly due to bad luck.  
B People's misfortunes result from the mistakes they make. 
3. A One of the major reasons why we have wars is because people don't take 
enough interest in politics. 
B There will always be wars, no matter how hard people try to prevent them. 
4. A In the long run people get the respect they deserve in this world  
B Unfortunately, an individual's worth often passes unrecognized no matter how 
hard he tries  
5. A The idea that teachers are unfair to students is nonsense.  
B Most students don't realize the extent to which their grades are influenced by 
accidental happenings.  
6. A Without the right breaks one cannot be an effective leader. 
B Capable people who fail to become leaders hive not taken advantage of their 
opportunities. 
7. A No matter how hard you try some people just don't like you.  
B People who can't get others to like them don't understand how to get along 
with others. 
8. A Heredity plays the major role in determining one's personality  
B It is one's experiences in life which determine what they're like.  
9. A I have often thought that what is going to happen will happen. 
B Trusting to fate has never turned out as well for me as making a decision to 
take a definite course of action.  
10. A In the case of the well-prepared student there is rarely if ever such a thing as an 
unfair test. 
B Many times exam questions tend to be so unrelated to course work that 
studying in really useless.  
11. A Becoming a success is a matter of hard work; luck has little or nothing to do 
with it. 
B Getting a good job depends mainly on being in the right place at the right time.  
12. A The average citizen can have an influence in government decisions.  
B This world is run by the few people in power, and there is not much the little 
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guy can do about it.  
13. A When I make plans, I am almost certain that I can make them work. 
B It is not always wise to plan too far ahead because many things turn out to- be 
a matter of good or bad fortune anyhow. 
14. A There are certain people who are just no good. 
B There is some good in everybody.  
15. A In my case getting what I want has little or nothing to do with luck.  
B Many times we might just as well decide what to do by flipping a coin. 
16. A Who gets to be the boss often depends on who was lucky enough to be in the 
right place first.  
B Getting people to do the right thing depends upon ability, luck has little or 
nothing to do with it.  
17. A As far as world affairs are concerned, most of us are the victims of forces we 
can neither understand, nor control.  
B By taking an active part in political and social affairs the people can control 
world events.  
18. A Most people don't realize the extent to which their lives are controlled by 
accidental happenings.  
B There really is no such thing as "luck."  
19. A One should always be willing to admit mistakes. 
B It is usually best to cover up one's mistakes.  
20. A It is hard to know whether or not a person really likes you. 
B How many friends you have depends upon how nice a person you are.  
21. A In the long run the bad things that happen to us are balanced by the good ones.  
B Most misfortunes are the result of lack of ability, ignorance, laziness, or all 
three. 
22. A With enough effort we can wipe out political corruption.  
B It is difficult for people to have much control over the things politicians do in 
office. 
23. A Sometimes I can't understand how teachers arrive at the grades they give.  
B There is a direct connection between how hard 1 study and the grades I get.  
24. A A good leader expects people to decide for themselves what they should do. 
B A good leader makes it clear to everybody what their jobs are. 
25. A Many times 1 feel that I have little influence over the things that happen to me.  
B It is impossible for me to believe that chance or luck plays an important role in 
my life.  
26. A People are lonely because they don't try to be friendly.  
B There's not much use in trying too hard to please people, if they like you, they 
like you. 
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27. A There is too much emphasis on athletics in high school.  
B Team sports are an excellent way to build character. 
28. A What happens to me is my own doing.  
B Sometimes I feel that I don't have enough control over the direction my life is 
taking.  
29. A Most of the time I can't understand why politicians behave the way they do.  
B In the long run the people are responsible for bad government on a national as 
well as on a local level.  
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HEXACO-PI-R 
© Kibeom Lee, Ph.D., & Michael C. Ashton, Ph.D. 
Directions: 
On the following pages you will find a series of statements about you.  Please read each 
statement and decide how much you agree or disagree with that statement.  Then write 
your response in the space next to the statement using the following scale: 
Strongly disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly Agree  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Please answer every statement, even if you are not completely sure of your response.   
 
1.  I would be quite bored by a visit to an art gallery. 
2.  I plan ahead and organize things, to avoid scrambling at the last minute. 
3.  I rarely hold a grudge, even against people who have badly wronged me. 
4.  I feel reasonably satisfied with myself overall. 
5.  I would feel afraid if I had to travel in bad weather conditions. 
6.  I wouldn't use flattery to get a raise or promotion at work, even if I thought it would 
succeed. 7.  I'm interested in learning about the history and politics of other countries. 
8.  I often push myself very hard when trying to achieve a goal. 
9.  People sometimes tell me that I am too critical of others. 
10.  I rarely express my opinions in group meetings. 
11.  I sometimes can't help worrying about little things. 
12.  If I knew that I could never get caught, I would be willing to steal a million dollars. 
13.  I would enjoy creating a work of art, such as a novel, a song, or a painting. 
14.  When working on something, I don't pay much attention to small details. 
15.  People sometimes tell me that I'm too stubborn. 
16.  I prefer jobs that involve active social interaction to those that involve working alone. 
17.  When I suffer from a painful experience, I need someone to make me feel comfortable. 
18.  Having a lot of money is not especially important to me. 
19.  I think that paying attention to radical ideas is a waste of time. 
20.  I make decisions based on the feeling of the moment rather than on careful thought. 
21.  People think of me as someone who has a quick temper. 
22.  On most days, I feel cheerful and optimistic. 
23.  I feel like crying when I see other people crying. 
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24.  I think that I am entitled to more respect than the average person is. 
25.  If I had the opportunity, I would like to attend a classical music concert. 
26.  When working, I sometimes have difficulties due to being disorganized. 
27.  My attitude toward people who have treated me badly is “forgive and forget”. 
28.  I feel that I am an unpopular person. 
29.  When it comes to physical danger, I am very fearful. 
30.  If I want something from someone, I will laugh at that person's worst jokes. 
31.  I’ve never really enjoyed looking through an encyclopedia. 
32.  I do only the minimum amount of work needed to get by.  
33.  I tend to be lenient in judging other people. 
34.  In social situations, I’m usually the one who makes the first move. 
35.  I worry a lot less than most people do. 
36.
. 
 I would never accept a bribe, even if it were very large. 
37.  People have often told me that I have a good imagination. 
38.  I always try to be accurate in my work, even at the expense of time. 
39.  I am usually quite flexible in my opinions when people disagree with me. 
40.  The first thing that I always do in a new place is to make friends. 
41.  I can handle difficult situations without needing emotional support from anyone else. 
42.  I would get a lot of pleasure from owning expensive luxury goods. 
43.  I like people who have unconventional views. 
44.  I make a lot of mistakes because I don’t think before I act. 
45.  Most people tend to get angry more quickly than I do. 
46.  Most people are more upbeat and dynamic than I generally am. 
47.  I feel strong emotions when someone close to me is going away for a long time. 
48.  I want people to know that I am an important person of high status. 
49.  I don’t think of myself as the artistic or creative type. 
50.  People often call me a perfectionist. 
51.  Even when people make a lot of mistakes, I rarely say anything negative. 
52.  I sometimes feel that I am a worthless person. 
53.  Even in an emergency I wouldn’t feel like panicking. 
54.  I wouldn’t pretend to like someone just to get that person to do favors for me. 
55.  I find it boring to discuss philosophy. 
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56.  I prefer to do whatever comes to mind, rather than stick to a plan. 
57.  When people tell me that I’m wrong, my first reaction is to argue with them. 
58.  When I’m in a group of people, I’m often the one who speaks on behalf of the group. 
59.  I remain unemotional even in situations where most people get very sentimental. 
60.  I’d be tempted to use counterfeit money, if I were sure I could get away with it. 
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Doors task 
Please answer the following questions regarding your experiences during the task using 
the scale provided. 
Not at all Rarely Occasionally Sometimes Frequently Usually 
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
1. How often did you win on a 1-cue trial? 0 1 2 3 4 5 
2. How often did you win on a 2-cue trial? 0 1 2 3 4 5 
3. How often did you win on a 3-cue trial? 0 1 2 3 4 5 
4. Did you feel you could predict the outcome? 0 1 2 3 4 5 
5.  How confident were you in your predictions? 0 1 2 3 4 5 
6.  How accurate were you at predicting the outcome? 0 1 2 3 4 5 
7. What was the likelihood of winning on a 1-cue trial? 
(please answer in the space provided, e.g., 30%)  
8. What was the likelihood of winning on a 2-cue trial? 
(please answer in the space provided, e.g., 30%)  
9. What was the likelihood of winning on a 3-cue trial? 
(please answer in the space provided, e.g., 30%)  
10. Did you have any strategy? If yes, please explain below. 
 
 
 
 
11. Do you have any other comments about the task that we did not address? If yes, 
please use the space below to expand. 
           
           
           
          
 
  
281 
Time Estimation task 
Please answer the following questions regarding your experiences during the tasks using 
the scale provided. 
Not at all Rarely Occasionally Sometimes Frequently Usually 
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
1. Were the cues helpful? 0 1 2 3 4 5 
2. Did you have a feeling of control over the outcome? 0 1 2 3 4 5 
3. How often did you feel you would win on an easy cue? 0 1 2 3 4 5 
4. How often did you feel you would lose on a hard trial? 0 1 2 3 4 5 
5.  How confident were you in your predictions? 0 1 2 3 4 5 
6.  How accurate were you at predicting the outcomes? 0 1 2 3 4 5 
7. How hard did you try on an easy cue? 0 1 2 3 4 5 
8. How hard did you try on a hard cue? 0 1 2 3 4 5 
9. Was the feedback helpful? 0 1 2 3 4 5 
10. Please estimate the likelihood of winning on an easy 
trial? (answer in the space provided e.g., 50% of the 
time) 
 
11. Please estimate the likelihood of losing on a hard trial?  
(answer in the space provided e.g., 50% of the time)  
12. Did you have any strategy? If yes, please explain below. 
 
 
 
 
13. Do you have any other comments about the task that we did not address? If yes, 
please use the space below to expand. 
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Feedback Form – Neuropsychology Lab -- Brock University 
Title of Study: The Role of Reward in Brain Electrical Responses  
Dear Participant, 
Thank you for taking part in this study! Without the help of volunteers these types of studies 
could not be done. 
As you are aware, this research study was conducted as collaboration between Brock 
University and University of Waterloo. The purpose of this study was to examine the effects of 
reward expectancy and perceived control over the outcome on brain wave responses, known as 
the event-related potential (ERP).  
Previous research has shown that feedback related negativity (FRN), an ERP component 
observed after presentation of feedback, is sensitive to reward expectations, such that unexpected 
events (wins or losses) lead to a larger FRN amplitude. In this study, we tried to manipulate 
reward expectancy by either varying the probability of an outcome (e.g., 3 out of 4 doors lead to 
wins) or through instructions (e.g., easy trial, where most people win). Although these 
manipulations might have a similar effect on the behavior, both rely on different networks in the 
brain. Currently, the majority of research suggests that FRN can be modulated by stimulus-driven 
information (e.g., probability). We are predicting that the perception of higher probability of 
reward (i.e., just believing you are more likely to win), has a similar effect on the FRN. 
Demonstration of such an effect would suggest that FRN is a reflection of combination of both 
networks (stimulus and psychological state), rather than if a simple stimulus-response pattern.  
In order to differentiate these influences, we want to compare the brain responses to the 
outcome in the two tasks. The ERPs obtained during the doors task will inform us how the brain 
responds to outcomes of different probabilities. In comparison, the time estimation task will 
provide information on the effect of instructions on the brain responses to expected vs. 
unexpected outcomes. It must be noted that in this task, the difficulty of the trials did not change 
with the type of cue. In both tasks the outcomes were predetermined and, thus, do not reflect your 
actual performance. This was necessary to ensure that we have enough trial of each type (e.g., 
win cue, win outcome) for analysis. Additionally, we had to ensure that the frequency of the 
outcomes in the time estimation task were equal across all cues, to eliminate potential influences 
of probability on the brain responses. 
In addition to comparing the tasks, this study examined the role that individual differences play 
in reward prediction. The questionnaires that you have completed were designed to measure 
levels of various individual differences in gambling behaviors as well as personality traits such as 
sensation-seeking, impulsivity and optimistic bias. These data will later be used to examine the 
extent to which individual differences contribute/related to the processing of feedback 
information. As you are aware, all the data will be kept strictly confidential and thus during the 
scoring of the questionnaires you will not be identified in any way.  
If you would like to learn more about the results of this study you could call Angela 
Dzyundzyak at the 905-688-5550, Ext. 3034, or through email (ad03cr@brocku.ca). It takes a lot 
of time to do the analyses though so the results are not likely to be ready before September 2013; 
however, if you are interested in the results feel free to leave your email and we will let you 
know when the results are available. 
If you have any concerns or would like to find out more about gambling-related issues the 
Ontario Problem Gambling website is a good resource (http://www.problemgambling.ca). 
Additionally, Ontario Problem Gambling Helpline (24-hour on call service: 1-888-230-3505) 
offer counseling services for individuals with gambling problems. 
Thank you again for taking part! Your help was very much appreciated.   
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If you have any issues you would like to discuss regarding your involvement in the study, you 
could call the Brock Research Ethics Board through the Research Office at 905-688-5550, Ext. 
3035.  
Angela Dzyundzyak, M.A. Diane Santesso, Ph.D. S.J. Segalowitz, Professor  
Department of Psychology  
Brock University  
905-688-5550 x3034, 
ad03cr@brocku.ca 
Gambling Research Team 
University of Waterloo 
519-888-4567 Ext. 31302, 
dlsantesso@yahoo.com 
Department of Psychology  
Brock University 
(905) 688-5550 Ext. 3465, 
ssegalowitz@brocku.ca 
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Doors Instructions14 
 
“A cue indicating how many doors contain a prize will appear on the screen. 
[A cue of X…means…] 
1 - 1 door contains a prize. 
2 - two doors contain a prize. 
3 - 3 doors contain a prize. 
 
Your job is to pick the door by pressing a button on the response pad.   
The doors correspond to the button in the following order: A, B, C, D. 
[Experimenter points to the buttons from left to right, such that response 1 = door A on 
the left] 
 
Once you choice is made you will be asked "Do you think you will win on this trial?" 
Press 1 for Yes and 4 for No.  [Put Post-Its on the table with “Y” on participant’s left and 
“N” on the right] 
Start with a 6 trial practice.” 
 
 
Time Estimation Instructions15 
 
“For this task you will be asked to estimate time. 
 
A cue, will appear indicating that the trial will be easy or hard.  
[The cue will be a green or a red square] 
 
A GREEN square means the trial will be easy. 
A RED square means the trial will be hard. 
 
After the cue the screen will go blank. 
Press 4 when you think that the screen has been blank for 1 second. 
[So the cue will flash on the screen and when it has disappeared your time starts] 
 
On EASY trials [or green square trials] you will win if you press 4 between 500 and 
1500 ms. 
 
On HARD trials [or red square trials] you will win only if you press 4 exactly at 1 sec. 
[So the green trials are easier because there is a larger window for error. Most people 
tend to do well on the easy ones and not so well on the hard trials] 
Start with a 6 trial practice” 
 
*The last sentence varied slightly between participants to make it sound as a spontaneous 
comments rather than part of the script, but always contained information that others do 
well on easy trials and poorly on hard trials.  
                                                           
14
 Note: [ ] indicate instructions given verbally and not presented on the screen. 
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Study 2: Visual Angles 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Vertical Horizontal  
Time Estimation 
  
 
Cue 5.06 5.06 
 
Win feedback 1.05 3.34 
 
Loss feedback 1.05 4.30 
 
Doors 
  
 
Cue 7.72 18.27 
 
Feedback 5.06 18.27 
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Study 2: Average number of trials used for FRN analysis in each condition (after artifact 
rejection). 
 
Doors Time Estimation 
Win Loss Win  Loss 
Expected 105 68 52 52 
range: 74-152 11-125 36-59 39-60 
Unexpected 41 80 51 51 
range: 6-77 27-153 35-59 33-58 
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Figure 3.4. Average ERP waveforms elicited by the four types of feedback conditions in 
the Doors task (nPG group). 
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Figure 3.5. Average ERP waveforms elicited by the four types of feedback conditions in 
the Time Estimation task (nPG group). 
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Figure 3.6. Average ERP waveforms elicited by the four types of feedback conditions in 
the Doors task (PG group). 
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Figure 3.7. Average ERP waveforms elicited by the four types of feedback conditions in 
the Time Estimation task (PG group). 
 
